United States versus Iran, the war of unequal forces that neither side could win

A simple example of asymmetric warfare: an Iranian drone flies to strike gas facilities in Qatar. The cost of the projectile, depending on the model and year, ranges between about $18,000 and $46,000. A U.S.-made Patriot air-defense interceptor is then launched to destroy it. Each missile of this type costs around $3.5 million. Moreover, to ensure a hit, two interceptors are usually fired. The cost‑benefit ratio of the interception can reach as much as 1 to 10 in favor of the unmanned attacking aircraft. In other words, it is more expensive to shoot down a drone (using kinetic means rather than electronic warfare) than to launch it. This example partly explains what has happened in the war between the United States — alongside Israel — and Iran.

It is a conflict between unequal forces in which the weaker side, the Iranian regime, has managed to stay in the fight through a mix of military capabilities refined over decades, combining both high- and low-cost systems, and a strategy of horizontal escalation (extending the conflict beyond the battlefield — in this case, into the international energy sector through control of maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz) that has upended the coffers of the U.S. Department of Defense and the global economy.

The drone example in Qatar may describe a thwarted attack, but a great deal of ordnance reached its targets during the 39 days of fighting and in the more recent breaches of the ceasefire reached on April 8. Evidence of this is that Iranian bombardment disrupted 17% of Qatar’s liquefied natural gas shipments — around $16.2 billion in revenue.

“Iran was facing a titanic challenge against a much larger and more advanced military,” Steven Feldstein, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, explained in an email exchange. “It quickly realized that fighting on the terms of the United States or Israel would lead to a catastrophic defeat.”

Tehran then activated a decentralized military decision‑making strategy, designed some 20 years ago by General Mohammad Jafari, to compensate for the loss of senior commanders and carry out a multi‑pronged offensive: precision ballistic missiles, low‑cost attack drones, and terror tactics in Gulf waters conducted by the naval arm of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. It is effectively a playbook for confronting the world’s leading military power — one that other conflicts may look to as a model.

Iran’s armed forces have put significant strain on the offensive and defensive capabilities deployed by the United States in the region. It marked the first time that U.S. air‑defense systems stationed in allied Gulf countries came under swarm attacks — that is, coordinated offensives combining unmanned explosive drones and missiles, whether ballistic or cruise, aimed at overwhelming the protective shields of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia.

According to estimates by Mark F. Cancian and Chris H. Park for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the United States used between 3,710 (at the low end) and 4,510 units of seven of the most valuable missiles in its arsenal — alongside munitions such as LUCAS drones and guided bombs. For four of these missile types, the Pentagon is believed to have depleted half its stockpile (including Patriot and THAAD interceptors, highly valued by partners such as Ukraine).

Cancian and Park estimate that replenishing missile inventories to prewar levels could take between one and four years. The resulting strain within the Pentagon had been building from the very first weeks of operations, the most demanding phase for U.S. defense systems deployed in the Gulf. For this reason, the Donald Trump administration, which is pushing for a 40% increase in military spending — up to about $1.4 trillion — has urged U.S. arms manufacturers to produce faster and at lower cost.

Asymmetric warfare is not new. As Feldstein notes, military history offers several examples: Ukraine’s counteroffensive after Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022; phases of the Israeli‑Palestinian conflict; the wars in Afghanistan against both the Soviet and U.S. armies; and the strategy adopted by Algeria’s National Liberation Front in its struggle against France in the 1950s. The difference now is the context. The current confrontation in the Middle East is unfolding amid a boom in low-cost lethal weaponry — led by drones — and within a highly interconnected global economy that is therefore more vulnerable. All this makes the horizontal escalation pursued by Mojtaba Khamenei’s regime and the Revolutionary Guard even more damaging for their adversary.

The U.S. deployment has been massive — the largest since the invasion of Iraq more than two decades ago. Washington sent close to 40% of its operational ships to the Middle East, a force that, with elite troops and amphibious assault vessels, would have been sufficient to put boots on Iranian soil. But that was not the plan.

“[U.S. President Donald] Trump never convinced his supporters, let alone the country, of the need for war, which made the risk of a ground invasion that could stall and lead to significant U.S. casualties politically unacceptable,” said Feldstein.

And without setting foot on enemy territory, it is difficult to secure military gains and declare a clear-cut victory.

This led to a war of attrition. The United States says it struck 13,000 targets with its missiles, drones and guided bombs. Iran, for its part, launched around 1,300 missiles and 4,400 attack drones against Israel, neighboring countries and vessels in Gulf waters. Needless to say, the smaller contender has suffered the greatest losses on the battlefield. Tehran estimates the offensive caused at least $248 billion in losses — 57% of its GDP. The U.S. Central Command in the region has repeatedly claimed it has destroyed a large part of Iran’s missile apparatus, a cornerstone of the country’s defense. The damage has been significant, but there is no evidence that it was decisive.

In early May, The New York Times reported, citing U.S. intelligence sources, that the regime has restored operational access to 30 of the 33 missile bases it maintains along the Strait of Hormuz, as well as 90% of its underground storage and launch facilities. As Matthew Savill of the Royal United Services Institute noted in a brief analysis on Thursday, the peace memorandum reached between Washington and Tehran makes no mention whatsoever of Iran’s ballistic missile program — one of the key war aims for the United States and Israel. It remains, and will continue to be, non-negotiable for the Iranian regime.

Part of the military might Iran has demonstrated stems from the lack of information about its arsenals, launch sites, and production facilities — very different from the enemy’s easily identifiable targets, whether U.S. bases or energy facilities in neighboring countries. Military experts have also questioned the extent of U.S. successes. While U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has released videos of strikes on launchers, weapons factories and military positions, it remains unclear whether each recorded strike fully destroyed the enemy’s capabilities. Without boots on the ground, the assessment is open to speculation.

Horizontal escalation

Iran’s defense forces are estimated to have taken a heavy hit to their inventories, in addition to the loss of at least a dozen senior military commanders. The regime, however, is believed to still hold a stockpile of between 2,500 and 4,400 missiles — enough to sustain its strike capability. A different matter is the element gaining prominence in modern conflict: drones. Iran’s production operates on a large scale—still capable of supplying its Russian ally — and before this war it had around 80,000 of these attack systems in storage.

Despite everything, and on paper, the United States — the world’s leading military power — had the capacity to sustain its operations in the region, including a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, for which it had deployed some 15,000 personnel. But Iran hit the psychological panic button through horizontal escalation on two fronts.

First, the threat of attacks in Gulf waters. As Mike Plunkett, an analyst at the intelligence firm Janes, recently noted, finding a single mine has the same effect as finding many. Maritime traffic was effectively paralyzed by the risk of striking one of these devices — Iran’s stockpiles include between 5,000 and 6,000 naval mines — or being hit by an Iranian drone.

Second, Tehran pushed the limits of the rules of war — largely shaped in the aftermath of World War II — by targeting civilian infrastructure such as energy facilities, airports and even desalination plants. It struck effectively, spreading fear among U.S. allies in the region, who felt exposed.

Feldstein sums up the result of this dual strategy of horizontal escalation succinctly: “Iran vigorously and successfully exploited the psychological cost of the war. The strategy was effective; it established a narrative among U.S. and global audiences that the United States was not achieving its objectives and opened a path for Iran to wait out the United States and settle for a better deal rather than concede in the first weeks and give up significant concessions.” That is what happened.

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