US midterms aren’t the panacea Europeans expect
The EU must continue investing in its defence, deepen the single market, expand its technological capabilities, and confront populism
When Americans vote in the November 3 midterm elections, Europeans will be anxiously awaiting the results. After nearly two years of abuse by the Trump administration, they are understandably eager for a change of course. A strong Democratic showing will send an important signal politically, including the desire to improve ties with scorned allies. Yet Europeans should have measured expectations about what will change for them practically, as it will take time to repair the damage.
If polls are accurate, the Democrats will win the House of Representatives. They are also expected to make gains in the Senate and could control both chambers. This outcome would reflect American unhappiness with the country’s direction, including the impact of tariffs and the Iran war on affordability. From a messaging perspective, a repudiation of Trump — who has informed voters that “I’m on that ballot” — will reassure Europeans who were incredulous at his re-election. And there will be new and returning members eager to engage allies.
The first challenge may be finalizing the results. Across the country, election officials are bracing for potential allegations of fraud, seizure of ballots or machines, and the deployment of ICE agents and even troops to polling stations, despite being clearly unlawful. Courts already rejected Administration efforts to restrict postal ballots, use government funds for political ads, and cross-check voter rolls with immigration records. Breaking a two-decade-long tradition, the U.S. has barred the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) from observing the polls. As a former OSCE observer in Albania and Kosovo, I welcome external scrutiny of U.S. elections and worry this will empower autocrats eager to prevent similar monitoring.
A Democratic Congress will have the greatest impact domestically, with a stronger role in the legislative and appropriations process imposing some policy guardrails. It will also conduct rigorous oversight of the administration, from the merits of its policies to rampant corruption. This won’t be easy, as Trump administration officials flouted decorum and showboated for an audience of one while testifying before a Republican-led Congress. Oversight committees may need to issue subpoenas compelling officials to appear. They may also ask third parties, including companies and foreign governments, to shed public light on private dealings. Although there will be pressure for the House to begin impeachment proceedings, as occurred twice in the first Trump administration, this effort will fail without two-thirds of Senators prepared to convict.
If Democrats win the Senate, they will gain the power to block administration appointees, including judges, ambassadors, and other senior officials. This can help prevent the appointment of unqualified or corrupt nominees. That said, the administration could use mechanisms like “recess appointments” to sidestep the Senate and temporarily place officials in posts without approval.
Despite a desire to course correct on foreign policy, a Democratic Congress will face structural constraints; correspondingly, Trump may double down on his agenda abroad. Iran will likely top the inbox of the next Congress given its deep unpopularity. The current Congress voted repeatedly to constrain Trump on Iran, but he ignored these measures and reporting requirements under the War Powers Resolution. Although a Democratic Congress could refuse to appropriate additional funds for the war, legislators are often loathe to deny money to deployed servicemembers and the annual process for funding the Pentagon is cumbersome. Aware of this possibility, the administration is already pressing Republicans to secure more money during the lame duck session.
Democrats will also face challenges on Ukraine. If a new Congress tries to pass a supplemental appropriations bill, the Administration could refuse to spend the money, as it has done on Ukraine and other congressionally mandated programs. It will also be difficult for Congress to compel the administration to impose tougher penalties on Russia. The current Congress recently passed legislation requiring robust sanctions with overwhelming bipartisan backing. Although Trump signed the law, he just waived most of the sanctions provisions and allowed the release of Russian diesel into global markets.
On tariffs, Congress has delegated significant authority to the president over the years. The current Congress has repeatedly failed to conduct serious oversight or adopt binding legislative controls. There may be an opportunity for progress here, as Democrats and even some Republicans may vote to roll back the most egregious measures. But Europeans should expect further trade chaos, given Trump’s inclination to deploy tariffs in reaction to almost any slight and as a solution to almost any challenge.
Despite the current strain, I remain heartened by Europeans’ faith in America’s ability to turn this political corner and their continued desire to work together on common problems. The next two years will not be easy, and midterm elections should not slow progress on needed reforms. Europeans should continue investing in their own defense, deepening the EU’s single market, expanding tech capabilities, and countering rising populism at home. And as attention shifts to presidential primaries ahead of November 2028 elections and a new administration, Europeans should begin thinking about what they will need from Washington to reset relations. Such steps will make Europe a better partner for a future administration that values the transatlantic alliance or less vulnerable to coercion from a Trump-esque one.
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