The Shield of the Americas, a major opportunity if built well

When Donald Trump signed the Shield of the Americas proclamation at his Doral golf club on Saturday, March 7, the short four-point text was essentially a statement of intent. Although defense ministers had met a couple of days earlier with their U.S. counterpart, Pete Hegseth, the Shield had no dedicated budget, no permanent secretariat and no mechanism to resolve disputes. It was a good name and a photo op of regional leaders with Donald Trump.

Paradoxically, the announcement also served as a lifeline for the former secretary of homeland security, Kristi Noem, who had been dismissed by Trump over mistakes and lavish spending and was immediately named the Shield’s “special envoy,” an ambiguous post created on the spot that reports to the State Department.

Five months later, the Shield is beginning to gain substance. It is now the Americas Counter Cartel Coalition (A3C), which brings together 19 ideologically aligned member countries. For that reason, Brazil and Mexico are not part of it, even though the latter is the main overland route for drugs entering the United States.

The A3C, led by Hegseth, has already held two ministerial forums and must approve a campaign plan in November. At the Panama meeting in early August, several countries offered to lead subregional efforts and to head operations against specific crime networks, showing they are taking the initiative seriously.

Operationally, leadership by the U.S. Southern Command gives the initiative credibility: it has been the region’s military interlocutor for decades, including joint exercises and operational trust. On August 4 it activated the Joint Task Force-Western Hemisphere (JTF-WHEM), which its commander, General Francis L. Donovan, called “the command’s action arm.” General Kevin Jarrard, who had led the U.S. response after the June earthquakes in Venezuela, was put in charge. Whereas Operation Southern Spear, which it replaced, was a maritime interdiction campaign, the new structure could expand to include ground operations.

The Northern Triangle will be key: Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala, which are A3C members, know the problem of transnational criminal structures from the inside. The Honduran case deserves particular attention. A founding country of the March declaration, Honduras has been a logistical corridor for northbound trafficking, and it has become even more so since Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele’s successful campaign against criminal gangs displaced their activities into the neighboring country. Coordinated Central American leadership will be crucial.

In South America, the natural leader is Colombia, recently added to the alliance with the arrival in power of Abelardo de la Espriella. Colombian security forces have operated shoulder to shoulder with U.S. forces for more than a quarter century, since Plan Colombia was conceived under Andrés Pastrana. With that plan, Bogotá and Washington built, from 2000 onward, a relationship between the security forces of both countries that survived several changes of government in both capitals.

That foundation later allowed Álvaro Uribe to defeat the FARC militarily, the hemisphere’s largest guerrilla group, and led to the 2016 Peace Agreement signed by Juan Manuel Santos, who had been Uribe’s defense minister. Twenty years of continuity with three different presidents on each side made Plan Colombia the deepest hemispheric security initiative of recent times, established Colombia as Washington’s closest partner and served as the model for A3C. I write this with the conviction of someone who was part of the bilateral team that designed that program, shepherded it through Washington, and accompanied its initial implementation.

However, there are two areas in which the A3C will need to be especially careful: First, joint operations will have to comply with each country’s national legislation. There will be intense political and legal debates within the countries, but that does not mean a viable and effective framework cannot be built.

Second, there is the budgetary issue. The $1 billion announced for Colombia is an example of the role Washington assigns to the region, but the resources required in this and other countries will have to be approved by Congress. Processing them before the legislative elections on November 3 does not seem viable, among other reasons because the A3C program will only be ready that month and because the White House has many other fronts of debate open in the Capitol. The process will take place in the new Congress elected in November.

That is where the landscape could change. Today, Republicans control the White House, the House, and the Senate. Nothing is written in stone, but many analysts see it as likely that Democrats will retake the House and it is not impossible — though less likely — that they could also win the Senate. The model from The Economist — although it dates from a few months ago — gives Democrats an overwhelming probability in the House, while the Senate remains uncertain. Cook and Sabato — two of Washington’s most-cited campaign rating firms — shifted races toward the Democrats in August, including in Iowa and Texas. A Democratic House or Senate reviewing security assistance to the region will set conditions and demand the predictable: clear rules of engagement, judicial oversight, and human rights safeguards beyond the purely military. That is not an obstacle, but it is the price of obtaining resources in that system.

In that context, A3C members must approve their action plan in November. Latin American capitals, especially Bogotá and those of the Northern Triangle, should submit well-analyzed proposals that are realistic and legally and politically viable.

Today there is the rare opportunity for more than half of the countries in the region to be seated at the same table and working in common cause with Washington. It is a moment Latin American leaders must seize.

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