Carlos Blanco: ‘Change in Venezuela is inevitable, like the fall of the Berlin Wall’

Three months have passed since the U.S. naval deployment in the Caribbean, and the crisis with Venezuela remains unresolved. While opposition leader María Corina Machado participates in international economic forums promoting the country’s investment potential, Donald Trump — her main ally — maintains an ambiguous stance on the next steps.

Meanwhile, over 600,000 Venezuelans in the United States have lost the protection of the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) and are now at risk of being deported. Maduro is facing the most severe crisis of his mandate, yet each passing day is another day in power, even as the arrival of the USS Gerald Ford in Caribbean waters and the launch of Operation Southern Spear seem to signal an imminent checkmate.

From Boston, Carlos Blanco, 78, observes the situation calmly, without rushing to conclusions. For years, he has been one of Machado’s main advisers, though his political career began long before that: in the 1980s, he took on the task of reforming the Venezuelan state to free it from the personalism, concentration of power, and corruption inherited from Venezuela’s oil rentier system. As minister for state reform in Carlos Andrés Pérez’s second government, he rose to prominence. His project was just beginning to bear fruit when Hugo Chávez emerged with a military coup that catapulted him to the presidency six years later. Despite his redemptive and revolutionary rhetoric, Chávez did not eradicate the country’s ills — he multiplied them. His successor, Nicolás Maduro, has deepened the abyss.

All of this matters because, if a transition in Venezuela ultimately occurs, it will require extensive experience to prevent it from descending into a new authoritarianism or further chaos. Blanco has spent nearly two decades outside the country, but he has not missed a single moment of its recent history. He is one of Machado’s closest strategists and interlocutors and could become a key figure in the arduous task of rebuilding a country devastated by a quarter-century of Chavismo.

Question. The change being discussed in Venezuela is very specifically a regime change. What would you say to Venezuelans who have expectations of that change?

Answer. Today there is a new wave of support for change in Venezuela. Although there have been several attempts at change in the last 25 years, a real transition was never achieved. Now, four factors make it more feasible: the 2023 primary elections [where 2.4 million Venezuelans voted] and the 2024 presidential elections [where opposition candidate Edmundo González was recognized as the winner by the U.S. and other countries] strengthened international and national confidence in the opposition leadership. A popular organization has emerged that remains active, despite having to go underground due to the repression following the theft of the July 28 elections.

International support, currently led by the United States, has intensified. This support began with Clinton long before Trump. It was maintained under all subsequent administrations. Today it is stronger than ever and has gained strength from the U.S. military operation in the Caribbean against the Cartel of the Suns.

The fourth element is the regime’s internal fracture: there are significant divisions both in the political sphere — including former allies of Chavismo such as the Communist Party — and within the armed forces and police, although repression by the General Directorate of Military Intelligence (DGCIM) has managed to contain them.

The regime’s main support comes from the police and military structure, along with some armed groups. They are not millions of militia members, as is claimed, but only a few thousand. They can generate terror, but they cannot sustain power. The sum of these factors is driving political change in Venezuela.

Q. There are two main scenarios for what could happen in a transition. One is that an opposition government would go after Chavismo and its facilitators, conducting a major reckoning and dismantling its corrupt framework. The other is that Venezuela would magically be fixed, and we would return to the idyllic, imagined community that existed before Chavismo.

A. It is a very good issue to bring up because it’s not true that we believe the hegemony of one sector, even if it’s the majority, is desirable. We believe there should be diversity. The leadership of María Corina and Edmundo [González] works with most of the country’s political parties, those integrated into the Unitary Platform, and other sectors of Venezuelan society such as the Church, the business community, the labor movement, and Chavista groups with whom we have a relationship.

Q. Some Venezuelans fear an all-powerful María Corina Machado. She has announced that Venezuela will aggressively open itself to foreign investment in all sectors of the economy. It is reasonable to ask in what political framework this openness will be managed if not within a vertical unity. What would you say to those who fear the rise of a new authoritarianism, even of a different type?

A. The first objective is to restore freedom. After an authoritarian regime, democracy does not emerge immediately; it is built gradually. To achieve it, genuine elections and the creation of strong institutions are required, starting with a credible National Electoral Council. This body is essential for renewing the National Assembly and enabling transparent electoral processes in the future. Ultimately, democracy is an orderly process that seeks to restore freedom and stability.

Q. Where does the order begin?

A. The first step is to control the territory and prevent public institutions from continuing to be assaulted under illegitimate control. It is essential to reform the police forces, restructure the Armed Forces, and begin building a reliable judicial system. This requires strong authority, based on the Constitution and the laws, never on authoritarian arbitrariness. Authority and rights are compatible.

Q. How will they achieve this?

A. In the 2024 elections, public employees, police officers, and military personnel voted in an estimated 70/30 split for Edmundo González, just like the rest of the population. This demonstrates the willingness of many officials to protect institutions and facilitate a less traumatic transition for the country. Although doubts remain about the future and about María Corina, the perception that change is necessary prevails. The anticipation and anxiety of becoming a different country are now part of daily life; change has permeated the very core of society.

Q. Many people do not want to get their hopes up and prefer passive waiting over active hope.

A. Skepticism is natural, fueled by past failures, but it is a healthy skepticism: citizens now trust less in promises and rely more on observable facts. Despite the repression, the resistance is persistent and enjoys significant international support, primarily from the United States. The process seeks freedom and needs legitimate authority during the transition. Political openness should facilitate the regime’s departure and the return to democracy. Although internal and external factors, such as the political leadership, international allies, and global events (for example, China’s significant role), influence the Venezuelan situation, the conditions for change are currently favorable.

Q. Machado and her spokespeople have spoken of transition plans for the first 100 hours and the first 100 days. What do these plans entail specifically?

A. In the first 100 hours of the transition, it is crucial to control the territory through citizen participation with the majority support of the Armed Forces and the police. Ensuring food security will be a priority; discussions are already underway with multilateral organizations and governments for an international operation for social support and security. This operation will include the immediate vaccination of children and their return to schools, not only to improve child nutrition but also to facilitate mothers’ return to work. All of this will begin from the very first minute, although some things may not materialize immediately.

Q. A reconstruction and rescue plan.

A. We must move quickly, not only in economic stabilization, but also in growth, prioritizing investments in infrastructure, education, health, and housing. These areas drive development and address urgent social needs. I compare the Venezuelan situation to the end of a major war, like World War II. People regained hope when devastated cities began to be rebuilt. The main challenge is to give the population back the ability to look to the future with optimism.

Q. How will you confront crime and organized crime, considering the presence of guerrillas, mining mafias, drug traffickers, and corrupt military personnel?

A. In the first 100 hours, political prisoners [currently numbering almost 900] will be released immediately and in an organized manner, ensuring their safety is not compromised by the outgoing regime. It is urgent to move forward with institutional reforms, especially the restructuring of the Armed Forces, which must have respected command structures. Bodies like the DGCIM, heavily corrupt and linked to organized crime, require intervention, although honest officers still resist within other police forces. To combat organized crime, we will rely on these loyal members and those who have resisted or even been imprisoned. The entire process must adhere to the Constitution and the laws, maintaining order and peace.

Q. Many of these issues depend on the decisions of Donald Trump, whose commitment to Venezuela remains uncertain. Furthermore, in critical circles, Washington’s accusation that Nicolás Maduro is the leader of the Cartel of the Suns and the Tren de Aragua is interpreted as a political ploy to justify more aggressive measures, such as the deployment of U.S. military forces in the Caribbean and a possible regime change intervention. How does this shape the situation?

A. From the beginning of Chávez’s government, collaboration was established with the [Colombian guerilla group] FARC to allow drug trafficking through Venezuela, with the active participation of military personnel and government ministers, protecting these illicit routes under the guise of weakening “imperialism.” This protection facilitated the growth of drug trafficking and created a network of complicity that involved a large part of the military and police structure. The Armed Forces were then reorganized into key regional “viceroyalties” for drug trafficking; hence the term Cartel of the Suns, which predates Chavismo and describes the close relationship between the military hierarchy and drug trafficking. This intensified under Maduro.

Q. And what about Tren de Aragua?

A. The formation of armed groups, collectives, and gangs with territorial control allowed the Tren de Aragua — a group used by the regime as an instrument of terror — to expand nationally and internationally. Tren de Aragua cells exist in Spain, the United States, and several Latin American countries, and the regime has used it to order assassinations such as that of Lieutenant Ronald Ojeda in Chile and the trafficking of Venezuelan migrant women. The damage caused by this gang has been a part of national life for more than a decade, which is why many Venezuelans have emigrated.

For the international community, Tren de Aragua may be something new, but we have suffered its effects for over a decade. Many Venezuelans left the country because of groups like Tren de Aragua. Therefore, what exists in Venezuela is not a dictatorship like those of Pérez Jiménez, Somoza, and Pinochet, but a criminal organization that has permeated the state, where crime and corruption have become political engines with the goal of international expansion.

Q. How does the U.S. military deployment in the Caribbean connect to the situation in Venezuela?

A. The deployment is a direct response to the Maduro regime’s ties to drug trafficking and the central role of the Cartel of the Suns. A war is being waged in Venezuela, initiated under Chávez and continued by Maduro, supported by international allies such as the Cubans, Russians, Hezbollah, the FARC, and the [Colombian guerilla group] ELN. This war not only affects political dissent but also targets traditional institutions that have been corrupted by the regime.

Q. The criminal state?

A. Exactly. For years, Venezuelans have faced this war almost alone, with only scant diplomatic support, especially during the presidency of Juan Guaidó [the opposition figure who declared himself the president of Venezuela]. International sanctions have been imposed against individuals, groups, companies — like [Venezuela’s state-owned oil company] PDVSA — and the regime, and now the United States has responded militarily in the Caribbean. The human cost has been enormous: since 2014, the repression has left 269 people dead for protesting against Maduro and more than 17,000 detained for political reasons, according to the Venezuelan Penal Forum. It is a war with real victims.

Q. However, the term “war” is problematic, since Venezuela has not experienced a conventional armed civil conflict like Syria. Rather than a civil war, society is up against a criminal regime — not only due to the alleged drug trafficking but also because it has systematically undermined the future of millions of Venezuelans through repression, corruption, and miserable living conditions.

A. Modern wars include psychological and technological operations, not just direct combat. Today in Venezuela, there is a national and international intimidation campaign that is politically isolating the regime. Although this does not guarantee an immediate solution, the international pressure is growing stronger, and allies recognize the need to maintain it. Maduro is cornered.

Q. On another note, do you believe that accusing Maduro of leading criminal organizations and the opposition’s cautious response to the end of TPS, which leaves 600,000 Venezuelans exposed to deportation, reflect a trend in Venezuelan politics where international pressure and diplomatic calculation carry more weight than defending the real interests of citizens, both inside and outside the country?

A. The allegation that Maduro leads the Cartel of the Suns mainly serves as an international political tool rather than the result of an independent judicial investigation. At the same time, the opposition, through María Corina Machado and Edmundo González, has maintained a discreet and pragmatic approach to the TPS issue for months. Unfortunately, we have not obtained the desired results. But that cannot lead us to attempt to dictate U.S. immigration policy. We will not use our migration tragedy to confront the main international ally of the democratic movement. However, the offer made by Edmundo González and María Corina Machado, for which they can be held fully accountable, is that only the freedom of Venezuela will allow for the true protection of the nearly 9 million Venezuelan migrants scattered around the world.

Q. The viability of the transition hinges on Trump, a volatile and erratic leader. It is crucial that decisions be made within weeks; otherwise, the momentum will fizzle out. Maduro seems to be reading Trump and shows no signs of negotiating despite the pressure. What are your thoughts on these factors?

A. The United States has already accepted that negotiating with Maduro is futile and has halted attempts at rapprochement, such as Richard Grenell’s. Trump, more than a cause, is a reflection of current conditions in the United States and the world: societies opt for disruptive leaders when seeking profound changes, with mixed results, as happened with Chávez. For Venezuelans, requesting international support is legitimate and necessary; the fight for freedom cannot rest solely on one society. Simón Bolívar also turned to foreign powers when he fought for independence. It is a duty to seek external support, especially from the United States, given its global influence.

Q. Isn’t that interventionism?

A. The war has been international since Hezbollah, Russia, the ELN, the FARC, and Cuba became involved in Venezuela. We have the support of the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and various Latin American nations. Each contributes what it can. Costa Rica and Ecuador have designated the Cartel of the Suns as a terrorist organization; the United States is deploying a military fleet. The goal is to force Maduro to leave. If this doesn’t happen, things will get worse for him and the regime.

Q. You are considered María Corina Machado’s right-hand man, but you have a long career. In the 1980s and 1990s, you were a technocrat and minister who spearheaded state reforms and institutional modernization. Taking into account everything we’ve discussed, what are the biggest challenges for rebuilding Venezuela?

A. I am just another member of María Corina’s strategic team. That’s what happens to those of us who have lived a long time. My story, in fact, is a long one: as a child, I lived through the unforgettable experience of the fall of the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship, and later I experienced other important periods, such as the democratic struggle and the reform processes, some successful and others not. Today, Venezuela needs to recover its democracy and create solid and transparent institutions. The current movement has the opportunity to propel society toward greater awareness. Civic responsibility consists not only of rights but, above all, of duties, particularly among public servants. I hope that this task can be successfully undertaken.

Q. Political scientist Javier Corrales wrote in The New York Times that the stagnation of the Venezuelan transition is due to the resistance of military personnel and economic groups linked to Maduro, who fear losing their privileges. Do you agree?

A. Yes, there is real resistance to change in Venezuela. Those who would lose privileges and status — many facing international accusations — are the ones most interested in keeping Maduro in power. Maduro uses control mechanisms, resorting to armed groups and violence to intimidate the population. However, I believe there is a deep desire for change capable of overcoming these obstacles. The exact moment is uncertain. But as with the fall of the Berlin Wall: we don’t know when it will be, but we know it will happen. Although the United States is exerting military pressure on the regime, the primary responsibility still lies with the internal forces led by Edmundo González and María Corina Machado.

Q. Latin America faces similar challenges to Venezuela: authoritarianism, corruption, organized crime, and political and social fragmentation. How do you see the future of the region and of Venezuela?

A. Latin America is often seen as the antithesis of the United States, but it is now experiencing a moment of real convergence, not with specific administrations like Trump’s, but in terms of social projects. The region has advantages such as a shared language and the absence of major religious and tribal conflicts; although violence exists, wars between countries are not the norm. After the extreme experience of Venezuela, the region is in the process of rebuilding. Venezuela, given its history, geography, and resources, could become the economic engine and a democratic beacon for Latin America — as it was after 1958, when there were only a handful of democracies in an ocean of dictatorships. For me, Latin America is the future of humanity.

Q. How do you see the role of Colombian President Gustavo Petro and Brazilian President Lula da Silva with respect to Venezuela?

A. Petro has aligned himself with Maduro as part of his international strategy to confront the United States and distances himself from Maduro when it suits him. As for Lula, he suffers from a historic cowardice: he could have been decisive in Venezuela’s democratic recovery or helped facilitate dialogue, but he didn’t even ensure that the Argentine embassy had proper protection while our colleagues were there. He didn’t send anyone to visit those who had sought asylum.

Therefore, Lula’s stance on Venezuela is neither neutral nor independent, but cowardly, which is unbecoming of his trajectory as a leader capable of transforming the Brazilian Workers’ Party into a modern, democratic popular movement. Now he is transforming it into something that is declining, unable to exercise strong leadership in the region and on the issue of Venezuela, his most problematic neighbor.

Q. If nothing happens with the U.S. naval deployment, would the United States be ridiculed internationally? Could that derail the transition and undermine the opposition leadership?

A. I don’t share that hypothesis. U.S. pressure is already having an effect, as are the attempts to sow internal division. The operation is primarily political, although it has a military component. It seeks to isolate Maduro internationally and send a clear signal to his allies. Its impact is palpable, although I can’t speculate about the future. I prefer to focus on what’s happening right now.

Q. If there’s one hope Venezuelans, both inside and outside the country, have, it’s to reunite in Venezuela for Christmas. But the clock of change is ticking. Will Venezuelans be eating hallacas in Venezuela?

A. What I wouldn’t give!

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