Javier Colomina, NATO representative for the southern flank: ‘The war in Ukraine will end, but the threat from the Sahel will continue’

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg announced on July 23 the appointment of Spanish diplomat Javier Colomina, 49, as Special Representative for the Southern Neighbourhood, aimed at putting the wide arc of instability — from Iraq to the Sahel — back on the agenda. Until now, the endemic problems in this region (the Arab-Israeli conflict, jihadist terrorism, irregular immigration, arms and drug trafficking, climate change) have been overshadowed by the urgent needs of the Eastern flank.

Colomina — who has been NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy since 2021 — believes that his appointment is a unique opportunity for the Alliance to deal with the explosive situation on its southern flank. He is, however, cautious, arguing “NATO cannot enter the region like a bull in a china shop.” He also avoids commenting on the controversy sparked by Giorgia Meloni’s Defence Minister Guido Crosetto, who accused Stoltenberg of “betrayal” for choosing the Spanish diplomat over an Italian. This is his first interview since his appointment in June. It took place last Tuesday near the Rota naval base in the Spanish province of Cádiz, where most of the powerful U.S. fleet in the Meditteranean is based.

Question. Italy says that the fact there is no department for the south devalues the new position.

Answer. During the negotiations it became clear that the countries wanted the post to be part of the current structure, a few for budgetary savings and the majority for efficiency. And this was reflected in the Action Plan approved at the Washington [summit]. Corporately my position hasn’t changed, but I am given an area of much greater scope. My team, which comprises some 80 people, will adapt and be reinforced by a support unit that I have already started creating. NATO is a complicated organization and if you create a free atom, even if you provide it with resources, it will not work if it is not within the machinery.

Q. Italy claims that it should have been given the post...

A. I am not going to talk about Italian politics. The truth is that there is nothing impromptu about this. The process, in which Spain, Italy and Portugal played a major role, began before the Vilnius summit [in July 2023]. There, it was decided to launch a reflection and this led the Secretary General to commission a report from a group of experts who, among other measures, proposed creating this post.

Q. What will change with your appointment?

A. What’s new is that I have a three-pronged action plan. The first is to strengthen practical cooperation and political dialogue with the countries of the South. To do this, we will seek more resources and use those we already have more effectively, such as the Naples hub, which is now purely military and we want it to be civil-military. The second is to incorporate the South into the Alliance’s priorities. The plan is expected to be reviewed annually and this review must be approved by the foreign ministers and submitted to the heads of state and government, so that it will be on the agenda of all the summits. This seems like a bureaucratic thing but it is essential because until now there has not been a permanent focus on the South, only sporadic attention. Lastly, my appointment means that there will be someone pushing for the process to move forward.

Q. NATO continues to lean towards the East, especially with the entry of Sweden and Finland.

A. The East is the main priority and will continue to be so. Nothing competes with that. Russia is part of the DNA of the Alliance, it represents an imminent threat that requires a direct response. Not simple, but a direct response. On the other hand, terrorism is an asymmetric threat that requires a complex response and I am not even sure that NATO should lead it. It should contribute, together with other bodies, to a strategy that includes everything from development cooperation to socio-economic and military measures. It is true that this is not the best time because the region is in a very complicated situation, but it is a real opportunity. We have the will and a plan. And we have never had that before.

Q. Southern countries accuse NATO of double standards. At the summit in Washington, there was a lot of talk about Ukraine, but only Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan talked about Gaza.

A. Others too.

Q. But not NATO.

A. Not NATO as such. I understand the criticism of double standards. We are living in a particularly dramatic situation because we have two ongoing conflicts. We must remember the differences between the two. In Ukraine, one country has decided to attack another without any justification. There is a guilty party and a victim, regardless of historical or cultural considerations. In Gaza, there is first a terrorist attack and a legitimate reaction recognized by the U.N. Charter and the international community. The problem is in what has followed...

Q. In terms of proportionality…

A. NATO has said that the response has to be proportionate, respectful of international law, human rights and with humanitarian assistance [to the civilian population], while we were talking about the release of hostages and self-defense. It is true that there are moments when the countries [of the south] have perceived a double standard because of how something or another was justified.

I will have to explain to them how far we can go to the extent that we do not have an agreed political position [on the Middle East], that this is impossible with the members we have, with a country that does not consider Hamas a terrorist organization [Turkey] and others with a marked pro-Israeli focus in their foreign policy. But, at the same time, credence must be give to the efforts that we are making, which are multiple. We must show that we can continue working on issues of mutual interest, as we are doing with the upcoming launch in Jordan of the first NATO office in the south.

Q. Iraq has asked for the withdrawal of the international coalition led by the United States, but not of the NATO mission.

A. NATO’s mission is advisory, while the coalition against Daesh [Islamic State] is combat. We have requested approval from Iraqi authorities every time the government in Baghdad has changed. It is a fairly successful mission that could serve as a model for other regions, such as the Sahel. NATO has the capacity to mount an operation of this type if there is political will on both sides. Will it happen in the short term? I don’t think so, but at least we will have a structure when it comes to thinking about how to work with these countries and one of the formulas is Iraq.

Q. France, the EU and the U.S. have withdrawn from the Sahel, leaving a vacuum that Russia is filling.

A. China too…

Q. From an economic point of view.

A. China is more present in the region than is often said, and not just economically, but also in terms of security, although it does not have the same visibility as Russia, which has thousands of soldiers.

Q. Is the Sahel the second theater of conflict with Russia?

A. It is a subordinate scenario. The war in Ukraine is now a priority, but it will come to an end, sooner or later. Hopefully it will be sooner rather than later and under the conditions that we all want for the Ukrainians! But the threat coming from the Sahel will continue to be there, it will be with us for a long time. That is why we must do something and we will see what that something is, because it is difficult to get 32 countries to reach an agreement; some of them think that NATO should limit itself to defence, deterrence and little else. But awareness has grown that we have a lot at stake in the Sahel.

Q. Is this a new theater of operations?

A. NATO does not yet see it as a theater of operations and it is possible that it will never see it that way unless the situation changes significantly. One of the lessons we have learned in recent years is that we must work with the countries in the region, try to make them face these challenges and help them with advice and training. It is true that the first thing they ask for is military equipment and that is the only thing that NATO does not do. It coordinates the delivery [of weapons] to Ukraine, but it is the countries that provide them bilaterally.

Q. The EU does finance the purchase of weapons for Kyiv…

A. There is a way to work together. NATO has security know-how that the EU will never have, but the EU, in contrast, does have financial muscle. Putting it all together and not being paternalistic, the countries of the region should lead the fight against these threats… although it is complicated when you have coup governments.

Q. How should these military juntas be dealt with?

A. You have to find a balance between respect for democratic principles and human rights and the needs of realpolitik and security. The answer cannot be to leave these countries out, you have to work with them, but at the same time you have to respond to the military coups that have frustrated nascent democracies.

Q. Where to start?

A. We can work from Mauritania, which is a NATO partner.

Q. It is a peripheral country…

A. It is a very respected country. We will have to try to work from there. To what extent? What NATO can do at this moment is to help in specific fields that complement the action of the EU or bilateral action. We cannot enter like a bull in a china shop, we have to go little by little, talking to everyone.

Q. The French intervention in the Sahel failed…

A. The French effort was admirable in terms of economic investment and loss of life, regardless of whether it had its national priorities. You have to respect the fact that it kept 5,000 soldiers there for a long time, but it was a purely military response and it has become clear that it was neither sufficient nor adequate. We need to work with regional organizations, such as the African Union. We have a military liaison office in Addis Ababa [AU headquarters] that we are reinforcing with civilian personnel and I have already contacted its head of peace and security. I am convinced that NATO can do many things, but not everything. It must do what it knows how to do.

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