China expands its spy networks across the European Union and beyond

Chinese espionage in the European Union and neighboring countries reveals its full scope when certain pieces are connected. The May 20 arrest in Germany of a German couple of Chinese origin who were taking military-technology information from universities is a particularly notable case. But it is only one of many. The episode exposes a strategy of large-scale, coordinated infiltration when placed alongside other arrests in EU member states and neighboring countries. In total, around 30 agents and collaborators have been uncovered in Europe and its vicinity in just the past two years; some were arrested, several expelled, and others are awaiting trial. China typically denies all espionage allegations and describes them as slander.

German MEP Engin Eroglu, a member of the liberal Renew Europe group and chair of the Delegation for Relations with the People’s Republic of China, says by email that China’s intelligence strategy in Europe has become “significantly more professional, broad, and diversified” over the past decade. He explains that whereas it used to focus on traditional military and diplomatic secrets, it now increasingly targets “technological innovations, critical infrastructure, political decision-making processes and networks of Chinese dissidents in Europe.”

The Italian government expelled eight Chinese nationals in March on charges of surveilling and intimidating members of the diaspora. This pattern of harassment, known as China’s “clandestine police stations,” came to light in 2022 when the Dutch government acted against two covert offices in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The NGO that exposed the case, Safeguards Defenders, reported that Beijing had set up 102 unauthorized security offices in 53 countries, including Spain.

Eroglu provides several figures to illustrate Europe’s “structural vulnerability” to Beijing’s influence and espionage operations: “China’s security and intelligence workforce is estimated at between 100,000 and 800,000 personnel, according to various estimates. By comparison, the United States has about 30,000 intelligence officers, and EU member states collectively have approximately 35,000 to 40,000.”

The MEP believes Beijing is interested in future-facing sectors such as semiconductor technology and artificial intelligence. “And Germany, with its strong industrial and research base, remains a key target.”

It was precisely in the EU’s largest economy that, in April 2024, Jiang G., an assistant to far-right MEP Maximilian Krah of Alternative for Germany (AfD), was arrested for spying for China. Around that time, three German citizens identified as Thomas R., Ina R. (a married couple) and Herwig were accused of illegally transferring military and scientific technological know-how to Beijing. They used publicly funded research projects to gather information useful to China’s maritime combat capabilities.

Cutting-edge technology is fertile ground for bribery. About 100 Belgian police officers raided the Brussels offices of Chinese tech giant Huawei in March 2025 and more than 20 lobbyists’ homes. At least eight people were charged in Belgium, including a senior European Huawei executive. All are alleged to have been involved in a scheme designed to prevent a ban on Chinese 5G technology in Europe. In addition, the Belgian public prosecutor asked the European Parliament to lift the immunity of five MEPs.

Belgium already knew how far Beijing could influence local and European politics. In December 2023, an investigation by Le Monde, the Financial Times and Der Spiegel revealed that Frank Creyelman, a veteran politician from the far-right Flemish party Vlaams Belang (VB), had received payments for at least three years (between 2019 and 2022) from China to influence both Belgium and the EU on issues such as the situation of the Uyghur minority and pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong. Creyelman was expelled from the party.

Greek colonel arrested

Traditional espionage that targets scientists and military personnel continues to yield results in the age of artificial intelligence. In Greece, on February 5, Air Force Colonel Christos Flessas, 54, was arrested on accusations of passing information of high strategic interest to China. The officer held a top-level NATO security clearance that allowed him access to highly valuable information.

Greek media reported that the tip about the spy came from the CIA. From there, Greece’s National Intelligence Service (EYP) monitored him for several months. Once arrested, the officer denied all charges until Greek authorities located the encrypted phone his Chinese contact had given him. After that, Flessas — who faces a possible life sentence — confessed to everything. It emerged that the recruitment method resembled other similar cases in Europe: an initial contact via LinkedIn, a trip to China in 2024, and payments in yuan or cryptocurrencies for each piece of information provided.

A two-meter satellite dish

On the same day Colonel Flessas was arrested in Greece, France uncovered another case. Two technicians, aged 27 and 29, who entered France to perform legal work as engineers, were detained. Two other men of Chinese origin with residency in France provided the logistics: a house rented via Airbnb in the Gironde department (southwest France, near Bordeaux). The Paris prosecutor’s office said the aim was to intercept Starlink satellite communications and military data to transmit to China. The agents made the mistake of installing a two-meter satellite dish in the rented property’s garden, which caused interference and knocked out internet service in the area. Neighbors alerted the authorities and the two engineers face up to 15 years in prison.

In Poland, the episode that marked a turning point in the fight against Chinese espionage occurred in 2019 with the arrest of Wang Weijing, a Huawei executive in Warsaw, and Piotr Durbajlo, a former Polish intelligence agent and cybersecurity expert.

After Russia’s invasion of neighboring Ukraine, Warsaw stepped up its counterespionage efforts. And they are paying off. In February, police arrested a 32-year-old Montenegrin citizen at Warsaw’s Chopin Airport who was the subject of a European arrest warrant. The suspect was accused of passing intelligence to China from neighboring Lithuania. That same February, Poland approved restrictions to prevent vehicles made in China from entering protected military facilities.

Henrietta Levin, senior fellow at Spain’s Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, says by videoconference that the EU’s priority should be to secure NATO-critical infrastructure such as ports, water systems, power grids, and communications. Beijing acquired 67% of the Piraeus port’s shares in 2016 — the main Greek port and one of eastern Europe’s largest distribution hubs.

Levin, who was director for China on the White House National Security Council (2023–2024) and U.S. deputy coordinator for China in Global Affairs (2024–2025), also says the electric vehicle issue matters. “Beijing announced [in 2021] restrictions on where Teslas could operate in China in relation to areas sensitive for national security. That is a good indicator of the potential they see in that technology, which are basically computers on wheels.”

There is still no EU-wide legislation banning Chinese electric vehicles from accessing certain facilities. Poland has gone the furthest so far on this issue.

Beyond the EU

Meanwhile, Beijing has not neglected countries close to the European Union. In Norway, a Chinese woman was arrested on May 8 on the island of Andøya, where a space-launch base is located, on suspicion of complicity in a serious espionage attempt related to state secrets, Efe reported. And on May 17, a Chinese national was detained in the same country on the same charge.

But one of the most decisive and explicit counterespionage battles Beijing is fighting is in the United Kingdom, known for its powerful intelligence services. One of the most recent cases resurfaced this month with a jury verdict finding a former immigration officer and his contact guilty of working for Chinese intelligence. They were accused of using access to immigration databases to track dissidents and pro-democracy activists from Hong Kong who had sought refuge in the U.K. And in March, David Taylor, the husband of Labour MP Joani Reid, was arrested, also accused of spying for China.

In 2023, MI5 director general Ken McCallum told parliament that about 20,000 citizens had been approached, with varying degrees of subtlety, by Chinese agents seeking information. The following year, it emerged that the former prince Andrew, brother of King Charles III, desperate to maintain his lavish lifestyle, had for years allowed an alleged spy for the Chinese government to use him to access the U.K.’s highest circles of power.

Last year, British intelligence services prepared a manual for MPs detailing the mechanisms through which they could unknowingly become victims of espionage. The guide provided a thorough description of the activities MPs should report and the suspicions they should raise with security services.

Keir Starmer’s Labour government faces the same dilemma that previous Conservative administrations have confronted: the need to maintain good trade relations with the Asian power. That is why, despite strong pressure from the U.S. government, Starmer approved the project to build a Chinese “super-embassy” in the former Royal Mint building in central London. Parts of the plans presented by the Chinese government, which bought the building in 2018 for around $340 million, show that some of the planned spaces would sit just meters above the fiber-optic cables that carry the City of London’s communications, one of the world’s most important financial centers. With a planned floor area of 20,000 square meters, it would be the largest Chinese embassy on European soil.

Spain remains cautious

Some EU countries, such as Spain, have not publicized the arrest of any Chinese citizen accused of espionage. Spain’s latest annual report from the National Intelligence Department details Russian espionage activity but is much more sparing about the Chinese intelligence service, reports Miguel González. The Spanish government is very cautious about publicly pointing the finger at China. However, sources within Spain’s intelligence services say that Chinese espionage activities are monitored with the same intensity as in other European countries and note that Chinese state-sponsored APTs (advanced persistent threat hackers) are among the most active in the world, alongside Russian and North Korean groups.

From Washington, analyst Levin notes that although commercial dependence on the Asian power will not disappear, Europe is making a mistake by underestimating its own weight and projecting weakness. “China will not take seriously a government that is unwilling to defend its sovereignty,” she says. For the expert, tolerance of operations such as clandestine police stations encourages Beijing to keep pressing harder.

In that complex balance between security and economic benefit, the EU’s major challenge is no longer merely detecting spies but forging a common shield without weakening its considerable commercial muscle.

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