Europe is bridging the ‘collapse’ in US military aid to Ukraine
The countries of northern and western Europe now account for 95% of support for Kyiv

Exactly one year ago, U.S. President Donald Trump announced with great fanfare that he was immediately initiating peace negotiations in Ukraine. It was February 12, and he had just telephoned his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, and Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelenskiy to begin a trilateral dialogue. The war front, about to enter its fourth year, remained at a stalemate in the east of the invaded country. The United States that Trump inherited from Joe Biden had been the largest and principal contributor among the allies to Ukraine’s military and financial defense. Twelve months later, little has changed on the battlefield — and there is still scant progress in negotiations over a cessation of hostilities — but there has been a significant shift in the corridors of power: Washington has almost completely cut off aid to Kyiv, and Europe has taken its place.
The Kiel Institute for the World Economy, founded in Germany more than a century ago, has been monitoring aid flows since the start of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. In its latest assessment, published Wednesday, the think tank states that “Europe has almost offset the collapse in U.S. support.” Specifically, U.S. contributions plummeted by almost 99% last year; those from European partners increased by 59% in financial and humanitarian assistance, and by 67% in military aid. “As a result, total aid in 2025 remained close to previous years,” the institute notes.
With the numbers in hand, it’s clear that Trump has achieved his goal. The Republican leader reiterated in the first months of his presidency that it was Europe’s responsibility to defend Ukraine. He even demanded that Zelenskiy reimburse the money the United States had spent during the first three years of the Russian occupation, a demand he softened with the signing of the minerals trade agreement.
By April 2024, the U.S. Congress had passed five bills for aid valued at approximately $180 billion. However, according to records from the Kiel Institute, Washington spent only $475 million last year on a military package, and nothing on humanitarian or financial aid.
Europe, through the impetus of the European Union — 89% of EU financial and humanitarian aid comes from Brussels via loans, grants, or the proceeds from frozen Russian assets — has taken the reins as a major contributor to Kyiv. However, the amount of military aid provided is far from what allies (including the United States) contributed in 2023, a record year for assistance, and is even 4% lower than the amount provided in the first year of the Russian offensive.
The distribution, however, is uneven. The Kiel Institute points out that Scandinavian and Western European countries, with Germany and the United Kingdom leading the way, account for almost 95% of military aid, far ahead of the southern region where Spain is located — the Spanish government pledged €817 million ($970 million) last November, 75% of which was for military equipment — and Ukraine’s eastern neighbors.
The credit, however, lies with Northern Europe. The German analysis center collects data from 31 allied nations. Of these, the northern countries, including the Scandinavian and Baltic states, represent only 8% of the combined GDP, but contribute 33% of the total arms spending to counter the Russian aggressor. Relative to the size of their economies, the efforts of Norway, Denmark, and Sweden — all three contributing more than 0.6% of their GDP — are far greater than those of Germany, which leads Europe in absolute figures. Spain barely makes the top 20.
The Nordic countries have also innovated in their approach to collaborating with Kyiv. Denmark is a prime example. The formula: Ukraine identifies its arsenal priorities on the front lines; Danish experts assess these needs; and, if Copenhagen approves, the necessary funds are mobilized. This is known as the Danish model. Since July 2024, Denmark has committed €830 million ($986 million) through this type of financing. It has been key, for instance, in the large-scale production of the 2S22 Bohdana howitzer, a gun manufactured by a company in Kramatorsk, in eastern Ukraine, and highly valued in the trenches for its mobility and destructive potential.
Washington has also managed to pass the baton to Europe without its military industry ceasing to supply weapons to Kyiv. Abruptly halting aid to the Ukrainian army carried a clear risk: disrupting the supply chain — European industry could not absorb all of Ukraine’s demand — and thus paving the way for Russian troops to advance on the eastern front. For this reason — thanks to the close relationship between Trump and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte — the PURL mechanism (Ukraine Priority Requirements List) was created. This mechanism allows members of the Alliance and their partners (Australia, New Zealand) to invest in the direct purchase of U.S. weaponry, subject to approval by the allied military command, for almost immediate use in Ukraine.
More than 20 donors participated in the PURL program in 2025 with contributions of more than €3.7 billion for the acquisition of, among other things, Patriot anti-aircraft defense batteries or Himars launchers.
A year of Trump’s intervention on the battlefield and behind the lines in the war in Ukraine has spurred Europe to open new avenues of support for the armed forces of the beleaguered country. European defense companies and the public sector have accelerated their investment plans in the local military industry — giants like Germany’s Rheinmetall have even opened factories on Ukrainian soil — and established joint production agreements such as the one announced this week by Paris and Kyiv.
In turn, and given the dynamism and high levels of production in the Ukrainian defense sector, the Zelenskiy government announced last Sunday the upcoming opening of a dozen production centers on European soil, an open path to the export of its weapons, including the prized land, water, and interceptor drones, which until now had been vetoed by the needs of the war front.
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