Mark Rutte: ‘Russia will remain a threat to Europe even if there is a peace agreement in Ukraine’

Mark Rutte, 58, has traded his seat as prime minister of the Netherlands — a position he held for 14 years — for that of secretary general of a NATO in turmoil due to the Russian threat and the upheaval on the global geopolitical landscape. And as if by magic, the Dutchman has gone from embodying frugality to urging allies to invest more in defense — Spain included. Rutte believes that the prediction that Spain can meet its targets by spending 2.1% of its gross domestic product (GDP), as Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez has suggested, “is not realistic.” “He will soon see that he also needs to spend between 3.4% and 3.6%,” says Rutte in an interview held Monday with EL PAÍS in one of the Alliance’s gleaming offices at its vast headquarters in Brussels.

At a key moment in peace negotiations for Ukraine, the NATO secretary general warns that even if an agreement is signed to end the war launched by Vladimir Putin nearly four years ago, “Russia will remain a long-term threat for a long time.”

Rutte arrives with a confident stride and an almost indelible smile. And in a NATO that watches with caution and side-eye any movement coming from the United States, the Dutchman has left some astonished — and drawn criticism — for his very close relationship with U.S. President Donald Trump, with whom he uses a tone that some consider overly flattering. Such as when he called him “daddy,” praising him for pushing allies to commit to higher defense spending. “I like the guy,” he admits in a conversation with this newspaper and with Sven Christian Schulz from the German outlet RND. “I’m really glad about President Trump’s leadership,” he concludes.

Question. Do you see the Ukraine peace plan more as a farce or as an opportunity?

Answer. What I truly admire about the U.S. president is that, from February onward, he consistently tried first to break the deadlock with Putin and then to end this terrible war. This peace plan on Sunday was the basis for the talks between Ukraine and the U.S. The plan has been a good basis for the discussions. The proposal contains strong elements, and others that need more work and dialogue. That’s what the Ukrainians and the U.S. are doing right now.

Q. Russia wants to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO in the future. Don’t Kyiv and NATO have the right to decide for themselves?

A. Russia has no vote and no veto over who becomes a NATO member. But within NATO, membership requires unanimity. At the Washington summit, we decided that Ukraine is on an irreversible path toward NATO. At the same time, several allies, including the U.S., have said they are currently opposed to Ukraine joining. When you look at the peace plan and want to ensure that Putin never again tries to attack Ukraine, then if NATO membership is not an option, we must at least put in place security guarantees strong enough to make Russia never try again. The first question is how to keep the Ukrainian Armed Forces strong, the second is what a coalition of the willing can provide, and the third is what the U.S. will contribute, since President Trump has said before meeting Putin in Alaska, that he wants to be involved in security guarantees. That discussion is ongoing.

Q. But will the door for Ukraine stay open?

A. The Washington Treaty of 1949 allows any country in the Euro-Atlantic area to join. But without unanimity among all allies, it isn’t possible.

Q. Europeans have not been involved from the beginning in the peace plan. Will Europe only play a role in the peace negotiations when money is needed, like for reconstruction?

A. I disagree, because there is also a European peace plan. Since February, there have been extensive discussions between European allies, the U.S., and Canada to find a path to peace. The coalition of the willing is one result of those conversations, outlining what security guarantees could look like after a peace deal. The U.S. weapons purchases under the so-called PURL program [whereby Europeans buy weapons from Washington for Kyiv] to help Ukraine to stay in the fight also stem from this. And Sunday’s Geneva talks between the security advisers of Europe’s three biggest countries show that there has always been a dialogue.

Q. Do you think it’s possible that the war will end by the end of the year?

A. Of course, we all pray for this war to end as soon as possible. I want to do everything to help implement President Trump’s vision to get this done. I fully share Trump’s view that this meat grinder must be stopped. At this point, around one million Russians have been killed or seriously wounded, and Russia is losing around 20,000 soldiers every month. Can you imagine that, 20,000 every month? These are fathers and sons dying for almost no territorial gain. And many Ukrainian casualties too. This year, Russia has taken only about 1% of Ukrainian territory and advances just a few yards a day. They’ve been trying to capture Pokrovsk for 18 months and still don’t fully control it. More Russians have died trying to take the city than the number of Ukrainians who originally lived there.

Q. But do you have the feeling that we are now in a special situation, which might soon lead to an end of the war?

A. It’s always difficult to predict, but I truly hope peace comes soon. Of course, what happened in Geneva, was served as a base to get the two parties to a real dialogue, and the talks were very successful. But it has to be followed through with more meetings and then there also has to be a discussion separately with the EU and NATO on some issues. So on the way to peace, we are not yet there.

Q. For NATO and especially the Europeans, Russia is a long-term threat. Can you imagine that a peace deal could change that in just a few weeks?

A. No. Russia will remain a long-term threat for a long time. If a Russian president is willing to sacrifice a million of his own people for this fallacy to correct history, we must be prepared. That’s why we need to spend so much more in our defense. A peace plan doesn’t change the assessment that Russia is a long-term threat to Europe.

Q. Spain maintains that it can achieve NATO’s target range with 2.1% of its GDP and therefore has not committed to investing 5% (3.5% in strict defense and 1.5% in security-related spending), as other allies have done. Do you think Spain’s forecast is realistic?

A. No, it’s not realistic. Spain will soon see that it also needs to spend 3.4% to 3.6%. The 2% target from the 2014 Wales summit was plucked from the air. The current 3.5% is rooted in the capability requirements agreed by defense ministers in early June before the summit in The Hague. These are the costs of having 400% more air defense systems, maneuver platforms, long-range missiles, and all the other capabilities Europe and Canada need to defend themselves. Spain says it can do it for 2.1%, but it is the only one that thinks so. The positive part is that Prime Minister Sánchez and his government have committed to 2% this year, which is important. Spain is spending much more on defense, and I want to thank him for that. I also mentioned Spain’s contribution to the PURL initiative, and during [Ukrainian President Volodymyr] Zelenskiy’s visit, Spain announced a much larger package, around €600 million [$695 million]. That’s good news.

Q. Spain is a very active ally in NATO.

A. Exactly, Spain is the framework nation for the forward land forces in Slovakia, for example, and is deployed in many other parts of the alliance. Wherever I go, I meet Spanish soldiers. As a lead in Slovakia, but also participating in many other countries.

Q. But even with all this contribution, President Trump said that Spain might be expelled from NATO because of not meeting the 3.5% target..

A. That’s not on the table. But I expect Spain to deliver on the capability targets. That’s what Prime Minister Sanchez promised me and NATO. I know that he does what he promises, like reaching the 2% this year. I expect the same for reaching the capability targets. When you make the calculation, you will see that you need to spend 3.5%., because 2.1% is not enough.

Q. But is it a good system to give more importance to defense investment than to contributions to missions and operations?

A. Spain is an important ally and is supporting Ukraine. Everything you do in core defense spending is counting into the 2% and also in this new 3.5% target. When you have your Spanish military deployed in Slovakia, that’s all part of the 2% and a few to 3.5%.

Q. Since becoming secretary general, you have met with Trump several times and have received some criticism for your closeness to the U.S. president and for the tone you use. Is the U.S. treated as an equal among NATO members?

A. All allies are equally dear to me and I love them all equally, of course. But we must be honest: the U.S. is by far the most powerful military in the world and the ultimate guarantor of Europe’s security through its nuclear umbrella. It has a massive military presence in Europe and provides key capabilities. So yes, we are all equal, but some are more equal than others, and the U.S. clearly is. And Trump? Yes, I like the guy. We know each other well from my time as prime minister when he was the 45th president. I think he is doing exactly what we need him to do. With the 5% target agreed at the Hague summit, he achieved his biggest foreign-policy success in Europe. What he has done on Ukraine, breaking the deadlock with Putin, the progress on Gaza, striking Iran’s nuclear facilities, and working to resolve conflicts involving India, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and others — he deserves full support. Because it always starts with the U.S. As U.S. president, when Trump picks up the phone to Putin, that really makes a difference. That’s why I think we can all be glad with Trump’s presidency.

Q. You said you like the guy…

A. Yeah, I’m really fond of him, because he is really engaging. He’s pushing the envelope. Would Spain have committed to reaching 2% by the end of this year without him? Would the entire alliance have reached 2%? Would we ever have agreed on 5% in The Hague? So let’s thank him for that.

Q. But he brings a lot of instability, especially to Europe.

A. Instability? I don’t see that, not at all. President Trump is totally committed to Article 5 [mutual defense]. There was this one big irritant he had, we were not spending enough on defense. He is actively resolving conflicts, including Gaza. We held more than 100 meetings of European leaders but in the end it was the U.S. president who broke the deadlock on Gaza with Qatar, Israel, the Palestinians. I’m really glad about President Trumps leadership. Yes, I support him totally.

Q. And what about tone?

A. There’s sometimes a language issue. When I said “daddy,” I did not realize at that moment, what impact that would have. But that’s fine. I mean, it’s a question of taste, whether you say that or not. But it’s my style and people like it or not. But they knew that when they asked me to become secretary general.

Q. Since the summer, new monthly weapons packages for Ukraine have been delivered through the PURL mechanism, in which Europeans buy U.S. weapons. What have these packages achieved?

A. A lot, because this is crucial gear going into Ukraine. Europeans have contributed significantly over the past years, but there are certain capabilities only the U.S. can provide. Ukraine receives roughly $1 billion’s worth of weapons per month. I’m very pleased that Spain has decided to support a package as well. I want to thank the Spanish prime minister and his government for that. It matters for Ukraine’s protection, for saving innocent Ukrainians lives, and for defending infrastructure hit by Russian drones and missiles. It also ensures Ukraine can conduct its own attacks and prevent Russia from being successful in Ukraine.

Q. How many packages do you expect by the end of the year?

A. We will reach around $5 billion by end of this year, so about $1 billion per month. We are on track with delivering all the weapons into Ukraine. But it’s not only the PURL initiative, there is also the Czech ammunition initiative and the Lithuanian and Danish efforts to buy from Ukraine’s defense industry. And European nations are still providing equipment from their own stockpiles. Of course, after three or four years of war, those stockpiles are shrinking, but deliveries are still possible.

Q. The U.S. recently sanctioned Russian oil companies in a surprise move. Are you already seeing any effects?

A. This has a big effect because what President Trump did against Rosneft and Luke oil is also impacting countries like China and India, who are worried about being hit by U.S. sanctions, because they still trade with those companies. This means, we see a first order effect and a second order effect which are considerable. Look what happened the last couple of days in the Russian media: Putin is now seriously deciding to increase taxation. I was a politician and I know the last thing you want to do is raise your taxes because it’s not popular with the voters. So if Putin is now at a point where he has to increase taxes, it tells you a lot about the state of play in Russia. The war against Ukraine is really having an impact on Russian way of life. In the end, it will therefore also reach, no doubt, the elite in Moscow and people will start to call Vladimir Putin asking him: “Yes, of course, we support you, but could you still explain again why this is a good policy?”

Q. Do you think all NATO countries, even countries far away from the Ukrainian battlefield, like Spain, Italy and Portugal, feel the same threat as the Baltic?

A. You know what is the difference between Vilnius and Valencia? Five minutes. It’s five minutes difference between Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania and Valencia, the beautiful city in Spain. The five minutes is the time it takes the latest Russian missiles to reach Spain. These missiles come down with five times the speed of sound. You cannot take them out with conventional interceptors. So whenever you think that it is Lithuania on the eastern flank, and you are somehow safe far away, you are also on the eastern flank. We’re all on the eastern flank. There is no difference anymore.

Q. You met Putin several times during your time as Dutch prime minister. What did you learn about Putin during that time that still helps you today?

A. I learned something fundamental about Russia in general and Vladimir Putin in particular: whenever you make a deal, you must ensure it is in his own interest to stick to it. It’s not just about trust; it’s trust plus. In practice, that means keeping trust low and ensuring the incentives are clear. When it comes to a long-term ceasefire or, preferably, a full peace agreement in Ukraine, we must make sure he will never try again, because he knows the consequences would be devastating for him. That is the core lesson I took away.

Q. Do you remember when you learned this lesson?

A. I had many conversations with Putin, starting with my first visit to Moscow in 2011. He visited me in Amsterdam, we met twice in St. Petersburg and again in Sochi during the Winter Olympics. The invasion of Crimea in March 2014 ended that dialogue, but we had to resume it in July after the downing of MH17 by a Russian missile, when 298 people were killed. For six nights, we held long discussions. I won’t go into details, those conversations also carry a certain expectation of confidentiality, even if they were with Putin.

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