The new, conciliatory Milei: Real change or façade to appease Trump?
The Argentine president is trying to show himself open to seeking consensus after the US bailout and his victory in the legislative elections
“I am the lion! [...] I am the king, I will tear you apart!” goes the song that Argentine President Javier Milei often roars at his rallies. Radiant and somewhat surprised, he repeated it on October 26 to celebrate the far right’s victory in the midterm elections.
In the speech, Milei celebrated the results of the election — his party, La Libertad Avanza (Freedom Advances), won 40% of the vote across Argentina — and indicated his willingness to work with other political groups. “There are dozens of deputies and senators from other parties with whom we can find basic agreements,” he said. “We want to invite the vast majority of governors to discuss these agreements together.”
In just a few words and even fewer minutes, Milei went from lion-like monarch to democratic leader.
In the second half of his term, Milei aims to project a new image: that of a president who no longer attacks both allies and opponents, but rather summons them to dialogue. But his previous attitude is just one of many issues that will make it difficult to sell this image.
Other issues include the resignation, on Friday night, of his chief of ministers, Guillermo Francos, the most skilled negotiator in his administration, and the failure of his attempt to reach out to former president Mauricio Macri. But the main obstacle — the one that casts doubt on the credibility of this new-look Milei — is that the need to broaden the support base of the ultra-right government was an explicit demand from the United States. The Trump administration made this clear when it granted Milei a multibillion-dollar bailout to try to stabilize the Argentine economy ahead of the midterm elections.
Milei entered the elections in a position of marked political weakness — having been soundly defeated by Peronism (Argentine political movement based on Juan Perón’s ideology, combining populism, labor rights, and nationalism) in the provincial elections in Buenos Aires — and with his economic plan in crisis, first needing IMF assistance and later U.S. support. Not even the government expected the outcome of the legislative vote: to beat Peronism by between seven and nine points, depending on how the calculations are done. For many analysts, Trump played a decisive role in the result: not so much due to the success of his economic bailout, but because of his threat to withdraw support if Milei lost. From this perspective, fear of chaos did the rest.
“Peronism in almost the entire country performed as it always does; it didn’t do badly,” explains political scientist Miguel De Luca, a professor at the University of Buenos Aires. “The decisive factor was the concentration of almost all non-Peronist votes behind a single option, something atypical in legislative elections.”
Why did La Libertad Avanza, Milei’s party, manage to monopolize the anti-Peronist vote? Much of the electorate prioritized, above all else, inflation control — the government’s main achievement — “a time horizon in which people struggling can make calculations, a survival strategy,” says De Luca.
According to political scientist Lucas Romero, director of the consulting firm Synopsis, voters were spooked by the possibility of a return of Peronism. “The government experienced several weeks of uncertainty, especially after the electoral defeat in Buenos Aires,” says Romero. “The idea grew that if Milei lost, a ‘Black Monday’ would come and Peronism would return to power. U.S. intervention was the clearest demonstration of the fragility of the situation,” he argues. “All of that created a fertile scenario for strategic voting, allowing the government to attract voters from different forces who do not want Peronism to return.”
After winning the October 26 midterm election, Milei set about giving signals of openness and consensus-building, as repeatedly requested by Trump and U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent. His first concrete act was to lead a meeting last Thursday at the Casa Rosada, the seat of government in Argentina, with the governors of 20 of the country’s 24 provinces. The stated purpose was to start weaving support for the laws and reforms the government hopes to advance in a renewed Congress, where it will have more allies than before. But Milei’s invitation already revealed the limits of this openness: the Peronist governors most critical of the far right were not invited. This included Axel Kicillof, governor of Buenos Aires province, home to nearly 40% of Argentina’s population.
“These gestures lack credibility,” Romero says. “The pressure from the United States was so intense that we can’t know if Milei is truly doing this out of conviction or because he’s being forced to.”
De Luca believes it’s unlikely Milei will change his leadership style. “He’s not a politically savvy figure, he never was. If he didn’t open himself up to forming a coalition government when he was weakest, why would he do it now, when he’s in a stronger position?” he asks.
In addition to meeting with most of Argentina’s governors, Milei also resumed dialogue with Mauricio Macri. The former president’s relationship with Milei has been inconsistent, but his party, PRO, has forged electoral alliances with the far right in some provinces and has been the government’s key ally in Congress.
However, their first meeting ended in frustration: “We couldn’t reach an agreement,” Macri reported on Saturday. In a message on his social media, the former president questioned the announced changes to Milei’s cabinet and the “well-known internal disputes within the government.”
It was no surprise that negotiations between Macri and Milei ran into difficulties. “Macri’s moment has passed,” says De Luca. “If Macri didn’t stand firm when the government needed him, now the situation is much more precarious. Not only have PRO leaders left for La Libertad Avanza, but their voters have already clearly chosen Milei.”
Romero warns that the government’s capacity and willingness to engage in dialogue will largely depend on the outcome of “the internal struggle over the cabinet reshuffle.” The departure of Guillermo Francos, the most conciliatory face of the administration, is a blow to the executive branch’s relationship with the provinces, which he managed. As the new chief of staff, Milei appointed his spokesperson, Manuel Adorni, a close ally of the president’s sister, Karina Milei, who is also secretary general of the presidency.
The other vertex of what Milei calls the “iron triangle,” his closest circle of power, is the influential adviser Santiago Caputo. To maintain balance among the different factions of the far right, Milei is considering how Caputo’s responsibilities will evolve; he currently controls the Justice portfolio and the Intelligence Secretariat.
Last week, Milei insisted that he would personally decide the timing and replacements for his ministers. But Several key resignations came in rapid succession over the past few days. In addition to Francos, Interior Minister Lisandro Catalán resigned on Friday, and five days before the elections, Foreign Minister Gerardo Werthein had also stepped down. Security Minister Patricia Bullrich and Defense Minister Luis Petri will also leave their posts on December 10 to assume their newly elected legislative positions.
How this puzzle is assembled will define the profile of Milei’s second two-year term, the period in which the president promises to begin “building a great Argentina.”
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