Don’t bring sovereignty into it

The outcome of the tug-of-war between Spain and the European Commission concerning the Spanish deficit for 2012 has been a half-percentage-point toughening of the authorized ceiling: 5.3 percent of GDP instead of 5.8. The Eurogroup — and not only “Brussels” — has firmly called Madrid to order.

However much the finance minister pretends that he “welcomes” the news because it involves a wider margin than that promised by the previous government (4.4 percent), the fact is that it constitutes a rebuke for Mariano Rajoy, who announced the new figure, rather gratuitously, as a “sovereign decision.” This sovereignty has dissolved like a sugar cube in water — suggesting several lessons for Spain’s EU policy.

The first is that, contrary to what was initially suggested, the 5.8-percent margin was not agreed upon with the EU authorities. The proof is that the Eurogroup rejected it. Ambiguity, sometimes useful in domestic politics, is less so in a debate with other member states of a supranational institution. In this case, it has served only to produce confusion among the Spanish public.

One must also know with whom one needs to reach agreement. Cordial relations with friendly governments are of little use if you defy the one who is negotiating in the name of them all. Of little use, too, is rhetoric about sovereignty, or the strutting of nationalist sentiment. In a forum characterized by shared sovereignty, it lasts just as long as one meeting. Especially if you announce a unilateral initiative, consisting of flexibilizing a single state’s deficit limit a few minutes after signing a Treaty that tightens the budget rules for all members.

In the future it would be better to avoid these supposed battles between “Spain and Europe,” as if the two were opponents. The fact is that the correction to Rajoy’s government has been administered by an institution, the Eurogroup, of which Spain forms part. To go against its authority is to go against oneself.

These considerations, however, concern only the formal aspect of the episode, although this side of things is fundamental because with greater finesse in procedures and more efficacy in the work of persuasion, Spain might have avoided the rap on the knuckles.

More irksome is that in the content of the discussion and the underlying question, Spain did in fact have powerful arguments, which are still valid. Indeed, it is worse than undesirable to reduce deficit by half in a situation of recession and intense unemployment. Even with the new figure, it will be more than difficult to comply.

Precisely because Spain has good reasons to support the need for flexibility it demanded, it ought to have understood that others have different priorities, little inclination to make exceptions to the rule, and a long-standing aversion to departures from deficit objectives. In such a case, the Popular Party government would have done well to court the complicity of others, rather than confronting them with a fait accompli.