ETA: less than the minimum

Less than what the abertzale radical, separatist left has been demanding, and far less than what the public expects. ETA's latest communiqué says much the same thing as always: an end to violence conditional upon political negotiation. Unlike what the abertzale party Batasuna (outlawed for its terrorist connection) has been demanding, the ceasefire is not unconditional, and the communiqué says nothing to indicate a move toward a definitive laying down of arms.

On the contrary, it is the terrorists who still demand the thing they have been killing for: until this happens, ETA "will not desist from its struggle to bring about the democratic process." What they call a democratic process is in fact a change of the political framework, so as to admit their principal demands: self-determination and Navarre. The communiqué, then, falls far short of what the consensus of democratic political parties considers to be the bare minimum, if Batasuna is to be legalized again.

This puts the ball in the court of the abertzale left. Should it opt to close its eyes, interpreting the announcement as proof of its ability to convince ETA to abandon violence, this will postpone a definitive withdrawal and its own legalization. Alternatively, it will gain credibility if, like the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), it refuses to participate in any negotiation conditioned by ETA.

This is the minimum that can be demanded. For reasons of principle, but also on practical grounds. By this time, a negotiation such as that demanded by ETA is impossible. No government would risk taking such a course after the accumulated experience, which suggests that ETA is more likely to disappear by a decision of its own than through negotiation. The organization will dissolve itself when its leaders reach the conclusion that it is no use going on ? and no one is better placed to persuade them of this than Batasuna.

The Strasbourg Court's ruling in support of Spain's Political Parties Law stems from the view that Batasuna is an "instrument of terrorist strategy." This does not mean that all its members also belong to ETA, but it does mean that the party's actions have enabled the terrorists to give political meaning to their crimes. To recover its legality Batasuna is obliged not only to condemn possible future attacks, but also to renounce any cooperation with the ETA leadership's attempts to derive political profit from its killings through negotiation.

It would be unrealistic to deny that in Batasuna there has been a (self-interested) evolution that has opened a breach in its relations with ETA. The terrorists have waited 10 months before answering the first call for a credible truce, which surely indicates that there has been an internal arm wrestle about its scope. ETA has in fact been obliged to declare a ceasefire. In 1996 there were more than 1,000 acts of violence and vandalism; in 2010 there were 74. The decline of ETA is all too visible, and the main objective should be to deprive its violence of political meaning. The internal breach is the result of unyielding, patient antiterrorist policy. There are reasons for some cautious satisfaction, and also for firmly sticking to the policy.