Trump extends his military tentacles in Latin America
Defense Secretary Hegseth says he does not rule out a military option in Cuba and proposes operations on Colombian soil. Trump’s strategy to control the region is meeting with resistance from Mexico and submission from Central America
The Trump Administration can be accused of many things, but not of hiding its true intentions in Latin America: it aims to control the region. Those U.S. tentacles in what it has traditionally regarded as its backyard extend in various ways, from more or less puppet regimes such as Delcy Rodríguez’s Venezuela to extremely close political alliances such as Javier Milei’s Argentina, and they also include military operations to impose its interests.
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has taken that further by announcing that Colombia’s new government under Abelardo de la Espriella, after just one week in office, has approved U.S. troop operations on Colombian soil. Hegseth also said he does not rule out a military intervention in Cuba. These are new names on the list of Latin American countries where the world’s most powerful military threatens to operate with impunity.
Guadalupe González, an analyst at El Colegio de México, calls the situation a “breaking point.” “The central axis of the United States’ strategy is to restore its preeminence in the Western Hemisphere as the top priority, ahead of other potential conflict zones such as the Middle East, Europe and even Asia. This is a huge novelty,” she adds.
All options, including military ones, are on the table, Hegseth said Wednesday in Panama when asked about the Republican administration’s plans for Cuba. He also urged the island to “pay attention” to Trump’s willingness to “assert American strategic prerogatives.” Shortly before, the Pentagon chief had delivered a message aimed at Colombia.
After the Republican administration’s clashes with the previous president of Colombia, the leftist Gustavo Petro, the rise to power of a far right president heralds a new era of collaboration between Washington and Bogotá. That new phase opens with a two-part announcement. The Defense Secretary — the Department’s official name, though Hegseth prefers to call it the War Department — said, on the one hand, that Colombia had asked the United States to join the fight against narco-terrorism by authorizing joint military operations to destroy terrorists and terrorist networks. And, on the other hand, that the South American country will join the Shield of the Americas, a coalition founded by Trump that with this addition will have 19 countries sharing methods to fight drug-trafficking networks in the region.
None of these statements is a major surprise. The Republican administration’s conception of Latin America became crystal clear with the publication last December of its National Security Strategy. There it bluntly stated that the United States seeks to “restore its preeminence” in the Western Hemisphere. To that end it resurrected the 19th-century Monroe Doctrine, summarized in the phrase “America for the Americans.” Or, in a less literal but truer-to-spirit rendering, “The Americas for the United States.”
“In other words, we will assert and enforce a Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine,” the document said, introducing a new theory that has become known as the Donroe doctrine, a wordplay between Donald and Monroe. According to the text outlining this administration’s priorities, the Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine constitutes “a common-sense and potent restoration of American power and priorities, consistent with American security interests.” The document added that Washington must reconsider its military presence in the Western Hemisphere.
For Michael Shifter, a researcher and former president of the Inter-American Dialogue — one of Washington D.C.’s most influential hemispheric policy think tanks — “the obstacles to a military intervention are not legal factors, because those carry no weight for this administration. What they are measuring are practical factors: in the case of Cuba, an intervention could produce a totally chaotic situation or a massive migration wave,” he explains.
Shifter says the agenda of institutional strengthening and human-rights defense that once existed between the U.S. and Latin America has been completely sidelined in favor of an aggressive strategy focused on security and the fight against drug trafficking. “The whole approach aimed at strengthening institutions and protecting human rights has been overrun, if it hasn’t disappeared altogether. Washington has basically given a green light to any authoritarian project a leader in Latin America might pursue,” Shifter warns. “Today ideology matters less. There is a fairly wide field for right-wing or left-wing regimes to eliminate checks and balances and weaken, if not destroy, the rule of law,” he adds.
Resistance from Mexico
Pressure on the region was sealed last March, when Stephen Miller, Trump’s deputy chief of staff, said that “cartels that operate in this hemisphere are the ISIS and al-Qaeda of this hemisphere and must be treated just as ruthlessly,” remarks that suggested a possible direct military intervention in Mexico. In Washington’s main trading partner, powerful drug organizations such as the Jalisco New Generation Cartel exercise territorial control that the White House deems an unacceptable threat.
Mexican president Claudia Sheinbaum has repeatedly and categorically rejected any proposal or hint of a U.S. military incursion. The president said such a scenario is “not going to happen,” stressing that Mexico cooperates on intelligence and security but will not accept subordination or violations of its sovereignty. “The last time the United States came to Mexico with an intervention it took half the territory,” Sheinbaum recalled, alluding to the 19th-century seizure of the states of Texas, California, New Mexico and Nevada.
Sheinbaum’s response followed Trump’s controversial remarks, in which he declined to rule out the use of force to stop the flow of fentanyl and other drugs northward. “With Mexico it seems that whatever the government does to satisfy Trump is never enough. Unfortunately, this is creating a rather tense and conflictive situation,” Shifter says.
Trump contrasted Mexico’s situation with the operations and extrajudicial attacks against alleged drug-running boats in the Pacific and Caribbean, boasting that “drugs brought in by ocean and by sea are now down 94%.” In his view, Mexico has failed in its commitments against organized crime.
The attacks in the Caribbean and Pacific on vessels suspected of carrying drugs have so far caused the deaths of more than 200 people. According to expert Guadalupe González, these amount to “extrajudicial executions, a unilateral use of force.” Likewise, she speaks of the establishment in Venezuela of a situation of “almost a neo-protectorate.” “The difference with De la Espriella is that the latter case is alignment by invitation, not imposition,” the expert concludes, describing a menu of different formulas used to establish “systems of control and discipline” by the Trump administration. For the moment, Brazil remains outside Washington’s military offensive.
Submission in Central America
If tension and resistance mark the dynamic with Mexico, the opposite is true south of the Mexican border. Central American countries have shown rapid alignment with the Trump security doctrine. Whether out of political calculation or genuine fear of a direct intervention, the region has bent to Washington’s demands. After the capture of Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro on January 3 in Caracas, the Central American isthmus has returned to the center of U.S. geopolitical strategy, forcing a drastic shift in the regional fight against organized crime.
In Guatemala, President Bernardo Arévalo formally requested greater assistance from the White House by letter, seeking training, operational advice and intelligence sharing. That approach was consolidated with a visit from U.S. Southern Command commander General Francis L. Donovan to strengthen bilateral counternarcotics cooperation.
Meanwhile, El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele has become the principal military custodian of the U.S. strategy in the Pacific. Bukele attended the Shield of the Americas summit in March, convened by Trump in Doral, Florida, to consolidate his ideological allies.
In Honduras, President Nasry Asfura, fully aligned with Washington after the support he received during the electoral contest, has promised to reinstate the extradition treaty and fully join the Counter-Cartel Coalition. Asfura’s alignment has not been weakened even after Trump pardoned former president Juan Orlando Hernández, who was convicted in U.S. courts of drug trafficking.
On the ideological opposite, Nicaragua’s authoritarian co-leaders Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo fear becoming the next target of a direct incursion. Under constant pressure from the State Department, the Nicaraguan regime has opted to erect a strict containment wall against drug trafficking to avoid Washington’s blows after Maduro’s fall.
Finally, Costa Rica and Panama complete this regional scheme. Costa Rica president Laura Fernández backed the Miami initiatives, maintaining close cooperation with the DEA and the U.S. Navy at sea. Panama’s José Raúl Mulino has had to balance a complex relationship, especially after Trump suggested retaking control of the Panama Canal — a proposal that sparked widespread indignation in the region. Despite that friction, Panama leads the continent in seizures with more than 43 tonnes seized in the first five months of 2026, showing how, under fear of White House reprisals, the region ends up conforming to Washington’s discipline.
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