Steven Forti, historian: ‘Dissatisfaction among young people is leading to a rejection of democracy’

Nicola Bombacci (1879-1945) was one of the leading socialist figures in interwar Italy. With strong ties to the Soviet Union, he was a founding member of the Italian Communist Party in 1921. However, 25 years later, he was shot and hanged by his feet alongside Benito Mussolini. He had defected to fascism. Some referred to him as “the super-traitor.”

Bombacci is one of the figures explored by historian Steven Forti, 43, in his thesis, which began by exploring revolutionary socialism in Italy. “I wanted to know if there were other similar trajectories in Europe. And I found them,” he explains. His research, which culminated in the book, The Weight of the Nation: Nicola Bombacci, Paul Marion, and Óscar Pérez Solís in Interwar Europe (2015), marked the beginning of his study of fascism and, more importantly, its ability to attract some of its natural enemies from the left.

When far-right movements began to gain traction (with Donald Trump in the United States, Matteo Salvini in Italy, and Brexit in the United Kingdom), Forti became interested in whether we were witnessing the rise of a new fascism. His research into contemporary right-wing movements led to the publication of Extreme Right 2.0 (2021), which was followed by his coordination of the collective volume Myths and Tales of the Extreme Right (2023).

Forti spent a year in Spain as an Erasmus student in 2003, and in 2006, he completed his PhD at the Autonomous University of Barcelona, where he is now a professor in the Department of Modern and Contemporary History. “In [Silvio] Berlusconi’s Italy, research had been heavily cut back, while under [José Luis Rodríguez] Zapatero in Spain, it had been boosted. That was one of the reasons I decided to return,” he says. Forti has just released his new book, Democracies in Extinction: The Specter of Electoral Autocracies.

Question: Is democracy in danger?

Answer. Yes. And after Trump’s victory, we have more reasons to think so. But it’s not just about Trump. Since 2009, all the indices show a wave of de-democratization. More and more countries are moving from being full or partial democracies to autocratic systems. And the reverse [where autocracies become democracies] is happening less and less, which was the norm in the second half of the 20th century. There are different reasons, but one of the key drivers is the extreme right.

Q. How does this process of de-democratization happen?

A. There are different models. There can still be coups d’état, for example, but in general what we see is a hollowing out from within. More or less populist or far-right leaders win elections and gradually centralize power in the executive, the separation of powers disappears, minority rights are curtailed, and also, very importantly, information pluralism disappears.

Q. You consider Viktor Orbán’s model in Hungary to be paradigmatic.

A. Yes, but there are various autocracies, from Iran and China, to Venezuela and Nicaragua, that are not linked to the extreme right. The extreme right is not a definitive cause, but rather a symptom of the crisis facing democratic models. The case of Orbán is paradigmatic for three reasons: first, because he has been in power since 2010; second, because he represents a pattern that many parties want to follow; and third, because he is successful. It is not a post-Soviet republic lost in the middle of Asia, but a member country of the European Union and NATO.

Q. Why do many people, especially young people, say they want an autocratic model?

A. There is growing dissatisfaction with the democratic model across different age groups. It is a complex debate. It depends a lot on how the survey questions are framed. The fact that someone is dissatisfied with democracy doesn’t necessarily mean they are not a democrat. This was evident during the [Spanish anti-austerity movement] 15-M, when there was no authoritarian tension. But in some cases, especially among young people, we are seeing that this dissatisfaction leads to a rejection of democracy.

Q. Why?

A. Often there are material reasons: the social elevator has broken, inequality is increasing, the middle class has shrunk, there is no hope for the future unless you come from a rich family... People begin to wonder if there might be a different solution. Sometimes, two things are in conflict: freedom and the security of making ends meet. In some surveys, people are asked: strong democracy or strong economy? And there we see trends, which began even before the 2008 crisis, where many value the economy more than democracy. This happened in Eastern European countries, and it would also explain the high level of support for [Russian President Vladimir] Putin: after total chaos, Putin has managed to secure economic stability for large segments of society.

Q. Sometimes, it seems like the era of the social state and democracy in the second half of the 20th century will be remembered as just a fleeting moment in history.

A. It is an idea that David Runciman has defended in his book How Democracy Ends. I believe that here we are slaves to a vision of history in which things were always getting better. Democracy, after the end of the Cold War, seemed to be the triumphant system, and also linked to the welfare state. But that is not the case. And the neoliberal revolution also put an end to this.

Q. How do you reverse de-democratization? You mention Poland as an example.

A. It’s difficult. The process of dismantling democracy in Poland was as advanced as in Orbán’s Hungary or [Nayib] Bukele’s El Salvador: Donald Tusk has been in power for a year, after defeating the far-right Law and Justice Party, but he has many problems: it is a very heterogeneous coalition that is generating a certain disenchantment. And, in addition, it is very difficult to reverse the changes, when the previous government had already undermined the separation of powers.

Q. What is the extreme right 2.0?

A. It is an attempt to define today’s extreme right, from Trump and [Italian Prime Minister Georgia] Meloni, to [Argentine President Javier] Milei and [Spanish far-right leader Santiago] Abascal, and Orbán to [French far-right leader Marine] Le Pen. The “2.0″ refers to the fact that we cannot yet label them as fascists, and it highlights the significance of new technologies in their development. While social networks are not the only cause of their rise, they have been crucial in their viralization and normalization.

Q. Conspiracy theories and the esoteric were once more typical of the left. How have they been adopted by the extreme right?

A. In general, the far right capitalizes on distrust better than the left. And now there is a deep distrust of the system in general, and social media networks serve to convey these ideas. The world is increasingly difficult to understand, but conspiracy theories offer a simple explanation, accessible to anyone. That makes your life easier and calms you down a bit.

Q. Speaking of technology: is it better to stay on X or move to Bluesky?

A. The truth is, I hear arguments from both sides, and I’m convinced by both. I understand that we have to leave this X dump, but I also understand that it can’t be left in the hands of the extreme right. I’m in a stand-by phase, trying to see which option may be better.

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