Sinaloa Cartel war is taking its toll on Los Chapitos

There is no publicly available data to quantify this, nor is there an official statement drawing definitive conclusions about whether the internal war within the Sinaloa Cartel is tilting the playing field in favor of either of the two factions, Los Chapitos or La Mayiza, which have been fighting for over a year following the arrest of Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada in the United States. However, these past few months have dealt clear blows to the cartel’s structures, which, according to data from the U.S. government and the few leads from Mexican authorities, have diminished the power of the group led by Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán’s sons. The latest victim — assassinated in the heart of Mexico City — was “El Panu,” a hitman boss and one of the few remaining strongmen still active.

A series of high-profile arrests, murders, and seizures, occurring not only in Sinaloa but also in Jalisco and Mexico City, have fueled the perception that the setbacks being inflicted on Los Chapitos are becoming more frequent and decisive. According to Cecilia Farfán, head of the North American Observatory of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, this perception doesn’t arise from nowhere, but neither can it be supported by hard data.

“We don’t know the profiles; we don’t know how the government determines that someone belongs to one group or another, at least not publicly. So we can’t have hard data and say: 80% belong to this group,” she explains. However, she adds, there are elements that allow for a reasonable conjecture, such as the formal indictment filed by the U.S. government against Los Chapitos for trafficking and producing fentanyl, and the multimillion-dollar rewards offered for information leading to their whereabouts and possible capture. Added to this is the change in the security cooperation relationship between Mexico and Washington and the type of intelligence that this cooperation typically generates. “Generally, what the United States contributes is intelligence, which is telling the Mexican government, ‘So-and-so is in such-and-such place; if you want to arrest him, he’s there.’ It’s not hard to imagine that there’s an emphasis on one faction over another,” Farfán points out.

Behind this emphasis lies an operational logic, based on using limited resources against the groups perceived as being most lethal. “If you direct your actions toward what the public perceives as the source of disorder and violence, that also gives you political leeway to say, ‘I’m doing something, I’m responding,’” Farfán explains.

Los Chapitos’ losses

The security operations of Claudia Sheinbaum’s government have led to the arrest of several heavyweights within Los Chapitos, but they have also revealed that many others have been murdered in a sequence that — in the last 15 months — has affected doormen, administrators, operators, members of the same family, and the group’s production structure.

On November 22, 2023, Nestor Isidro Pérez Salas, alias “El Nini,” the operative who turned violence into a spectacle, was arrested. He was finally captured in November in Colinas de la Rivera, pulled down from a rooftop while trying to escape. From Culiacán, he was sent directly to New York on an extradition order.

In February of this year, Kevin Alonso Gil Acosta, alias “El 200,” an operative for Los Chapitos, was arrested and subsequently extradited to the United States. That same month, José Ángel Canobbio Inzunza, alias “El Güerito,” was also arrested during a joint land and air operation by federal forces in Sinaloa. He was a high-priority target for the United States.

In May, Jorge Humberto Figueroa Benítez, alias “La Perris,” considered the head of security for Los Chapitos, was murdered. The crime occurred during a special operation led by the Mexican army in Navolato, Sinaloa.

The most recent events include the execution in a restaurant in the Zona Rosa district of Mexico City of Óscar Noé Medina González, alias “El Panu,” the last remaining hitman boss, followed by the arrest of Carlos Gabriel Reynoso García, the faction’s leading operator in Mazatlán. He is believed to be in charge of drug trafficking and sales, coordinating acts of violence, and vehicle theft. Two days later, authorities apprehended Mario Alfredo Lindoro Navidad, 44, and Mario Lindoro Elenes, 69, the brother-in-law and father-in-law of Archivaldo Iván Guzmán, respectively, as well as financial operators for group.

On December 23, Alan Gabriel Núñez Herrera, alias “The Alchemist,” was murdered at a gas station in the Tres Ríos neighborhood. His name appeared in U.S. federal wanted records as a figure associated with conspiracies to import and traffic fentanyl into the United States, as well as with “possession and conspiracy to possess machine guns and destructive devices, in addition to a money laundering conspiracy.” A reward of $1 million had been offered for his capture.

Despite these actions, Miguel Calderón Quevedo, citizen coordinator of the Sinaloa State Public Security Council (CESP), agrees that more official information is needed to understand whether the operations have had a greater impact on one side than the other, and why. “It’s difficult to confirm because they don’t give us information about the profiles. This data comes from investigation files that aren’t made public,” he says. However, he adds, what is noticeable is a change in the criminal dynamics after 15 months of conflict. “At the beginning, there was an imbalance due to territorial control, but this has progressed, and now we can see a reverse imbalance,” he points out, while also acknowledging the strength Los Chapitos still possess to inflict harm. “Despite the casualties and seizures, they carry on with impressive intensity. They have logistical, human resources, and supply capabilities that show the structure is still functioning.”

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