Waiting for Mr. Marshall in Venezuela

The sudden deployment of a U.S. war fleet off the Venezuelan coast has raised all sorts of eyebrows. An article in The Economist this week wondered, “Is the goal mere theater or Venezuelan regime change?” Before attempting to answer, it’s worth remembering that this isn’t the first time.

On April 1, 2020, Donald Trump ordered increased U.S. surveillance in the Caribbean to control drug trafficking to the United States. A Reuters story dated that day described the U.S. government’s objective: “The increased naval deployment could ratchet up pressure on Maduro and his allies but is not a prelude to U.S. military action against Venezuela, one person familiar with the matter said.” Another Reuters story from August 2025 summarized the new objective: “Three U.S. Aegis guided-missile destroyers will arrive off the coast of Venezuela in the next 36 hours as part of an effort to address threats from Latin American drug cartels, two sources briefed on the matter said.”

Then as now, the trigger for the naval deployment is the same: to put Nicolás Maduro in check and force him to negotiate and leave power. Back then, Juan Guaidó was seeking to depose him with Trump’s help. Today, national opposition leader María Corina Machado is pursuing the same goal, relying on the same person. The déjà vu is more than justified.

Machado’s circle

Is there any significant difference between the two? Yes, one: the United States has declared Maduro the leader of the so-called Cartel of the Suns, an alleged criminal organization run by senior Venezuelan military commanders, and Trump has authorized his armed forces to act against them and organizations designated as terrorists. This has increased tensions and made Maduro a target for direct action. But, returning to The Economist, the critical question is whether this time there is anything different or whether it will once again be “pure theater.”

Unlike in 2020, after the fraud of July 28, 2025, Maduro is a much more unpopular leader, he has lost allies, and his resources are increasingly limited, and the truth is that he remains in Miraflores thanks to military support. Therefore, it is logical that the purpose of any action—external or internal—by the opposition led by Machado is to undermine that support and break the regime. The issue, however, is not the intention, but the real possibilities of achieving it. And in this regard, opinions vary wildly.

Within Machado’s circle, some are convinced that the naval deployment is the final push toward Venezuela’s liberation. Others, more cautious, believe Trump will act in a limited manner, using military threats as a means of pressure but not war. “What Trump does cannot be predicted because he is unpredictable. But his administration is willing to support Maduro’s fall, short of a military intervention on the ground. They will help as long as the Venezuelans do everything they can to oust the regime,” one of the sources I consulted told me.

U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Chris Landau is closer to this position than to a solution based on force. In a recent statement, he said that the Venezuelan people must rise up and demand their own freedom. “We cannot go around the world changing governments at will. (…) Freedom must be an achievement of the people themselves.” What both views agree on is that there is an active underground organization in Venezuela preparing for an opportunity.

Between hope and skepticism

But among commentators, doubts reign over the objectives and results of the naval deployment and the increased pressure on Maduro. In informal conversations in recent weeks, I heard several experts argue that the military deployment seeks nothing more than to instill fear, without a substantive strategy. Machado’s opposition, in that case, would be miscalculating by betting its future on a commando operation or an invasion that would overthrow Maduro and his entourage. A friend, well qualified to speak on the subject, was blunt: “It’s all showmanship. Trump hates U.S. occupations and having boots on the ground. Period.”

In an interview with the journalist César Miguel Rondón, political scientist Ángel Álvarez argued that the fleet represents the fantasy of an express solution and repeats other cycles of inflated illusions of change, such as those led by Juan Guaidó in 2019 or Henrique Capriles in 2013.

“These leaders can’t consider another strategy because it destroys them politically. They don’t have the means of violence to do it,” Álvarez said. Thus, they enter into the diabolical dynamic of trying to get other countries to do something that they and their bases are unable to do. Regarding María Corina Machado, he was blunt: “She can’t do more than what she’s doing in secret. What she could not do politically in the medium term is overthrow Maduro, because she doesn’t have the means of force to do so.”

Álvarez has a point: at key moments in the last quarter-century, the opposition leadership has been unable—or unwilling—to accept defeat and failure. One consequence has been the periodic decay of its cadres, the apathy of its ranks, and the disenchantment of voters. It’s as if the refusal to acknowledge defeat condemns them to repeat mistakes in different arenas. Leaders who have gone through this grindstone have been punished by voters, like Capriles, or relegated to irrelevance, like Guaidó. Although Machado and Edmundo González Urrutia still enjoy legitimacy and popularity, both now run a similar risk if this gamble doesn’t yield the promised results.

And yet, the open entry of the United States into the Venezuelan political arena introduces a powerful variable that offers the possibility of a different outcome than the one described by Álvarez.

Until now, Washington hasn’t had a single position, but rather a series of diverse and contradictory opinions converging around the need to control drug trafficking in the Caribbean, punish Maduro, and put an end to the Cartel of the Suns without deploying troops on the ground. This statement is a euphemism for “regime change.” What remains unresolved is how to achieve it.

One scenario is the one proposed by Landau: the United States will support a popular uprising in Venezuela while remaining at a distance, ready to intervene in the event of negotiations. The problem is the one pointed out by Álvarez: Machado seems to lack the necessary strength to initiate such an uprising. Although the majority of Venezuelans want Maduro’s departure, without a spark to ignite the country, that majority is a dead letter.

The other scenario was presented by James Story, former U.S. ambassador to Venezuela. The naval deployment would be a show of force against drug traffickers, but the fleet would have the capacity to attack military installations in Venezuela and cause significant damage. Both scenarios imply a direct threat to the regime, including the possibility of removing or eliminating Maduro and other figures in the Chavista nomenklature.

The Rubio factor

And another important factor must be taken into account: Marco Rubio. For the Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, regime change in Venezuela is a top priority. His impact on today’s major conflicts—the war in Ukraine and Israel’s attack on Gaza to destroy Hamas—has been weak, if not nonexistent. Rubio needs successes to give him oxygen to keep his presidential aspirations alive. Venezuela is his closest bet.

He also clearly sees that this is the moment of least resistance to a light, or even harsher, intervention in the region. To understand this, just look at Maduro’s supporters in the neighborhood: Colombia, once again caught up in violence; Brazil, with its own tariff dispute with the United States; and Mexico, under threat of intervention from its neighbor due to drug trafficking. The other countries will do whatever the White House and the State Department dictate.

So far, the flotilla’s deployment seems like nothing more than a show of force. But, in essence, what Trump has done is put a gun on the table to negotiate with Maduro over his departure from power. Given his own ineffective efforts in Ukraine and Gaza, he could also see a sudden gain in his backyard in Venezuela.

In contrast, María Corina Machado has offered interviews on Fox full of gratitude and praise for Trump, and released a video narrated in English inviting large capitalists to invest in the country’s brilliant reconstruction.

The pressure continues to mount. Ian Bremmer, a keen observer, warned this week that, as a result of the escalation, military attacks look increasingly plausible. Bremmer insists that the dots must be connected. Even without a major intervention, an Iran-style attack could be expected, “and Venezuela’s response would be very limited due to the enormous military asymmetries in favor of the United States.”

Meanwhile, Maduro’s military is preparing for an attack, and memes are already circulating online showing a group of smiling marines posing at the iconic El Rey del Pescado Frito restaurant in La Guaira. But the only thing that’s clear is that it’s as premature to declare the fleet episode over as it is to celebrate Mr. Marshall’s arrival on the Venezuelan coast.

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