US-Iran peace to be negotiated in Pakistan under the threat of Trump’s erratic policies

The United States and Iran will begin negotiations this Friday in the Pakistani capital, Islamabad, barring any unforeseen circumstances, over a possible end to the war between the two countries. However, they will do so amid confusion and contradictory statements from Donald Trump regarding the starting point for this dialogue. Tehran, which has proven to be a more formidable adversary than the U.S. president anticipated, appeared to have established the outlines of a potential agreement on Wednesday, after the Republican president described Iran’s 10-point plan in the early hours of the morning as an acceptable starting point for negotiations. However, in one of his characteristic shifts in opinion, Trump clarified his own words hours later in a message on his social media account, Truth.

In it, the Republican asserted that he would not accept some of Iran’s 10 demands to end the war — citing uranium enrichment — and again brought up the 15-point plan presented to Tehran on March 24, which Iran rejected as “excessive.” According to Trump, some of those 15 demands have already been agreed. For example, the delivery of the more than 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium possessed by the Asian country, which the United States fears Iran will use to produce nuclear weapons.

A few hours later, White House spokesperson Karoline Leavitt added to the confusion by declaring that the 10-point plan Trump had referred to as a viable basis for negotiations was one agreed upon by both parties, different from the one that had been leaked, which she claims corresponds to the original plan presented by Tehran to the White House. That initial plan, according to Leavitt, was “unserious, unacceptable,” and had been discarded. Faced with the president’s threats and the massive military deployment, Leavitt asserted, Iran “acknowledged reality to the negotiating team” and presented a “more reasonable and entirely different and condensed plan,” reports Macarena Vidal Liy.

Trump and his advisors “determined the new modified plan was a workable basis on which to negotiate and to align it with our own 15-point proposal,” Leavitt added.

Although the content of those 15 demands has not been officially disclosed, it crosses what Iran considers red lines and directly contradicts Tehran’s 10-point plan. For example, regarding the demand to cease uranium enrichment, limit Iran’s missile arsenal and its range, end Tehran’s support for its network of regional allies, such as the Lebanese militia Hezbollah, and the unconditional reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.

Before Trump backtracked and Leavitt accused Tehran of changing its plan, a triumphalist statement from the Iranian National Security Council had made it clear in the early hours that the Islamic Republic already sees itself as the winner of the contest and takes it as read that only what is included in the Iranian 10-point plan will be negotiated in Islamabad.

The document does not detail each of the 10 sections, the full official text of which has also not been released, but it does mention the most important ones: the ambitious “fundamental issues” that the Islamic Republic has declared it will not relinquish. A message on the social media account of the Iranian government’s news portal later summarized Iran’s demands: Tehran is calling for a definitive commitment to non-aggression and a cessation of the war “on all fronts, including against the heroic resistance of Lebanon,” alluding to Hezbollah, something that the United States’ ally in this conflict, Israel, has already refused to contemplate.

Iran also demands the withdrawal of “U.S. combat forces from the region,” referring to Washington’s bases in Middle Eastern countries, and, importantly, permanent and coordinated control by its own Armed Forces of maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, the crucial artery through which a fifth of the world’s oil and other vital raw materials, such as gas and fertilizers, pass.

The statement from the Iranian National Security Council gives more details on that point of the plan which envisions the “establishment of a safe transit protocol in the Strait of Hormuz in such a way as to guarantee Iran’s dominance,” an aspiration that had provoked Trump’s anger and several of his threats, at least until a few hours ago.

The text does not specify the details of the protocol that the Iranian parliament is already processing as a bill, which includes the possibility of charging ships a toll, the country’s official media reported on Monday. This right of passage would be levied with Oman, the country that shares sovereignty over the waters of Hormuz with Iran, and could amount to as much as $2 million per vessel, according to an unconfirmed figure published by international and regional media.

This potential toll is closely linked to another of the 10 points in the Iranian plan: the payment of compensation for the damage caused to its territory by the war. If Tehran manages to impose this passage fee through the Strait of Hormuz, it could present it as an indirect way of recovering funds for the widespread destruction resulting from the war.

Before the U.S. president clarified his remarks, Iranian political scientist Trita Parsi noted in an analysis on his website that the United States “had, of course, not yet endorsed the 10 points” of the Iranian plan. However, “the mere fact that the framework proposed by Iran” was invoked by Trump himself as “a basis for negotiations represents a significant diplomatic victory for Tehran.”

This expert finds it “even more surprising” that, as the Associated Press reports, Washington has accepted that Iran “retains control of the Strait of Hormuz during the ceasefire.” Parsi infers from this that “Washington appears to have admitted that reopening the waterway implies tacit recognition of Iran’s authority over it.”

Washington’s mere acquiescence to sitting down to talk about Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz “says it all” about Washington’s “strategic failure” in this war, concludes Eldar Mamedov, a nonresident Iran researcher at the U.S.-based Quincy Institute, speaking by phone from Brussels.

A recent analysis by Mohammad Eslami, a professor at the University of Tehran, and Zeynab Malakouti, a senior research fellow at the Global Peace Institute, highlighted how Iran views the Strait of Hormuz as a key element in a profound strategic shift. More than “a tool to end the war,” the researchers stated, Iran sees control of Hormuz “as a key element for the next stage,” the aim of which will be to restore “its deterrent capability” to prevent further military attacks. The truce announced this Wednesday points to a potential success in this new Iranian deterrence strategy.

A paradox

Some of the other remaining items in the 10 that could be discussed in Islamabad if there is no new twist in the script by the United States are no less significant and could confirm a possible paradox: that if the negotiations bear fruit, which already seems extremely complicated, the Iranian regime will not only not be brought down, as Israel but also Washington intended, but will emerge strengthened from this war.

The 10-point plan not only includes the aforementioned demands and the continuation of uranium enrichment, which Trump and his spokesperson have dismissed. Two other points on the list effectively call for Iran’s financial rehabilitation and the end of its status as an economic pariah in the international community. These points concern the lifting of all “primary and secondary” sanctions imposed on the country for decades and the annulment of “all UN Security Council and IBA Governing Council resolutions against the country.”

If there isn’t rapid progress toward some kind of resolution that both sides can sell as a victory, we’ll be back to square one

Eldar Mamedov, Iran researcher at the Quincy Institute.

Even if Tehran only obtains a portion of what’s included in its 10-demand plan — at least the publicly disclosed version — the Islamic Republic would still be strengthened. Hence, Parsi concludes in his analysis that what he defines as a war “chosen” by the United States has not been “just a strategic mistake.” It has also failed to “precipitate regime change” and has even “probably given the Iranian theocracy a second chance, just as it did Saddam Hussein in 1980, when his invasion allowed Ayatollah Khomeini to consolidate his power in the country.”

Mamedov adds that, in the brief two-week period the United States and Iran have set for negotiations starting Friday, “if there isn’t rapid progress toward some kind of resolution that both sides can sell as a victory, we’ll be back to square one.” This carries an added risk, since “Trump has already tried everything to subdue Iran; the military approach has failed, and the only thing he hasn’t tried is using nuclear weapons.”

For now, he emphasizes, this war, “instead of ending Iranian civilization as Trump threatened, is destroying the prestige of the United States and his presidency, which is already ruined.” Washington has not only failed to achieve “any of its objectives,” but along the way has lost “all its coercive capacity and the power of its threats and ultimatums,” the researcher asserts.

Ali Vaez, director of the Iran project at the International Crisis Group, summarized the situation on Wednesday with a tweet that reads: “As it stands, a ceasefire that may or may not be in place based on terms that may or may not be commonly understood could lead to negotiations that may or may not actually happen based on proposals that may or may not be a starting point.”

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