Emmanuel Macron: ‘The strategy of bowing down to the US doesn’t work’
The French president defends a sovereign Europe in the face of Trump’s attacks and a landscape of ‘permanent instability’
Everything about Emmanuel Macron, 48, that Jupiter who arrived on the political scene in 2017 to radically transform it, has always been precocious. His great success, and also his own decline. After nine years as head of state of France, he has gone through practically every phase. Today, after a period riddled with political crises, he is entering the final stretch of his term. Weakened internally, he has decided to focus on his role as an international leader and staunch opponent of the new U.S. imperialism, ending his adventure as he began it with his famous Sorbonne speech. That is to say, by invoking the urgent need for European sovereignty. “It is time for Europe to wake up, to emerge from its status as a geopolitical minority. If we do not decide for ourselves, we will be swept away,” he said in an interview at the Élysée Palace with EL PAÍS and a group of six international newspapers, addressing some of the points he will propose at the informal meeting of EU leaders on Thursday, focused on revitalizing the EU economy.
Question. France’s fragility seems to have weakened the historic Franco-German axis in favor of Italy. We have seen this in the latest document that both countries have prepared together on competitiveness.
Answer. When the Franco-German group is aligned, Europe can move forward, but it’s always necessary to respect others and engage their interests. It’s normal that a joint document on growth was drawn up for a German-Italian summit. I don’t see anything new under the sun. The issue is how Europe positions itself in the face of a new world order.
Q. And how should it be done?
A. We Europeans face an enormous challenge. Climate change is accelerating. The U.S. was supposed to guarantee our security forever, but now that’s uncertain. Russia was supposed to supply low-cost energy forever, and it hasn’t done so for three years. And China, which was an export market for many, has become an increasingly fierce competitor. This revolution, so to speak, has accelerated dramatically since the end of Covid-19, and even more so in the last year. And that’s why Thursday’s meeting is so important.
Q. What will you propose?
A. The question is simple for Europeans: are we prepared to become a power? We stand firm, but we react too slowly. If we choose to remain a market exposed to every whim, without making our own decisions, we will be swept away. We are the arbiter of the rest of the world. We are 450 million citizens and consumers, as well as millions of producers. It is time for Europe to wake up, to emerge from its status as a geopolitical minority, including in defense and security. The coalition of volunteers for Ukraine with the British is the revolution we have achieved in the last year.
Q. In what sense?
A. A year ago, we were completely dependent on the Americans for help in Ukraine. Now, this coalition, which unites Greater Europe beyond the EU’s borders and includes Canada, finances most of the aid to Ukraine, provides almost all the targeting and location tools for the Ukrainian resistance, and has secured security guarantees. We want to bring in the Americans to help us, but we are no longer entirely dependent on them. And now, the revolution we must carry out is on the economic front.
Q. For nine years you’ve defended this vision of European sovereignty. But your critics will say that, among its pillars, protection means protectionism, that you support diversifying alliances but oppose the Mercosur deal…
A. Mercosur is a bad agreement. The strategy is good, the geopolitical signal is correct. That’s why I’ve also increased my trips to that region. The problem with Mercosur is that its mandate is too outdated. I advocate for mirror clauses, which means that I impose the same restrictions on non-European producers as on my own, which is fair if I don’t want to deindustrialize. I defend fair agreements and, therefore, agreements that include safeguards and respect the climate while achieving what we want for the economy. It’s an outdated, poorly negotiated agreement.
Q. The world is facing an emergency situation. Do you have the sense that this European awakening could gain momentum after Greenland, after the tariff war?
A. [Former Italian prime minister] Mario Draghi recently spoke in favor of federalism. But what he really meant, and this aligns with what I’ve been saying for years about power, is that we need common leadership. Our Europe has failed when it has been slow or divided. The [2008] financial crisis originated in the U.S., but it made us suffer 10 times more. The Americans made quick, joint decisions. For us, it was an asymmetric shock; we were divided. And it took us between five and 10 years to resolve the crisis. Conversely, when we had a symmetric shock, one that affected everyone equally, we were united and acted quickly. In Ukraine, it took us 48 hours to launch an aid program to address the consequences for our economies.
Q. Does the old order no longer exist?
A. People have doubts. When we emerged from the peak of the crisis, when a tariff agreement was negotiated, there was a kind of cowardly relief. But don’t believe for a second that it’s over. Look at what’s going to happen with tariffs on pharmaceuticals and everything that’s coming. Every day, every week, there will be threats. There were insults and intimidation regarding Greenland, and then suddenly, a retreat. We must be aware that the crisis we are experiencing is a profound geopolitical rupture. We have the Chinese tsunami on the trade front and instability on the American side. Both crises represent a profound shock, a rupture for Europeans. If we want to be spectators, we will be vassals. We will do the same as before with the Chinese, and I assure you that, within five years, we will have disappeared. We are in what I would call the Greenland moment, which is undoubtedly what made Europeans aware that there was a threat. But it is not enough.
Q. And then?
A. We are alone. Europeans always thought there was someone who would help them; we had grown accustomed to that. And for me, this is the definitive culmination of the European adventure of the last 70 years. We united to avoid war again, we united to create a market, but, in reality, we had always forbidden ourselves from thinking together about power. Why? For a simple reason: because until 1945, power was civil war. European power is now something we do together to protect ourselves from the rest of the world, to try to carry on with our model, and to avoid suffering. We are Europe, and it is a vast place with 450 million inhabitants.
Q. Mario Draghi speaks of strengthened federalism. Do you agree?
A. I’m wary of the term federalism; it fuels fantasies. Will we be able to introduce changes to the treaty in 2026 that would allow us to have different institutions? I’m clear-headed and realistic: no. But I think we know what pragmatic federalism is: uniting quickly, deciding together. And that’s why I say that if we haven’t made firm decisions in six months, if we’re still in the debate phase, perhaps we need to explore avenues for cooperation.
Q. How will we finance this major shift?
A. First, we must once again mobilize our savings. Europe has the largest volume of savings in the world: €30 trillion [$35.7 trillion]. But those savings finance our debt and, beyond that, flow abroad. Every year, €300 billion [$357 billion] finance American companies. At the same time, given that the European budget is limited, it is time to set up a common borrowing capacity for these future‑oriented expenditures: future eurobonds. We need major European programs to finance the best projects.
Q. And in this strategy of unity you describe, what impact could the arrival of a far‑right government in EU countries such as France or Spain have?
A. I have seen at the Council table people elected against the European idea who organized to block Europe. But I have also seen some who benefited from European generosity and became pragmatic. I don’t want to prejudge. In countries where the far right is rising, the lucidity of their leaders has led them to realize that they benefited greatly from Europe, from its subsidies, from its recovery programs, and that it wasn’t so bad after all.
Q. The union described in the Draghi report is also based on energy. France has never promoted interconnections with Spain to harness renewable energy…
A. The issue in Spain is a false debate. Its problem is that it has a 100% renewable energy model that its own domestic grid cannot support. The blackout in Spain has nothing to do with interconnections, but with the fact that no system, at least with current technology, can sustain such dependence on renewable energy. Stability in the energy mix is needed because otherwise, shocks that are too large occur. But it’s not just about interconnections. Grids are needed.
Q. Last week, your diplomatic adviser was in Moscow to explore the possibility of restarting dialogue between France and Russia. Where does that stand?
A. We stopped it in the spring of 2022, after the war crimes and other atrocities. It was leading nowhere. And it made no sense to resume dialogue in the midst of war. Now, the level of losses and attrition on both sides makes it legitimate to consider ending it. And for several months now, U.S. envoys have resumed talks. My reflection is very simple. Do we want to delegate this discussion to others? Our geography isn’t going to change. Like it or not, Russia will still be there tomorrow. And it turns out it’s right on our doorstep. It’s important to structure the resumption of a European debate with them. Without being naive, without pressuring the Ukrainians, but without depending on a third party in this debate. And what have I obtained now? Confirmation that Russia doesn’t want peace now. But, above all, we have rebuilt these channels of dialogue at a technical level. My wish is to share this with my European partners and have a well-organized approach.
Q. How will that dialogue be structured?
A. Without too many interlocutors, with a specific mandate, a simple representation. The day peace arrives, it will also affect Europe. The security guarantees are the coalition of volunteers. The coalition of volunteers represents 80% of Europeans. And we will have to build a new security architecture in Europe with Russia. Tomorrow’s prosperity concerns Europeans. Or would you prefer that American ambassadors and envoys negotiate on your behalf the date of Ukraine’s entry into the EU? It’s about realism and self-respect. Let’s not be afraid to be ourselves. It’s in Europe’s interest. That’s why I want Europe to sit at the negotiating table for peace as quickly as possible, having protected Ukrainian interests to the fullest extent, because we have European interests to defend. And I’m not going to delegate them to anyone. Not even to the U.S.
Q. You said earlier that the Greenland chapter is not over.
A. Nothing is decided. There is an ongoing discussion with our Danish friends. They will decide. But we will not allow any coercion to be exerted on them. And then there is the NATO framework, within which we will conduct longer-term exercises there. Things are clear. But there will be further stages. The nature of the discourse that has been articulated regarding Greenland and the positions taken must be disassociated from a supposed geopolitical threat to Greenland’s territory. Let no one be mistaken in thinking that the true intention of the U.S. was simply to confront a geopolitical threat. It was not the Russians or the Chinese who posed the threat. I can tell you that we have compiled an intelligence tally of the number of Russian and Chinese ships and submarines that were around Greenland and whose presence we detected: it is negligible. They are essentially on the fringes of the Baltic and in Europe.
Q. And have the threats to the EU to raise tariffs again ended?
A. We mustn’t relax and think that everything is over after a peak in a crisis subsides. We are in a state of permanent instability. There was a tariff threat that intensified significantly until the summer of 2025. A trade agreement was reached to settle all accounts, which theoretically included pharmaceuticals. Starting in the fall of 2025, we saw Trump resume talks with Big Pharma and ask them to raise prices in Europe or restrict European access to certain molecules, which completely contradicts the agreement he signed. There will be crises, instability. There is unpredictability. And in the face of this, I believe the best approach is to reduce risk, reduce dependencies, and make decisions for ourselves instead of waiting for the next crisis.
Q. How do you handle your relationship with Trump on a personal level?
A. I am professional in my approach. I am always respectful and predictable. But not weak. I have never insulted the U.S., its people, or its leaders. I believe it is a great democracy. But when there is blatant aggression, we must not bow down or try to reach an agreement. We have tried that strategy for months, and it doesn’t work. But above all, it strategically leads Europe to increase its dependence. And that is why I believe the response must come from a predictable and respectful force. Europe must become a power, and it is in the midst of a metamorphosis.
Q. What type of power?
A. A predictable power for markets and political actors. But a strong one, capable of responding swiftly, effectively, and democratically when attacked. Europe’s greatest strength lies in its continued preservation of the rule of law. Today we have China, controlled by a single power, which is pursuing a long-term strategy. It doesn’t share our values; it can sometimes be a partner on certain issues, but it is authoritarian. And, on the other side, we have the U.S., with increasingly more extraterritorial rules that can change. And, above all, with a capacity for coercion that is incompatible with the rule of law. When you can sanction an economic actor you don’t like, when you can force someone coming to your country to provide five years of their personal data in order to obtain a visa, when, under the pretext of doing their job, you sanction a European Commissioner because they’ve annoyed you — as in the case of Thierry Breton — or you sanction a judge of the International Criminal Court because she’s done her job and you don’t like it, depriving her of all her means of communication and funding, that’s no longer the rule of law. And I say this because for all investors worldwide, for all industrialists, if we are able to make that European leap to becoming a power, a great democratic rule of law, it will be a colossal attraction. We used to act as if that were the case everywhere, and it’s no longer so.
Q. There are governments in Europe that maintain ideological relations with the U.S. administration.
A. It’s a paradox, because sometimes these are nationalist governments, and they can end up weakening their own countries or Europe. I clearly see the limitations of these models. The ideology that prevails today in the U.S., which is also a historical novelty, is blatantly and openly anti-European. It doesn’t respect the European Union, shows its contempt in all its strategic documents, and it seeks its dismantling. We are not obliged to let ourselves be trampled. I think all those governments that thought their ideological proximity could yield results have seen that this wasn’t the case. I, with great respect and friendship, hope they commit to the European path. That path is more powerful. But there will be key debates. The U.S., for example, is going to attack us in the coming months regarding digital regulation.
Q. In what way?
A. They’re going to try to impose fees on those who use it. They’re going to force us to give in on that. That will be a real test. If they do, it will be coercion. We have mechanisms to protect ourselves, and we’ll have to activate them. Europe must stand firm on this issue. Also on the initiative I launched to protect our children from social media. Their brains are not for sale. Our children’s emotions will not be monetized by the big American or Chinese platforms. That’s sovereignty, that’s the power of Europe. We don’t delegate our democratic model. We want our collective preferences, our democracy, and our values — which are not the same as American values — to be protected. And therefore, we don’t want them imposed on us.
Q. What does that refer to?
A. They have chosen the privatization of minds and emotions. In fact, they have chosen the privatization of their teenagers. That is what they have done with their network, with the terrible consequences we see every day. We do not want that.
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