The struggle for hegemony: US and China compete for supremacy in a turbulent landscape

The year 2025 marked the end of an era. Donald Trump’s return to power signaled the demise of a phase characterized by globalization, the development of a network of international institutions, and U.S. hegemony supported by strong European and Asian alliances. The new year will offer crucial clues about the turbulent course of this new historical stage, one in which power balances and international relations are being reshaped. The struggle for hegemony between the U.S. and China, and the dual assault on Europe (military, from Russia; political, cultural, and commercial, from Washington), are emerging as the most important factors in this complex and far-reaching transformation.

The two elements are interconnected, since in this competition not only does the intrinsic strength of each matter, but also their ability to garner support on the international stage. And it is in this global sense — in addition to its regional impact — that what happens in Europe matters so much. The year 2026 will clarify the consequences of the White House’s astonishing strategic shift, which now explicitly considers the EU an adversary and warns that it will cultivate resistance against it by supporting national-populist movements in the Old Continent. The results of this shift will influence the emerging new world order. For Washington, a strong and allied Europe is an asset; an independent and distrustful Europe is a defeat; a fragmented Europe is an opportunity in some ways, but a setback in other more important ones. For Beijing, a defeated Russia is a problem. A Russia that is still standing but weak is an asset thanks to the exploitation of the dependence inherent in that weakness. A victorious Russia that the U.S. plays along with is another kind of problem.

Thus, Europe is a key player in a new era dawning with two superpowers, as in the Cold War, although this time it doesn’t seem headed toward bipolarity. Back then, a large and powerful part of the world was firmly aligned with one side or the other; the non-aligned part was large but very weak. The new superpower struggle, however, shows many signs of playing out in a more volatile, multipolar world; with two dominant poles and other significant — albeit misaligned — powers such as Europe and, increasingly, India, or medium-sized powers with strong regional influence.

All of this will be influenced by a decisive political event in 2026: the U.S. midterm elections scheduled for November. On the one hand, because Trumpism knows it has a window of absolute power to deepen its counterrevolution — against the advances of multilateralism, human rights, democracy, and long-standing alliances — and that this window could be partially closed in 2027 when the new Congress is installed. Today, it controls the White House and both chambers of Congress, as well as enjoying a judiciary with conservative dominance, but the loss of one or both houses would represent a significant setback. This will spur action. On the other hand, the prospect of the elections will inhibit actions that risk negatively impacting public opinion, which could have consequences, for example, in the trade dispute with China due to the potential repercussions in terms of consumer prices.

In this respect, the 2025 figures have highlighted Beijing’s resilience to U.S. pressure, primarily due to its control of strategic raw materials. Consequently, Washington has had to scale back its trade offensive. The year 2026 will offer clarity on this new balance of power.

In parallel, both countries will pursue efforts to consolidate their own strength. The U.S. is processing an extraordinary military budget approaching $1 trillion, and its companies are investing wildly in the AI race. China is making powerful strides in its program to achieve pioneering capabilities and greater independence in key technological sectors. Both, of course, face difficulties, from the risk of a bursting bubble in the U.S. AI sector to the persistent problem of weak domestic consumption in China.

Competition in international relations will likely remain fierce. Washington is brazenly pursuing interference in other democracies. This interference takes many forms, including, but not limited to, manipulating public debate through digital platforms. The bailout offered to Javier Milei’s Argentina on the eve of elections points to a wide range of options. Nothing seems off the table, not even maneuvers around Europe’s most sensitive flank: security. Several points of tension characterize the transatlantic relationship, from trade to technology and defense spending. But the nuclear issue represents Europe’s dependence on the American security umbrella. Many Europeans fear losing it abruptly, and this also constrains them on other fronts.

China, for its part, is trying to build its global projection network not through formal alliances — as the U.S. did — but through investments or less rigid groupings, such as the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), both of which are currently expanding. Washington is poised to counter these moves in the Americas, attempting to assert a sphere of influence that does not allow for the strategic presence of others. China also seems unhappy with the U.S. projection in its region, which, incidentally, is the most dynamic in the world economically and the one where the most dangerous conflict of this century could erupt, centered around Taiwan. Beijing is achieving some success in these international maneuvers, as was seen at the end of the summer when an SCO summit and a military parade drew dozens of leaders to China, including the prime minister of India, who, after sanctions imposed by the U.S., made an eloquent gesture to reach out to its Asian arch-rival.

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