Zelenskiy wants to have his peace proposal for Russia ready by the end of this year
The Office of the President of Ukraine affirms that, in a few months, the country must agree with its international allies on the roadmap to negotiating with the invader
By the end of 2024, Volodymyr Zelenskiy wants to have Ukraine’s proposal to end the war ready to be presented to the Russian government. On June 16, during the Swiss Peace Summit, the Ukrainian president stated that the next and final summit with his allies should be held in “months, not years.”
At this second meeting, a document must emerge. Third countries — on behalf of Ukraine — will subsequently present it to President Vladimir Putin to commence negotiations. On June 25, Andriy Yermak — Zelenskiy’s right-hand man — confirmed to Time magazine that the goal is for a conference to be held in Saudi Arabia before the end of this year. This meeting will determine the final proposal.
On June 21, Igor Zhovkva — a member of Yermak team’s — told the Interfax news agency that there are three reasons to hurry: the first is that Ukraine “desires peace as soon as possible.” The second is that the multinational work that’s being done to specify each of the 10 points of Zelenskiy’s proposal is advancing rapidly, according to this representative of the Ukrainian presidency. And the third reason has to do with the US presidential elections in November. As Zhovkva acknowledged, everyone is watching for a possible victory for the Republican candidate — former President Donald Trump — who is openly opposed to continuing economic and military aid to Ukraine. Yermak added that the war in Gaza has further complicated the global geopolitical situation.
The Trump factor
Trump has a plan on the table to end the war. This is what the candidate’s two advisers who developed it — Keith Kellog and Fred Fleitz — told Reuters on Tuesday, June 25. This document states that Ukraine must be required to open a dialogue with Russia if it wants to continue receiving American weapons. And Moscow — according to the plan — will be asked to agree to negotiate with Kyiv because, if it doesn’t, the White House will increase military support for Ukraine.
Mijaílo Podoliak — an advisor to Zelenskiy — told the same agency that the plan proposed by Trump’s team is “strange,” because it involves legitimizing the violation of international law. It also doesn’t contemplate Russia paying compensation for the destruction caused.
On June 16, Swiss Foreign Minister Ignazio Cassis ventured that the most practical thing would be for the second summit to be held before the US presidential elections. Yet, not everybody agrees. On June 24, Mijaílo Gonchar — one of Ukraine’s most senior defense policy advisors and president of the Strategy XXI Centre for Global Studies — assured EL PAÍS that the ideal month to present the peace proposal is December: “Before November, in the middle of the US elections, could seem like a pressure operation on Joe Biden. In December, the elections will have passed… [we’ll] know who the new president is, who won’t have taken office yet.” Gonchar — who was involved in the negotiations in Switzerland — emphasizes that the main pressure to start talks as soon as possible comes from the European powers.
The 10 points of Zelenskiy’s so-called Peace Formula are the basis of the summit that was held in Switzerland. 89 countries ultimately signed the joint statement that supported Zelenskiy’s proposal. However, there has been intense debate in Ukraine about whether the summit was truly positive. The media outlets opposing the president have been critical of the lack of important support from the Global South, including India, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Saudi Arabia and — the most prominent nation — China, which is Russia’s main diplomatic support.
Negotiating directly and through third parties
The structure of Zelenskiy’s Peace Formula assumes that 10 governments will develop the content of the 10 points, so as to obtain the maximum possible number of states that support it. It remains to be determined how the final document will be presented to Russia, but on June 21, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba noted in state media that the model to follow will be similar to the one that managed to launch the Black Sea Grain Initiative in 2022, which allowed for the export of Ukrainian wheat through Black Sea ports. Russia broke the pact a year later, but Kuleba pointed out that this is the way to go: “The participation of the Russian Federation in the second peace summit is possible according to the format of the Black Sea grain initiative. We [had a] very successful experience in negotiations on the grain initiative. Then, Ukraine negotiated with Türkiye and the UN, then Türkiye and the UN negotiated with Russia. The agreement looked like a document signed between Türkiye, the UN and Ukraine, as well as Türkiye, the UN and Russia.”
Yermak — who is the most influential politician in Ukraine, along with Zelenskiy — assured Time magazine that the final scenario must involve Ukrainian and Russian officials sitting at the same table to seal the agreement.
The Kremlin considers Ukraine’s Peace Formula to be unacceptable. The Russian government doesn’t intend to return even a square foot of the territories occupied since 2014. The Zelenskiy administration also isn’t contemplating giving up one bit of Ukrainian sovereignty, not even in the Crimean Peninsula, illegally annexed in 2014 (which Russia considers to be an inalienable part of its national identity). This past week, a meeting of the Crimea Platform — a diplomatic summit that Zelenskiy founded in 2021 — was held in Kyiv, “precisely when, in the negotiations with Russia, Crimea didn’t appear anywhere,” details Maria Tomak, head of the Crimea Platform, in a conversation with EL PAÍS. “The Platform was established precisely to make it clear that Crimea won’t be a bargaining chip.”
A report published this past spring by defense experts from the Crimean Platform asserts that liberating the peninsula is critical to the outcome of the war and even to Russia’s future: “Crimea has been used by Russia as a springboard for its offensive and, currently, Crimea is used as a base for the occupation… it remains the center of gravity of the war and its liberation will block Russia’s war efforts and may trigger the collapse of Vladimir Putin’s regime.”
From Kyiv, Refat Chubarov — president of the Crimean Tatar People’s Council — insists that military experts are convinced that it’s possible to isolate Russian troops in Crimea and close the invader’s logistical supply in southern Ukraine. A diplomatic representative of an EU country that borders the Black Sea — who asked not to be identified — explained to EL PAÍS that one of the priorities of his presence at conferences held by the Crimea Platform was to gather information about the real possibility of expelling the invader from the peninsula. The Ukrainian authorities, meanwhile, are trying to convince NATO that Russia’s departure from the Crimean Peninsula will bring stability to the entire Black Sea.
Independent voices within Ukraine are beginning to question the realism of some of these proposals. On June 22, Anatoliy Amelin — founder of the Ukrainian Institute of the Future — published a short essay in the Italian magazine L’Espresso, in which he concluded that the best option for all parties involved in the war is to freeze the conflict. He argued that this meant ensuring Ukraine’s access to the Sea of Azov and tripling the country’s military potential. Amelin estimated that the end to hostilities on the front could come by the fall of 2024 or the spring of 2025, depending on the outcome of the US presidential elections. He also wrote that Zelenskiy’s peace proposal has little chance of succeeding, because it represents a defeat for Russia.
Earlier in June, Mikola Bielieskov — a researcher at the National Institute for Strategic Studies, an organization dependent on the Office of the President of Ukraine — summarized to EL PAÍS that Washington, above all, doesn’t want the war to worsen levels of global instability. “The United States follows the old doctrine of ‘Russia cannot win this war… but it also cannot lose it.’”
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