‘Foreign agent,’ the brush with which the Kremlin tars its most critical opponents
The label was initially applied in 2012 to identify NGOs that received foreign funding and has become a catch-all tool against Russian dissidents
The plague bell, the penitents’ hood, and the sanbenito garments of those condemned by the Inquisition: to these and other historical methods of marking uncomfortable groups and potential sources of physical or ideological contagion, Russia has contributed its own, namely the label of “foreign agent.” Enshrined in Russian legislation in 2012, the concept of “foreign agent” has served the system presided over by Vladimir Putin to restrict the rights of active citizens who question its course, or who are annoying carriers of diverse alternatives to its nationalistic and increasingly dictatorial policies.
The “foreign agents” legislation began as a way to publicly identify non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that carried out political activities and received foreign funding. Over time, and through successive amendments, the scope of the legislation was broadened and today the concept of “foreign agent” is a mandatory label for legal entities, individuals, and media designated as such, which applies not only to those who receive foreign monetary or material support (however minimal), but also to those who are labeled as subjects “under the influence” of the foreign country in question.
Individuals and legal entities are thus obliged to present themselves (and be presented) as “foreign agents” wherever they appear. Whether they are making a brief comment, publishing an article or a book, or performing on stage, their names can only be mentioned in public with the humiliating label attached.
“Foreign agents” are not allowed to take up official posts, to carry out government orders, to obtain state resources, or to teach in schools. In addition, they are subject to special fiscal control and must submit quarterly and semi-annual reports on financial and administrative matters, as well as accounting for all of their public activities.
A list that grows every Friday
Artists, journalists, NGOs and their members, writers, singers, and political scientists, among others, appear on a list that widens with new names every Friday. As of March 15, the registry, for which the Ministry of Justice is responsible, consisted of 781 names, of which 199 were excluded, which means that the “foreign agent” label is in force in 582 cases. The names excluded from the register are mostly liquidated entities (134), such as LGBTQ+ associations. Only in five cases does the ministry acknowledge its error in applying the label “foreign agent.”
Initially, the Russian authorities had four different registrations (according to the various categories of foreign agents). The first entity registered, in 2013, was the Eurasian Antimonopoly Association, formed by jurists with roots in Kazakhstan. In 2014, the NGO Gólos (Voice) for the protection of electoral rights and others followed, bringing the total to 29. In 2015, there were 80 new additions, including the international rights organization Memorial and the Committee Against Torture.
The most recent seven names added to the list last Friday correspond to an economist, a municipal deputy, an actor, a theater director, two journalists, and a former police officer. In five cases they are accused of opposing the Kremlin’s “special military operation” in Ukraine and in at least three of spreading “unreliable information” about official policy. Of the seven new “foreign agents,” six live outside Russia.
One of the latest measures to come into force prohibits Russian citizens from placing advertisements in media outlets labeled as foreign agents. This deprives major figures in Russian journalism such as Katerina Gordeeva (1.64 million subscribers on YouTube) or Alexey Pivovarov (four million on YouTube and more than one million on Telegram) of their resources. Both journalists have announced that they will be forced to restrict their activities.
As well as the public register of foreign agents, there is another of “affiliates of foreign agents,” with a reserved character and intended to inform those responsible for the Russian electoral system of participants in elections who have been connected with foreign agents. The category of “affiliates” does not carry the same limitations as that of foreign agents and was used in the 2021 parliamentary and regional elections. In 2023, more than 800 names were on that register.
The concept of “foreign agent” is one of the pillars of the current Russian regime and ties in with cultural stereotypes rooted in the country since the time of 16th-century monarch Ivan the Terrible and with Stalinist repression, many of whose victims were accused of spying for foreign powers.
These historical associations carry great weight in Russia and an example of this was Mikhail Gorbachev’s categorical refusal to be labeled as a foreign agent when the legislation to that effect came into force. In order not to be burdened by the humiliating “foreign agent” label, the foundation of the former Soviet president had to shelve its plans for international cooperation and drastically restrict its outreach and political debate activities.
In 2012, Russian authorities presented the mandatory identification of “agents” as a measure to detect lobbying, claiming that similar legislation has existed in the United States since the 1930s. But the Russian concept had its own development. First, with underhand and confusing regulations and, from 2022 after the invasion of Ukraine, systematically. The law clarifying and ordering the policy on foreign agents came into force in December 2022.
Up to six years’ imprisonment
At present, a “foreign agent” in breach of his obligations may be sentenced to up to two years in prison (as a result of a violation following two administrative offenses within one year), or up to five years (for collecting military data, even openly) and up to six years (if the foreign agent carries out activities forbidden by the government). In the second case, journalists and analysts may be affected, and in the third, foreign agents who create organizations to oppose official policy (for example, helping to circumvent military call-ups or urging people to attend rallies).
The legislation on foreign agents can be seen as part of a policy of “archaization,” consisting of neutralizing influential and active individuals who are likely to be cogs in an independent civil society. The other part of this policy, recently outlined, consists in promoting a new type of elite in accordance with the militaristic model that Putin intends to establish in society. On February 29, in a speech to parliament, the president announced the launch of a program of his own invention, which he called the “Time of Heroes,” designed to further the careers of Ukrainian war veterans. The cadres of this project, reminiscent of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, will begin to be trained “in the coming months,” the Russian leader announced.
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