Spain's role in Europe

Mariano Rajoy is now in a very good position to substantially increase Spain's weight and influence in the European Union. Among his high cards is the continuity of strategic ideological orientation (alignment with the Franco-German "engine"); Spain's persistence and eventual improvement in the restructuring of its public finances; the intangible but real credit of being at the head of a country that keeps its promises - such as that of last autumn's constitutional amendment - and the expectations raised by any new government whose first economic package, regardless of internal debate, has been well received internationally. To fail to live up to these expectations would be suicidal. To insist, however, on an act of faith, as Rajoy did on Saturday, by making hollow, generic assertions that his government knows how to generate employment and control the deficit, may undermine his credit abroad as well.

Yet Rajoy still has everything in his favor in the EU. Not only is he free of the Anglo-Saxon-like euro-skeptic leanings that characterized José María Aznar; he has placed a fervently pro-European team in charge of the Foreign Ministry. And he has made a clear choice in favor of complicity with Paris and Berlin, instead of the ephemeral and unsteady alliances pursued by the Popular Party's previous prime minister. This is the sensible thing, though it also makes sense to render the political initiative more plural by complementing this special relationship with other decisive ones: with the European Commission and other EU institutions, with the emerging Italy of Mario Monti, and with a Poland - so similar to Spain in many parameters - that is now unprecedentedly Europeanist, among other options.

The debate as to whether or not Spain ought to join the so-called "directorate" formed by Merkel, Sarkozy and Monti is, for the moment, a somewhat pointless one. True, the meetings between the leaders of the euro zone's top three economies began as a form of visible support to the technocrat Monti in his struggle to bring Italy out of the danger zone, from which Spain must always try to dissociate itself. But it is also true that his moderation and skill in economic and European policy is endowing these meetings with a certain feedback, in which it is Monti who, in certain matters, enhances the image of his two interlocutors.

This is why - without ruling out any formula - the optimal one must be sought for Spain to exercise an influence in the EU. Not only in favor of its immediate interests, but in the general relaunching of the EU, because this is Spain's first and principal interest.

Now a golden opportunity has arisen: that of the debate on the Stability Treaty, whose rather modest scope, limited to budgetary policy, demands that it be enriched with compensatory features for those countries that have made most effort to comply with it, by means of a policy of selective stimulus to demand, that would clear away the stubborn expectations of further recession. The chance should not be missed.