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Ground attack or negotiated exit? Trump’s indecision raises tensions in Venezuela

Between threatening to strike the country and resuming repatriation flights for migrants, the US president is sending mixed signals. Meanwhile, his unprecedented military deployment in the Caribbean is awaiting orders

Although the world has long grown accustomed to Donald Trump’s volatility, the U.S. president’s attitude in recent weeks toward the idea of an attack on Venezuela has left observers of the bilateral relationship baffled, with both countries in a state of anxiety and heightened alert. The messages coming from the White House have been decidedly contradictory. One day, Trump threatens the imminent start of a ground offensive, vowing “taking those sons of a bitches out,” in reference to the South American country’s drug traffickers. The next day, he resumes deportation flights for irregular immigrants and leaves open the possibility of a negotiated resolution to the crisis. The result? No one — neither in Washington nor in Caracas — dares to predict whether the feared military intervention will actually take place, or what form it might take if it does.

And at this point, it is possible that, Trump — aware of how unpopular the idea is among his supporters — may not even dare to act. Meanwhile, his indecision is raising tensions in Venezuela a little more each passing day.

After months of a rhetorical escalation that seemed headed straight for a military outcome, it was only three weeks ago that the president began speaking of “maintaining contacts with [Venezuelan President Nicolás] Maduro,” according to Phil Gunson, a Crisis Group expert who has lived in Venezuela for 26 years. “Clearly, with the idea of forcing him to leave. When it became clear that this was the last thing Maduro intended to do, Trump realized he didn’t like the other options. He knows, because the polls tell him so, that getting rid of Maduro might be popular if it were quick and painless, but embarking on a military adventure is not.”

“Seventy percent of Americans would oppose military action in Venezuela,” notes David Smilde, a professor at Tulane University in New Orleans and author of an influential Substack newsletter on U.S.–Venezuela relations. He describes Trump’s negotiating style as “abusive” and ‘maximalist’: “He lacks a master plan, constantly changes its mind, and pushes things to the limit only to back down later.”

In light of the unpopularity of military action in Venezuela, Trump abandoned the school of thought of his secretary of state, the hawkish Marco Rubio, who “is clearly obsessed with regime change, and anything less will be a failure for him,” says Gunson. “Trump can always claim some kind of false victory, but Rubio cannot.”

Gunson points out that the idea of a ground offensive was floated by the president six weeks ago, and that the threat has yet to materialize amid an unprecedented U.S. naval deployment in the Caribbean. This includes at least a dozen warships, the world’s largest aircraft carrier, the Gerald Ford, and a nuclear submarine, along with the deployment of roughly 15,000 troops.

Trump is feeling the pressure not only from the polls but also from within his own party. Some Republicans have been pushing in Congress for greater oversight of the extrajudicial attacks Washington has been carrying out since early September in international waters of the Caribbean, and to a lesser extent in the Pacific. At least 22 alleged drug-running boats have been bombed, killing at least 87 crew members, two of whom were finished off by the military on September 2 following an initial attack — what could constitute a war crime under international combat rules. That incident has taken a toll on Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and put the White House, which rushed to blame Admiral Frank Bradley, in damage-control mode.

“Adding to this scandal are the news reports published in recent weeks that some of the crew members were fishermen who turned to drug trafficking to earn extra money, casting doubt on Maduro’s direct relationship with the Tren de Aragua gang or even the existence of the Cartel of the Suns,” Smilde warns, referring to the alleged transnational criminal network linked to Chavista leaders.

The U.S. State Department recently placed the Cartel of the Suns on its list of “designated terrorist organizations” — a move that was believed to be paving the way for an offensive. “Trump is also not in a strong position after the defeats at the polls last November [when the Republican Party lost races in New York], which is why I think he has shifted toward a more conciliatory stance,” says Smilde.

President Donald Trump speaks during a reception for the Kennedy Center Honors.

The Venezuelan government trusts that the buildup of pressure — including the statements made from prominent MAGA leaders such as Steve Bannon and Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene, who see any intervention as incompatible with the America First promise — is keeping the possibility of a military strike at bay.

This is the view despite the diplomatic earthquake caused by the publication on Friday of the new U.S. National Security Strategy. The document traditionally sets out a presidency’s foreign policy priorities at the outset of the term, but this time it puts in writing what had already become evident: Washington is ready to dust off the old Monroe Doctrine, crafted in the 19th century to justify the idea of “America for the Americans.” In practice, the so-called “Trump corollary” revives the old idea of Latin America as Washington’s backyard

Although the document also lists principles such as a “predisposition to non-intervention” and an emphasis on “soft power,” the latter is in clear contradiction with Trump administration measures such as the elimination of the USAID development cooperation program, the slashing of the Fulbright scholarship program, and cuts to the Voice of America international broadcasting service.

The Venezuelan government is also clinging to the White House’s request to resume deportation flights for irregular Venezuelan immigrants, despite the fact that, in practice, Venezuelan airspace remains almost completely closed — a situation reinforced two weeks ago by a Trump announcement that suggested some form of imminent invasion.

The call between Trump and Maduro took place before that — reportedly on November 21 — but there are conflicting accounts on what was discussed. While the U.S. press described it in tense and threatening terms (either Maduro and his allies leave the country, or they will face the consequences), a source with information from both sides said the call was “respectful, even pleasant, and without any kind of ultimatum.” Maduro and Trump also “remained open to further talks,” although the source did not specify when or under what terms.

The path of dialogue appears to have been strengthened by a possible second call. But there is speculation over whether the call happened. If it did, a “pact of silence” would have been observed until results emerged. Maduro made a similar point when discussing the first call: “When there are important matters, they must be handled quietly until they are resolved.” When asked on Wednesday whether this second call had taken place. Trump replied: “No, there hasn’t been.”

All this back and forth has also fueled discussion in Washington on the roles and influence of the two people Trump seems to value most in this matter: Rubio and the special envoy to Venezuela, Ric Grenell, who steered the relationship with Caracas during the early stages of the new administration and is more in favor of dialogue than the secretary of state. It seems like the classic good cop, bad cop scenario. Or, to continue the analogies, one plays the devil and the other the angel, both whispering in Trump’s ears from opposite shoulders.

Grenell is still being listened to in Washington, according to a source familiar with the crisis who has contacts in the Chavista regime: “His opinions continue to reach the president, and his role could grow in importance,” after he was sidelined from leading the U.S. negotiations months ago.

According to Smilde, “It’s, once again, a typically Trumpian destabilizing tactic: when someone [Rubio] thinks they’re in charge and has the president’s favor, he sidelines and humiliates them, only to later restore them, thus keeping everyone on edge. It’s a classic power strategy.”

“I think Grenell is waiting for Rubio to fail so he can take his job,” says Gunson, who believes Rubio is currently “under a lot of pressure.” “He sold Trump on the idea that he wouldn’t need to send troops, that Maduro would leave if he was dealt with firmly enough. Now the president knows it wasn’t as easy as he was led to believe,” argues the analyst. Given the course of events, Gunson says he is “more optimistic,” about the possibility of avoiding a military intervention, though less so “that anything good could come from a Maduro-Trump agreement.” “I don’t think either of them cares about democracy in Venezuela. Maduro, obviously, doesn’t. Trump? He only cares about Trump,” Gunson concludes.

“There isn’t really a good way out of this situation, only relatively bad alternatives. A major military intervention would be the worst,” argues Smilde, who sees an operation involving “the bombing of airstrips or what they call drug trafficking facilities” as more likely. “If Trump were to withdraw the military deployment and leave things as they are, that wouldn’t be a good idea either; it would represent a major victory for Maduro against the empire, and surely the repression of any dissenting voice in Venezuelan civil society.”

Meanwhile, at least two things seem certain. The first is that Maduro, who has reinforced his personal security, according to sources close to the Venezuelan government, has no plans to relinquish power. The second: Washington and Caracas will remain mired in a volatile state, closely watching Trump’s contradictions.

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