How Iran’s power structure is handling the crisis

In Iran today, the central question is not who will replace Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, but rather who is best positioned to decide how that transition would be managed. The question matters because, in the Islamic Republic, such a transition would not only be a constitutional issue. Above all, it would be a test of cohesion among institutions, factions, and security apparatuses. And that test has already begun, even though no one announces it as such.

The first key is understanding that power in Iran functions as an arbitration system, in which ultimate authority rests on a network of formal bodies and informal centers. The Assembly of Experts has the formal role of validating the successor. But the real decision would not be made there autonomously. It would be conditioned by the balance between the Leader’s Office, the security forces, the clerical apparatus, and the institutions of political arbitration.

That is why, rather than looking only at a potential successor, it is more useful to watch those who control the process. In that landscape, Ali Larijani, secretary of the National Security Council, stands out today as a particularly relevant figure — not so much because of his ideological profile, but because of his functional usefulness. He is the kind of actor the system tends to reactivate when it needs discipline, coordination, and open channels at the same time. His importance lies in his ability to act as a bridge between the language of security, political management, and external dialogue. In a succession scenario, figures like him matter less for personal ambition than for their capacity to bring order to the situation.

A similar dynamic can be seen with Ali Shamkhani, secretary of the National Defense Council since August 2025, whose return to an active position suggests that the system is prioritizing operational experience and coordination capacity over old factional rivalries. Shamkhani represents a liaison figure between the military, strategic, and diplomatic spheres. His repositioning indicates that one of the immediate objectives of a transition would be to avoid command vacuums and ensure a clear chain of decision-making in defense, regional crises, and international negotiation.

On another front, Bagher Ghalibaf embodies the more visible dimension of security power with an institutional façade. As speaker of Parliament, he does more than shape legislation: he helps translate the logic of security into political discourse, internal order management, and signals to the outside world. His role would be crucial in any transition because he offers something the system values especially in critical moments: the ability to manage a narrative of stability while reinforcing control mechanisms.

Sadegh Larijani, secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council, is less important for his public profile than for his capacity for institutional arbitration. From within the legislative and institutional oversight and arbitration bodies, he forms part of that level of the system that filters, corrects, or blocks decisions to maintain the regime’s coherence. The fact that he and Ali Larijani are brothers is no minor detail; it serves as a reminder that long-term networks of trust also operate in Iran, where kinship, experience, and access become political capital.

Above all these factors remains the least visible yet most sensitive: the network of loyalties surrounding the leader’s immediate circle and, in particular, the influence of the security apparatus, in which the Revolutionary Guard is a key actor. The Pasdars do not necessarily publicly “choose” a leader, but without their acceptance, an orderly transition is impossible. Their primary interest is not to create an opening, but to guarantee continuity, protect their economic and political prerogatives, and prevent a change of leadership from becoming a negotiation about the very nature of the system.

A reshuffle of this kind could only partially unlock Iran’s international situation. If the elite’s primary objective is to preserve continuity, the scope for a major reconciliation will remain narrow. The most plausible approach would be to attempt to mitigate risks, buy time, and negotiate partial concessions, rather than redefine the bilateral relationship. In other words, a controlled transition could facilitate a tactical de-escalation, but not necessarily a strategic shift. In Iran, even when power changes hands, the first thing it tries to do is demonstrate that, in reality, nothing essential has changed.

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