How Trump can revolutionize the world order through four conflicts

Donald Trump’s second presidency has the potential to provoke a true geopolitical revolution. There is no certainty about what he will do — given the unpredictability of his character and the ambiguity of his campaign in certain aspects — but the available indications point to a probable profound impact on international relations. This may occur at different levels, including, clearly, trade. In addition, there are four conflicts through which this impact may be transcendental and long-lasting. Two are wars in full development (Ukraine and the Middle East), while the other two are potential (Taiwan and Korea). Below is an attempt to offer an analytical reading of the available elements.

Ukraine

During his campaign, Trump repeatedly insisted on two concepts: his willingness to force a peace deal and his unwillingness to continue funding Kyiv’s war effort. At no point has he defined the conceptual outlines of the former or the timetable for the latter. It is likely that even he is not clear on exactly what he wants to do.

Ukraine and its partners hope that the Pompeo doctrine will prevail, in which Trump’s former secretary of state proposes to force Vladimir Putin to at least a relatively reasonable agreement through a series of measures that will lead him to believe that it is not in his interest to continue fighting. These measures would include an increase in energy production (by the U.S. and, ideally, Saudi Arabia) that would lower prices, an increase in military spending by NATO countries, a strengthening of the U.S. defense industry and a large loan — not a grant — to Ukraine. But, within the Trump universe, Pompeo is part of a minority traditionalist segment, which will not necessarily succeed in imposing its theses. Another segment, the isolationist, will push for a very different policy. Trump, for his part, has said that he will stop the war immediately, and he abhors the idea of disbursing more money.

During the last term, Republicans blocked the passage of a new aid package for months, under the influence of the Trumpist theory that spending so much American money on Ukraine was absurd. They finally gave the green light, most likely because Trump understood that without this aid, the presidential election in November would have been held with Ukraine defeated and the Republican candidate universally regarded as responsible for this debacle.

Trump will certainly not want to go down in history as the leader who presided over Ukraine’s complete collapse. But the balance between that and his America First policy is extremely complex at a time when current aid is already insufficient and Kyiv is losing. Total defeat may well happen without the political will to do so.

The context is that European countries have made a considerable effort to sustain Ukraine in the face of the Russian invasion, but U.S. support is irreplaceable. Not only is Washington by far Ukraine’s leading military supporter (around $60 billion from 2022, compared to around $10.65 billion each from Germany and the UK, according to data from the Kiel Institute), but it is the only power capable of providing essential intelligence support and special capabilities. The EU is far from having managed to increase its productive fabric enough to compensate for the absence of Ukraine’s primary support. U.S. support, although also limited, is an indispensable pillar.

On the other hand, Putin has just received a major boost in strength with the arrival of North Korean soldiers. At the same time, he is no doubt sensing the hesitation and fatigue of his opponents. He will persist.

An outright Russian victory would be a historic turning point. But even an agreement sanctioning a significant territorial loss and the inhibition of the freedom of foreign policy of what remained of Ukraine would be a geostrategic success for Russia that would not only have an impact on the region, but would change global relations, with the understanding that Western democracies can be defeated on matters of utmost importance by sheer superiority of willpower. It would be a message of immeasurable effect on a global scale: both for European allies, who would be touched by the reality of American detachment from the region, as well as for the entire galaxy of authoritarian regimes dissatisfied with Western primacy, who would see its weakening and the disintegration of the bond between its main representatives.

Middle East

Trump’s first presidency made clear his absolute support for Israel and its colonizing plan, and also his determination to redraw the map of the region, fostering an alliance with the Sunni monarchies that would corner the Shia axis. The Biden administration has given Israel immense military support. The Trump administration can give it even greater political support.

A study by Brown University in the U.S. estimates that Washington provided military aid worth around $18 billion to Israel between October 7, 2023 — the day of the Hamas attack — and September 30, 2024. This is in addition to the approximately $4 billion provided annually in recent decades. Israel’s brutally disproportionate response, an intolerable collective punishment, would not have been possible without all this. Nevertheless, albeit insufficiently and ineffectively, the Biden presidency attempted to draw some boundaries and maintained its attachment, at least rhetorically, to the two-state solution. Now the scenario may get worse.

For starters, until the new president is sworn in on January 20, Benjamin Netanyahu can count on more than two months of absolute freedom from an outgoing and delegitimized U.S. administration. He will probably continue his campaign, under the logic that an intense conflict is his best guarantee of staying in power. Afterwards, he will have a president who is happy to turn a blind eye to illegal colonization and who broke the nuclear agreement with Iran that Barack Obama had sealed and that Europe wanted to maintain. It is worth remembering that the Israeli prime minister recently made thinly veiled threats of regime change in Iran. It is possible that Trump will pressure him to end the war and take credit for it. If this is the case, it is possible to foresee a great willingness to make concessions on the part of Trump’s White House in the face of Israel’s colonizing abuses and a transactional relationship with Saudi Arabia and other Sunni regimes that will allow them a wide range of action if they are involved in large arms purchase contracts in parallel — a scheme that was already seen to emerge in his first term.

This would have multiple consequences. Not only would it likely put a final nail in the coffin of Palestinian aspirations — and rights — but it would also drive Iran even further into the arms of Russia and China, consolidating the nascent Asian authoritarian axis alongside North Korea.

Taiwan

Although the new Trump presidency’s relationship with China will be marked from the start by the tariffs that the U.S. may impose, or new restrictions on access to sensitive technologies, an essential strategic point in the medium and long term will be the signals that the new president sends about Taiwan.

It should be remembered that Xi Jinping has repeatedly pointed out that the “rejuvenation” of China that he seeks necessarily entails the assertion of Beijing’s control over the island. Biden has been the most explicit of American presidents in his promises to defend Taiwan if it were unjustifiably attacked.

While the desire to maintain U.S. primacy over China is a central part of Trump’s discourse — and is, incidentally, the only bipartisan consensus in Washington — the isolationist instinct and the reluctance to get involved in military operations are an essential part of his policy. If Beijing were to interpret that Trump is not willing to act to defend Taiwan, this could change calculations about the opportunity of military action to subjugate the island.

North Korea

The strengthening of ties between Pyongyang and Moscow raises many concerns. The first reason is obvious: through military support to Russia, North Korea seeks in return aid from the Kremlin — military technology, food, energy — and in general the possibility of not depending only on China, to expand its options, to have a triangular capacity instead of merely bilateral. But some wonder if the activation of this clause of mutual military support is a step to strengthen Pyongyang’s options for attacking South Korea. This is unlikely, but it is inadvisable to rule anything out, especially if the isolationist branch ends up prevailing in the new Trump administration.

There is no certainty about what Trump will do. It is possible that none of the worst-case scenarios will materialize. But the track record of his first presidency, and of his recent campaign, gives the impression that, unlike in 2016, he will not surround himself with figures from the Republican establishment who curbed his instincts. Back then, he did not think he would win, he did not really have a program or a prepared team. This time it is different. This time a deep break in the network of alliances built by the U.S. after 1945 and a substantial alteration of the geopolitical landscape seem more likely.

Sign up for our weekly newsletter to get more English-language news coverage from EL PAÍS USA Edition