Ecuador, don’t follow in the footsteps of Colombia and Mexico

As each month goes by, the complexity of the security situation in Ecuador becomes more visible. The country has had to deal with prison massacres, growing national and international organized crime, increased homicides, illegal firearms in circulation, the assassination of a presidential candidate and a public television station seized on air with millions of people watching. All of this brings to mind the terrifying realization that Ecuador is going to suffer the same fate as Mexico and Colombia, and that it will be yet another case of tragedy.

Pressure is building as the world watches on. So what can Ecuador do to avoid ending up like those two neighboring countries? It would be advisable not to follow in the footsteps of both nations, in terms of the way they focused their rhetoric — especially with different leaders — and concentrated their political capital.

Ecuador’s most pressing task is to recover the legitimate monopoly of law enforcement, and this implies strengthening the state’s capacity and ability to manage security. However, the governance of this sector was affected by the elimination and merging of key institutions with direct competence in this area around seven years ago. This resulted in the weakening and elimination of qualified and professionalized human resources, as well as adequate technical, technological and financial capabilities. In addition, not surprisingly, several criminal organizations seized the opportunity to gain ground and consolidate their power.

Having reached this critical stage, the political challenge is to reinforce and purge the security and defense institutions without falling into the temptation of granting too much power to the public force, without the necessary tools to execute it in an effective and measured manner, and without proper monitoring and accountability. Experiences in countries such as Colombia and Mexico show that a public security force with excessive power, limited control and unquestioning political support leads to the accumulation of considerable political and economic power. It makes them prone to more corruption scandals and human rights violations and reduces their efficiency on the job, as if they were surgeons with machetes. Additionally, by being more involved in the administrative operations of the State, it is easier for them to block future institutional changes. Reversing this power will become a monumental challenge.

In addition to recovering the monopoly of force with tools and control mechanisms, hopefully Ecuador will be more strategic than Colombia and Mexico and also focus on the other side of the coin: justice. Security cannot exist without an efficient and effective justice system. Therefore, to reduce violence and curb organized crime, it is not enough to send the military to the streets and keep overcrowding the prisons. Although these are popular actions, they are also counterproductive because they fuel violence and strengthen criminal groups, as Ecuador has already verified — its prisons have become schools for criminals. Hopefully this country will choose the path of strengthening and optimizing the work of prosecutors’ offices and judges, stop overusing pretrial detention, consider alternative measures to incarceration for minors and non-violent crimes, decriminalize some types of conduct, improve prison systems and invest in programs for the prevention of reoffense.

Another aspect where Ecuador can make a significant difference, by not following in the footsteps of Mexico and Colombia, is to steer clear of placing everything (rhetoric, agenda, security, defense and justice policies) in the context of the fight against drug trafficking. The temptation to do so would seem to be a natural response since a large part of the criminal activities identified are related to this market. Yet sustaining the notion that the war on drugs is the solution is borderline insulting in light of the overwhelming evidence accumulated from decades of failure. It should not be forgotten that what is happening in Ecuador is occurring under a system of international drug prohibition, which is somewhat paradoxical.

Therefore, one hopes that Ecuador will be more cautious and be able to talk about security and drugs in due proportions. But it should also be more daring, and ask for or make evaluations of what has worked and what has not in this area in the region — a balance of money invested in this fight versus real impacts. It is hoped that Ecuador becomes more autonomous and does not allow itself to succumb to the pressure that Washington will no doubt impose on it — where some minds must already be thinking of a plan for Ecuador —, designing and implementing its own agenda. It should be coordinated on an equal basis with the appropriate parties, and not imposed ones. Hopefully the country will be more courageous and join Colombia in its goal of fostering a paradigm shift, because it cannot continue to be governed by drug control conventions that were conceived more than 60 years ago. One would hope that Ecuador would be more sensible in focusing its efforts on money laundering, where criminal organizations can really be hampered, and where there is a soft spot in the public security forces due to the exposure to corruption. And finally, hopefully it will be more ingenious and manage to spearhead regional experiments, studies or mechanisms for the regulation of certain substances.

Underpinning all these decisions is a common discourse favored in the region — the iron fist approach. This strategy prioritizes measures such as toughening criminal codes, increasing police and military presence in the streets, increasing imprisonment and preventive detentions, and emergency laws that limit civil liberties and enhance the power of the security forces. Once again, this is attractive but not very effective. They cause governments to become purely reactive and almost never preventive when it comes to security issues.

As a result, the discourse and model of security seems to wind up as a show of manhood — it is no coincidence that this is a historically male-led sector — that leads to a never-ending escalation of violence. It has turned into a game where several leaders follow the same logic of the criminal organizations — as was the case with Colombia President Iván Duque, who issued a stark warning to the leaders of the organized criminal armed organizations. In the name of security, authoritarian leaders and ideas are advocated, while certain groups, especially young people, become even more criminalized and stigmatized. They resort to an iron fist approach, but rarely reflect on why 16-year-olds are committing murder, and what could actually work, according to the evidence, to stop this from happening.

Hopefully, Ecuador will do better, and it has a chance to better channel the anger and frustration of its citizens. It can show us that being conscious of the primary, basic need to live in a society with rules that are complied with and are enforced does not inevitably imply hard-handed policies with a machete, but instead with a scalpel. Going from state of exception to state of exception is not a consistent security policy. Likewise, neither is paralysis of action or empty slogans such as “hugs, not bullets.” Hopefully, Ecuador will challenge the traditional narrative of security without succumbing to good-natured inaction and show us that this word can also signify a right, protection, safe environments, collective care and prevention. The real strength lies in the implementation of comprehensive, sustainable and specific security policies in cities, ports and at borders. In conclusion, Ecuador must show us that we do not have to choose between democracy and security. That security can go hand in hand with respect for rights and freedoms. Ecuador, we have faith in you.

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