The online network that offers jobs in Russia and sends people to fight in the war in Ukraine

A report by the African nonprofit network of digital democracy laboratories and data journalism, Code for Africa (CfA), published on September 16, sheds light on the shadowy digital network that, through deception and false information, recruits young people from poor countries — primarily in Africa — to fight for Russia in the war in Ukraine. The study reveals a criminal industry that uses at least 135 digital resources — websites, messaging accounts, or social media profiles — originating in Russia or Belarus but hosted on Western servers, to offer supposedly well‑paid jobs that end up being a one‑way ticket to the war, often with no return. According to Ukrainian government figures, around 3,000 African recruits have fought in the war in Ukraine, of whom about 500 have been killed in action.

Specifically, the report, titled “Techniques used to recruit and co-opt African nationals into fighting in the Russian-Ukrainian war,” has identified 89 websites — many created with artificial intelligence — seven social media profiles, and 39 messaging channels, mostly on Telegram. The investigation found that the network does not belong to a single organization but is operated by four different brands that even compete with one another: Military Staff Agency (MSA), Work in Russia (WiR), IRC Russian Bear, and Work Crew Agency (WCA). A fifth Belarusian agency also operates as a franchise, selling its recruitment system.

Young people from poor countries

The primary targets of this network are young people from poor countries. IRC Russian Bear, for example, operates in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, and in each of these regions its offers are made in local languages. However, the ads never mention the war and usually refer to contracts to work in construction, security companies, or even on a film set. Sometimes assistance is offered to obtain a Russian visa, access citizenship, or acquire land in Russia. According to CfA, it is only after payment — and when backing out has already become very costly — that recruits are told the contract is to fight with the Russian army.

If this were a simple job offer, the conditions would be very attractive to resource‑poor young people: up to $15,000 on signing the agreement, $3,000 a month, between $8,000 and $31,000 if wounded, and $60,000 to the family in the event of death in combat. However, victims of this criminal industry are unaware of the risks they face. Payments are normally made through Russian banks such as VTB, Sberbank, Promsvyazbank, or Gazprombank, all of which are subject to Western sanctions. According to the brands themselves involved in this activity, death benefits are collected at the Russian embassy in each country. CfA, however, has been unable to verify any such payments.

Another part of the deception involves the use of false information. Some sites try to appear more credible by presenting news or videos allegedly from Western media outlets, such as the BBC or The New York Post, to support the platform’s supposed official status. All of it is false. In fact, these brands present themselves as official representatives of the Russian government, but the report’s authors found no registration, evidence, accreditation, or mandate that directly links the Kremlin to this industry. CfA says governments of countries affected by this recruitment could question Russian authorities about such a link. If one exists, it would make Moscow responsible for the network; if not, it would dismantle the four brands’ claim of official status.

One of the report’s most striking conclusions, its authors say, is that “the infrastructure supporting all of this is, to a surprising extent, in the West”: a server in Amsterdam that hosts one of the main brands, pages generated with AI tools from the United States and Sweden, an Austrian software company that sold recruitment forms, and measurement and advertising systems supplied by U.S. giants Meta and Google. “A war being sold to Africans, Asians, and Belarusians is being promoted using the tools of the countries that publicly oppose it,” the study concludes.

A server in Amsterdam

The investigation points to five layers or levels. The first, and the most visible, are the social profiles and websites, conceived as “disposable.” Although hosted on Western platforms, they appear and disappear quickly, making them hard to trace. A second level comprises protection and distribution systems that exploit Western software. Third are Russian hosting services, where the true hardcore that runs the network is located. The fourth layer is the main recruitment site, hosted on a server in Amsterdam, and finally there is a sealed, inaccessible level in Russia that resists investigation.

A few months ago, the research organization Inpact revealed the existence of online recruitment networks aimed primarily at young Africans. The main countries where these recruits come from are Egypt, Kenya, Ghana, and Cameroon, but the networks extend across almost the entire continent. CfA’s report acknowledges the scale of the problem in Africa but stresses that it is only part of the network’s target. “Any response directed solely at African governments addresses barely a quarter of the operation and leaves three regional offices operating,” the authors warn, referring to the network’s arms in Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East.

The CfA report also points to companies and governments, both African and Western, that could act to shed further light on and, where appropriate, pursue this activity legally. In particular, it notes that Dutch law explicitly prohibits recruitment for foreign armies and also combats frauds like those being run from a server in Amsterdam. African governments, such as Kenya’s, have urged Russia to stop this recruitment, but the recruitment networks operate outside state control.

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