Zelenskiy’s adviser Mykhailo Podolyak: ‘I think Trump will succeed where previous US administrations failed with Russia’
The Ukrainian presidential adviser calls for calm, and argues that the U.S. president should lead the negotiations to end the war
Mykhailo Podolyak, 53, is one of the most popular figures in the office of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy. Podolyak works under Andriy Yermak, Zelenskiy’s chief adviser, and one of his key responsibilities is defining the political strategy that will guide Ukraine to survive the Russian invasion. As Zelenskiy has openly acknowledged, survival hinges on maintaining the United States as a crucial ally.
In an interview with EL PAÍS on Wednesday in Kyiv, Podolyak made it clear that Ukraine’s strategy is focused on rebuilding its relationship with Washington. The priority, admits this veteran member of Zelenskiy’s team — he has been part of the Presidential office since 2020 — is to restore bilateral relations with the U.S. following the commotion caused after Donald Trump’s return to the White House.
“I recommend we stay calm. We know the political style of the 47th president of the United States — taking the initiative, being aggressive in information, and dominant. But we also know that we still need to sit at the negotiating table,” he says.
Question. CIA Director John Ratcliffe says Zelenskiy has changed his strategy of confrontation with Trump after the Pentagon suspended military aid to Ukraine. Is that correct?
Answer. No, no, no. The U.S. is one of our key partners and the president of Ukraine proposes restoring the negotiation channels. There are three main areas for negotiation. First, the strategic economic partnership within the framework of the Mineral Resources Agreement. Second, the continuation of military aid. It is a fact that many [military assistance] programs have nearly been completed and most of the resources have already been used. The programs approved by the previous U.S. administration are coming to an end and everything needs to be renegotiated. Third, the synchronization of positions in the negotiation process with Russia and the conditions for ending the war. There is no point in speculating today about the suspension of military aid or the sharing of intelligence data. What is needed is to talk about restoring a constructive bilateral negotiation process with the U.S.
Q. But this is not speculation, it is something that Washington has confirmed. What are the biggest threats if Ukraine is left without U.S. defense assistance?
A. Intelligence data is critical because it allows us to understand where Russian troops are being relocated, how their logistics work, the concentration of military resources within Russia, or even where offensive and counteroffensive actions are expected. The supply of certain unique equipment, such as the anti-missile defense systems [Patriot], which protect civilians and critical infrastructure, is also crucial. And more. But we have already faced certain situations before, during this war, in which there was speculation about the suspension of military aid.
Q. Trump has proposed renegotiating a broader agreement on the mining of Ukraine’s strategic minerals. Zelenskiy has insisted that this pact must include future defense guarantees. Do you know whether the U.S. president has accepted this request?
A. The framework agreement on mineral resources is a path to large-scale strategic and economic cooperation. The first annex, I speak conditionally, would outline the economic structure of these agreements — how they would function, what investments should be made, in which sectors, how the sovereign fund [shared between both governments] would operate, the countries’ respective roles, how the fund will be replenished, how profits will be distributed, and the total volume of production and its implementation.
Then the question will arise of how we ensure that this is safe. Because one of the reasons for the war — besides Russia wanting to destroy Ukraine, dominate the region, and return to the concept of the Soviet Union — is also a very pragmatic Russian objective: to seize the territories where mineral resources are located. To prevent this, it is crucial to understand how the agreement will be defended and what security guarantees will be in place. These could include a no-fly zone, missile bases, a significant upgrade of the Ukrainian army’s capabilities, and investment in Ukraine’s military production.
Q. Does this mean that guarantees on defense assistance will be part of the agreement that will now be renegotiated? Or will they be left for later, as Trump wants?
A. As I said, we need to take it step by step. All of this is being discussed and will have different stages of implementation. But when the U.S. invests in any country, they are interested in ensuring that those territories will be stable and that no one else will claim them. And after the war, it will be necessary to clearly define the status of the territories and ensure that they are protected from any action by Russia. These are obvious things that will be discussed later.
Q. What has surprised you most about the tensions sparked by Trump and his team toward Zelenskiy?
A. Russia’s silence. They have chosen a clever strategy. They are not making any comments. They are pretending that Ukraine does not want negotiations and that Russia does. At the same time, missile and drone attacks against civilians are increasing. Russia is achieving its goals by increasing pressure on the civilian population of Ukraine, on critical infrastructure, and at the same time it is not making any comments. They expect the pressure to fall solely on Ukraine. The second thing that has surprised me is very positive: the growing role of Europe. Europe understands not only the overall risks posed by Russia but also the challenges to the European security architecture. Europe is showing a willingness to take responsibility today.
Q. But Putin has commented on the events of the last few days, celebrating many of Trump’s decisions…
A. What Russia is doing is a strategy of information deception. By the way, [Russian Foreign Minister] Lavrov’s words were very eloquent. He said that even if we sit down at the negotiating table, they will continue with missile and drone attacks. They are covering things up, masking everything very carefully. They are taking a false position. They are pretending to be peacemakers. Putin’s supposedly peaceful attitude seems to say: “Yes, we are ready for negotiations. We are ready for a ceasefire,” but they are definitely not ready for either negotiations or a ceasefire. And they want to blame Ukraine for this. If they want real peace, all they must do is to stop the missiles, at least they need to do this. President Zelenskiy said: “Look, let’s do a prisoner exchange, all for all, let’s stop the missile attacks on Ukrainian territory.” This would show that they are really ready for the negotiation process. But Russia is not ready for any of that. It still wants to continue its expansion.
Q. Zelenskiy has said that the process to end the war must be “under Trump’s strong leadership.” What role does Europe have?
A. Of course, the U.S. plays the leading role in this area. But the configuration of the negotiations could be like this: there will be Ukraine, because the fighting is taking place on Ukrainian territory; the U.S., because it is the main organizer of the negotiation processes and one of Ukraine’s key partners. But also Europe, because the war is taking place on European soil. We see the positions of [French President] Macron and [British Prime Minister] Starmer, who are ready to take an active part in this. How the war ends will depend on what kind of security framework Europe is in. And the war will clearly show who is who in Europe. And Europe is an ally of Ukraine. Of course, Europe must sit at the negotiating table because this affects the future of Europe. But the U.S. is creating the opportunities for negotiations today and we must give it the option to pursue this initiative.
Q. You’ve written that every U.S. president since George Bush Sr. has tried to reach out to Russia. Is there a difference in Trump’s case? He not only praises Putin and criticizes Zelenskiy, but also makes constant public statements humiliating Ukraine — these are made by himself, his team, and his family.
A. They speak in this way not only about Ukraine, but also about other partner countries, often with irony, with provocative statements. This is characteristic of their style, nothing more, and we take it calmly. The U.S. governments have always wanted to “reset” relations with Russia, and this has always been a fatal mistake, because Russia has completely different goals, and any “reset” of relations with Russia, as they understand it, is possible only on condition of their dominance. A reset will never work.
But there is another mistake made by all previous U.S. administrations: they viewed Ukraine not as a subject of its own, but as a territory within Russia’s sphere of influence. They were always ready to hand Ukraine over to Russia. The Trump administration, despite all these ironic statements and media pressure, wants to dominate, and, more importantly, they now consider Ukraine to be a subject in its own right. The U.S. wants to achieve its own dominance by putting pressure on Russia. This is not a reset, but U.S. dominance. I think Trump will succeed where previous administrations failed with Russia. It will not try to restore relations, but rather definitively consolidate this concept of U.S. dominance. The fate of Ukraine seems different because today it is seen completely as a subject and has nothing to do with Russia.
Q. Do you think a peace agreement with Russia will be reached in 2025?
A. Only if there is an accurate and fair assessment of who Russia is and what its real motives are. Only if tools of coercion are used against Russia, i.e. significantly increasing the cost of the war for them. And only if it is not encouraged at the diplomatic and informational level to escalate further. With these three conditions, a ceasefire is certainly possible. But there must be compensations, security guarantees. A peace agreement can be signed, but not on Russia’s terms. A ceasefire is possible at any time if the right tools of pressure are used. The problem is that no one is using these tools.
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