What’s next for Venezuela?

Last Friday, as expected, Nicolás Maduro was sworn in for a third term as Venezuela’s president. The regime he presides lacks both domestic and international legitimacy. It has been reduced to a virtual police state, relying on repression and terror to keep itself in power. The inauguration was a travesty. It was fitting that only two Latin American presidents attended: Daniel Ortega and Miguel Díaz-Canel, Maduro’s fellow dictators in the region.

The day before, María Corina Machado — Venezuela’s most popular political figure — was forcibly detained while speaking at an anti-government protest. Her quick release revealed divisions within the regime. It appears that Diosdado Cabello, Venezuela’s hardline Minister of the Interior, had ordered police to capture her, only to have the decision countered, presumably by Maduro. In this way, Maduro was able to avoid the costs for the regime that would come with jailing the country’s foremost symbol of resistance.

Most Venezuelans would have preferred that Edmundo González Urrutia — the candidate Machado selected after she was barred from running — had taken the official oath on January 10. After all, it was Gonzalez, not Maduro, who won — decisively — the presidential election nearly six months ago. On July 28, the will of the Venezuelan people was clearly expressed — and brazenly violated — in one of Latin America’s most egregiously fraudulent elections. Since then, repression aimed at opposition and civil society leaders has escalated, and Cabello’s position within the government has strengthened.

Despite its extremely low legitimacy both at home and abroad, the regime will be able to sustain itself if it can continue to count on the support of the armed forces. The military is the fundamental pillar of a government that relies on sheer repression. There are varied interpretations about how strong and unified the Venezuelan military is today. Signs of dissent within the armed forces are evident, as reflected in instances of cooperation with opposition efforts around the election.

But in some respects, it remains a “black box,” difficult to decipher from the outside. Yet, any warnings or threats directed to the military from the exterior — especially from the United States — could backfire, resulting in the institution closing ranks behind Maduro. This is precisely what happened almost six years ago with opposition leader Juan Guaidó.

Post-inauguration, attention has now turned to Donald Trump, whose January 9 message supported “freedom fighters” Machado and Gonzalez. Based on various accounts, there are at least two competing policy proposals of the incoming team. The first is a version of the “maximum pressure” strategy that the first Trump administration pursued in 2019. But the harsh economic sanctions put into effect failed to dislodge Maduro, and indeed only aggravated humanitarian conditions and fueled migration.

The second idea would be an attempt for the United States to strike a deal with Maduro. There would be an agreement on migration — Trump’s top priority — with Maduro prepared to cooperate with the U.S. on deportations. It would also enable the U.S. to take advantage of business opportunities in the petroleum sector. This more transactional approach would in effect recognize Maduro as the de facto president.

Advocates for each position will be represented in the new U.S. administration. It is unclear which of these — or perhaps some combination of the two — will take hold. Of course, Trump, always hard to predict, will make the decision.

But the country’s democratic future will be determined by dynamics within Venezuela and not by any external actor. At best, external actors — in this case, the United States — can help shape a more favorable environment to help bring about positive political change, but its impact is usually limited and often indirect. In Latin America, the roles of Brazil and Colombia in helping to foster a democratic transition in Venezuela have been erratic and have not produced any clear changes.

In light of the regime’s terror campaign and the country’s shrinking space for civic action, it is understandable that the opposition has devoted much of its efforts in the United States, Europe and Latin America. It may be nearly impossible now to carry out serious organizational and political work in Venezuela under such conditions. But that work will be essential to improve the prospects for a democratic transition, and to make whatever outside support there is for the democratic cause more effective.

The U.S. should denounce Maduro’s authoritarian practices and avoid threats and harsh economic sanctions that are often counterproductive and only strengthen his hand. It should also do whatever is possible to support the opposition, always in concert with Latin American and European allies, while avoiding anything that would involve the use of violence.

For its part, the opposition will have to confront a series of questions about political strategy and leadership. It will need to decide whether to participate in regional elections that are scheduled for later this year. It will also need to focus on developing a united position and consistent message about what it wants from the international community, including the United States.

The sad reality is that, despite Machado’s fearless and inspiring leadership, democratic change remains elusive. Maduro, though illegitimate, has begun his third term, consolidating his brutal rule. He has proven his ability to adapt to changing circumstances and pressures — and, after nearly a dozen years in power, to survive.

To be sure, Maduro has vulnerabilities. There are divisions within the regime. His terror campaign does not exactly reflect a strong or confident leader. The sudden collapse of Bashar al-Assad highlights that seemingly stable dictatorships can quickly crumble.

But in 2025, with the denouement of the long anticipated presidential election cycle, Venezuela may be beginning a new chapter that calls for a reassessment of political strategy. Some lessons from successful democratic transitions in Latin America and Europe are useful, but Venezuela has many particularities that set it apart from others.

Democratic forces are not only contending with ruthless authoritarian rule. They are also dealing with a country dominated by an oil economy and massive criminality and corruption, complicating any transition.

There is no substitute for intensifying political pressure internationally and particularly in Venezuela. In this epic Latin American tragedy, the task ahead is not only to rebuild a democracy that has been destroyed. It is also to rebuild an economy, a society, a country.