Josep Borrell, vice-president of the European Commission: ‘Putin is sacrificing his army and his people to survive’

Editing is, above all, deciding what to leave out. And it’s not easy to edit an almost 100-minute-long interview with Josep Borrell about the war in Ukraine, the coup in Niger, the unstoppable rise of China, the rise of the far-right around half the world and the political situation in Europe. But we’ve done our best.

Borrell, 76, was born and raised in Catalan village of La Pobla de Segur. After a long career in national politics with the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, he became a member of the European Parliament back in 2004. Today, he’s the high representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, as well as the vice-president of the European Commision.

The head of European diplomacy receives EL PAÍS at his home in Madrid, with two pots of coffee prepared. He is combative, articulate, eloquent: “Putin sacrifices his people and his army for his personal and political survival” and “Russia has failed in its invasion of Ukraine, but is on the way to the systematic destruction of that country” are just some of the many damning points that he makes. And he returns, again and again, to the idea of Europe: to, as the recently deceased novelist Milan Kundera once wrote, the old Europe with “maximum diversity in minimum space.”

Question. A year-and-a-half after the start of the war, the Ukrainian counter-offensive doesn’t seem to be succeeding. Will this conflict become chronic?

Answer. The counteroffensive hasn’t broken the front as it did last fall. Russia has built some formidable defenses. Ukraine is now the most heavily mined country in the world. In these conditions, the war is trial and error. A frontal attack would be suicidal, especially without air support. But, from a military point of view, Russia has failed. Putin wanted a blitzkrieg, but 18 months have passed and he’s on the defensive. His project has been a complete fiasco. Russia has already paid an enormous price in material and human terms: it has lost 2,000 tanks, more than all the armies in Europe combined. Although this is not to say that he has exhausted his capabilities. Putin is now sacrificing his army and his people for his personal survival.

Q. On the other side, Ukraine’s strategic objective is to isolate Crimea. But without planes that’s impossible.

A. Several countries have already agreed to send fighter jets. But you have to fly them. It’s necessary to train pilots… that will take time.

Q. Has Europe done enough?

A. We have done what had to be done: help Ukraine defend itself without expanding the conflict. But I also think that our help has been too gradual. In various cases — the tanks, the Patriot missiles, the planes — we started by saying “not this, we will not do this,” only to end up doing it.

Q. The U.S. was looking for that gradual strategy to avoid a conflict with Russia. Sometimes it seems that Europe follows in America’s footsteps too much.

We must correct those who say that this is a fight between Russia and NATO. If so, why are these bombardments against the civilian population taking place? Mariupol is Guernica”

A. We have to understand that this is high-intensity conventional warfare that mixes the most modern techniques with the most classic scenes of trench warfare. We see World War I, World War II and the war of the future, all at the same time. Along with systematic and terrible attacks against the civilian population, of course.

We must correct those who say that this is a fight between Russia and NATO. If so, why are these bombardments against the civilian population taking place? Mariupol is [like] Guernica. Thousands of Ukrainian civilians — including children — have been deported.

Q. What role does the Russian president play in all of this?

A. Putin has been wrong on almost everything. He believed that the enormous European dependency — especially Germany’s — on its hydrocarbons was going to prevent us from standing up to him. And, in a year-and-a-half, the consumption of Russian gas [by European nations], with the exception of Hungary, has been reduced to practically zero. He thought he had everything under control and, suddenly, a part of his army — or, at least, a part of his troops [the Wagner Group] — rose up in arms against their own comrades and advanced towards Moscow. This exposed the cracks in the Russian political system. Putin has shown that he doesn’t have a monopoly on the use of force, which is what characterizes strong regimes. One day, he says that Prigozhin [the head of the Wagner mercenaries] is a traitor and, the next day, he receives him in St. Petersburg, because he needs Wagner for his African adventures.

Let me repeat myself: Putin is going to sacrifice his people and his army for his personal and political survival. That’s why it is so difficult to negotiate peace. And what needs to be negotiated is a new system of collective security, which has been shattered by this war.

Q. Wagner is one of the most disturbing elements of the war: the countries that neighbour Belarus fear the presence of Wagner’s mercenaries on this Russian ally’s territory. What can Brussels do?

A. It’s a justified fear. Their presence could generate a second front to the north [of Ukraine], from Belarus. I don’t think it’s in their plans to attack a NATO country, but the latest shells that hit the ports from which grain is exported landed just a few feet from the Romanian border.

Putin has been wrong on almost everything. He believed that the enormous European dependency – especially Germany’s – on its hydrocarbons was going to prevent us from standing up to him”

Q. What effects has the termination of the grain agreement had?

A. In the early moments of the war, Putin had some success in uniting the so-called “Global South” against the “aggressor West.” But he has since been losing this advantage, largely due to his blockade of food exported by Ukraine. The recent summit between Russia and the African Union has been a major diplomatic failure. When Putin announced the donation of wheat, the South African president told him that he didn’t want alms, but that Russia should stop hindering the normal traffic that allows his people to buy food.

Putin cannot go to South Africa, because if he goes, he could be arrested. When he launched the war, did he imagine that he wouldn’t be able to leave his country, because of the possibility of arrest by order of the International Criminal Court?

Q. Is there an opportunity for a negotiated exit? Ukraine saw China’s participation in the recent Saudi Arabian peace talks as a success.

A. And it was. Although China will never make it explicit that it’s mitigating its support for Russia or facilitating its clear defeat. Beijing isn’t comfortable with the current situation. And less so with the references to [nuclear war]. China adds its voice to those who want to end the war, but the problem isn’t just when it ends, but how it ends.

Q. Another winter is approaching, with higher gas prices, problems with grain supplies, the risk of another refugee crisis, as well as the U.S. presidential campaign. Nerves are beginning to fray. When the time comes to negotiate, are the EU and U.S. going to force Ukraine to lower its targets, as suggested by a senior NATO official, who later had to rectify?

A. I’m afraid that we aren’t the ones to dictate to the Ukrainians the conditions of their peace. And I don’t think that ceasing to help Ukraine militarily would lead to any peace other than the peace of the vanquished. We do what we can to push for peace negotiations, but for a peace that recognizes that there is an aggressor and [a victim], and that the [victim] has to recover its territorial integrity, while the aggressor has to pay the consequences of their aggression.

Europe thought that war had disappeared from its horizons, that it was something that happened far away, something that others did. But now, a war is on our borders and it affects us. Putin’s Russia is a threat to our security.

Q. Some voices say that the EU has been absorbed by NATO.

A. The EU isn’t a military alliance. And NATO appears as the best possible insurance: this has been demonstrated by Sweden and Finland — traditionally neutral — requesting entry. The EU has been united; the important thing will be to maintain unity after the war.

Q. Is Ukraine’s entry into the EU feasible?

A. Without the war, Ukraine’s candidacy would have taken years. Incorporating a country of the size and socioeconomic conditions of Ukraine into the EU is a major challenge: if it entered tomorrow, it would be the only net recipient of funds. Everyone else would become net contributors. But wars speed up history. And one consequence of this acceleration is that Ukraine is suddenly a candidate and that candidacy is serious. It will be done as fast as possible. The war has definitely pushed Ukraine onto the side that Putin didn’t want it to be on.

Q. Now we’re seeing how the confrontation with Russia is moving to another stage. Is the Sahel region a new front in the same war?

A. I don’t believe that what’s happening these days in Niger is the result of a Russian conspiracy. We’re not going to blame everything on the Russians… although it’s clear that they’re taking advantage of the situation. What happened in Niger is an autochthonous military coup. It’s a pity: Niger was one of the few examples of democratic transitions in the region.

Q. Anti-French and anti-Western sentiment is growing in the region. Should Europe engage in self-criticism?

A. You always have to do self-criticism. [But] there’s a very powerful propaganda war: how did so many Russian flags suddenly appear on the streets of the Sahel? At the same time, we Europeans must carry out a thorough review of our African policy and commit ourselves more to development. In the Sahel, irregular wars won’t be won if the battle for development isn’t won first. These countries haven’t generated a growth dynamic that improves living conditions. No one saw the Niger coup coming. Partnerships need to be made on equal footing.

Q. Do you see a risk of a new migration crisis?

A. The Sahel is the point of origin and transit for a large part of irregular migration. It’s a clear risk. As is the jihadist threat and the potential destabilization of neighboring countries. And the rise of Russian influence, because Wagner’s mercenaries are the Praetorian Guard of African military dictators.

In the Sahel, irregular wars won’t be won if the battle for development isn’t won first. These countries haven’t generated a growth dynamic that improves living conditions”

Q. The option of a military intervention is gaining ground….

A. It’s crunch time for Africa: African solutions to African problems. Neighboring West African countries want to continue giving diplomatic negotiations a chance. I hope they succeed. A conflict between states would have serious consequences.

Q. If that were to occur, what would be the European response?

A. It depends. That decision rests with the member states [of the EU]. And I’m afraid that, this time, unanimity will be difficult.

Q. China has a huge presence in Africa and Latin America. It’s a major player in the Ukrainian war. And it’s redefining its relationship with Europe. What relationship should the EU have with China?

A. First of all, China isn’t Russia. China is a true geopolitical player, while Russia is an economic dwarf — it’s like a gas station whose owner has an atomic bomb. China is too important to ignore, but also [too important] to try to isolate. We have major divergences, but it’s not a challenge to our security like Russia. We must have a meaningful dialogue that allows us to cooperate in solving common problems, such as climate change or the indebtedness of poor countries. We have no interest in contributing to a polarization of the international system that results in a bipolar world and causes the emergence of two competing technological systems that force everyone to choose between one or the other. It’s clear that we’re closer to the U.S., but this doesn’t mean that we don’t have our own interests. Europe needs to avoid excessive dependencies: on Russian hydrocarbons, on American security, on huge market demand, or on minerals and technologies critical to digital transformation. Let’s learn the lesson and avoid dependencies that pose serious risks.

Until now, in Europe, we had sanitary cordons: in France, in Germany, the extreme right [had no chance]. But this cordon sanitaire is beginning to falter, as we have seen in Finland and Sweden”

Q. Javier Milei is leading the polls in Argentina. Trump is the best-placed Republican in the 2024 race for the White House. The populist wave doesn’t seem to be letting up.

A. Public opinion perceives that democracies based on multiparty competition don’t always provide real solutions to the material conditions of life. And populists offer false, miraculous solutions to real problems. This is the challenge of democracy throughout the world: that the competition between parties — which is the essence of democracy — doesn’t weaken the ability to offer solutions.

Q. In Europe, the center-right is trying to swallow the extreme right. We’ve seen this with Manfred Weber — the German politician who leads the European People’s Party (EPP) — getting close to Italy’s Giorgia Meloni. Or in Spain, with the Popular Party attempting to form a coalition with the far-right Vox. Is this normalization of the extreme right a risk?

A. Until now, in Europe, we had sanitary cordons: in France, in Germany, the extreme right [had no chance]. But this cordon sanitaire is beginning to falter, as we have seen in Finland and Sweden. The EPP is looking for its political space, its electoral narrative. We’re preparing for the next European elections and envisioning what kind of majority is going to take shape. I believe that Europe must continue to trust its values and must continue to integrate. I’m concerned about the divisive tendencies, the nationalist reflux that’s emerging. There has been a certain trivialization of the positions of the right.

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