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Beltway fire systems “entirely failed” during blaze that killed two, says report

Judge informed by police of empty nitrogen tanks and a failure to raise proper alarms

F. Javier Barroso

On October 26, 2012 a passer-by noticed smoke coming out of one of the emergency exits of an underground section of the M-30 beltway, in central Madrid. Firefighters were called to the scene, and by 7.15pm a blaze in one of the compartments alongside the road tunnels had been extinguished. But further inspections of the area revealed a grisly scene: two employees from the company in charge of the maintenance of the M-30 were found dead in a separate compartment, away from the starting point of the blaze.

The dead employees from the Emesa maintenance company — Sergio Martínez Pérez, 36, and Gregorio Camacho Díaz, 52 — died after inhaling sulfurous gases, which asphyxiated them.

A report from the Madrid municipal police department, which has been sent to the judge investigating the deaths, concludes that the emergency system in the section in question failed in all aspects on the day of the fire. Tanks containing nitrogen, which should have been used to extinguish the flames, were empty, while a compressor that should have distributed the gas was disconnected, the report reads. The agents who carried out the report found the same circumstances in another of the M-30’s four service areas.

The faults in the emergency system were not recent, according to the police report, given that they had been detected in inspections carried out in January and June of 2012. In fact, at the time of the accident Emesa had already received two cost estimations to address the problems.

No alarms

The police report includes a statement from C. S. M., an employee from the same department as the two victims. “Both the maintenance department and the purchasing department look for quotes, and choose the most appropriate,” the employee told the police investigators. “For work of up to 3,000 euros, the purchasing department would grant authorization, but for amounts higher than that the authorization of the finance director and the general manager are needed [...].”

The breakdown in emergency procedures on the day of the accident also involved the M-30 control center. When the emergency services were informed of the incident, the information was not flagged up in the center. No alarms were raised, according to the police report, which was based on statements from Emesa employees and firefighters from the Madrid municipal brigade.

The police report has put the estimated damages caused by the incident at 1.28 million euros. As such, the municipal company responsible for the beltway, Madrid Calle-30, will have the option to take legal action against Emesa for failure to properly maintain the emergency systems, thus contributing to the accident.

According to the police report, the two victims of the fire were “trying to connect the aforementioned system, or attempting to cover up the fact that it was out of service.” The report also states that, “according to statements made by their colleagues, both Sergio and Gregorio were highly dedicated, hardworking and decisive, and wanted to resolve the problems they were faced with as soon as possible. Both were aware of the situation regarding the water-spray system.” But their efforts on that day were in vain. “The system would never have worked,” the report continues, “given that the nitrogen tanks were empty and the compressor was not connected.”

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