The Faisán case in context

If the government's 2006 attempt at launching a peace process with ETA had been successful, probably no one would have demanded explanations on certain murky aspects of the negotiations. For example, the leak that tipped off José María Elosua ? owner of the Bar Faisán, and a go-between in ETA's extortion racket ? about an imminent police raid.

But the process failed, and the judicial inquiry into the leak has caused blame to be cast on three police officers, including the force's former director general Víctor García Hidalgo, as being responsible for the tip-off. Now the judge in the case has called as witnesses some individuals who, in the name of the government, acted as mediators with ETA. The aim of this judicial move remains to be seen, but it seems more than disturbing that its centerpiece is a set of papers included in the so-far secret part of the proceedings, which are now being brought forward as records of these conversations, held with parliamentary authorization.

For months the Popular Party (PP) has been putting forward questions in Congress on the supposed implication in the case of the (then recently appointed) interior minister, and now also deputy prime minister. On Tuesday the opposition party called for Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba's resignation, on the grounds that he must have authorized the leak. This is only a hypothesis. But it is enough for the PP, as part of its chronic hankering to use antiterrorist policy as a political weapon.

We should be clear about just what is under investigation. The result was a postponement, not a cancellation, of the planned arrests, which happened anyway a few weeks later; and it seems clear that the leak, which undoubtedly existed, was intended to help, not hinder, the negotiation. Those now awaiting arrest include a veteran leader of the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), whose role in the peace process is thought to have been decisive, especially concerning ETA's threats to break the truce if certain conditions (such as cessation of arrests) were not complied with. To postpone the arrests by means of the warning to Elosua was a mistaken decision that someone made to prevent such a breakdown.

This context does not excuse the leak, but does help us to understand its causes. To speak, as has been done, of collaboration with ETA is preposterous. According to these ETA papers, the government had pointed to the leak as proof of its goodwill in the course of the conversations with ETA held shortly afterwards. This may now seem shaming, all the more so in view of the admission that they knew that ETA was still going on with its extortion, contrary to government claims. It was, indeed, a poor strategy, since nothing strengthens the terrorists so much as hearing the government tell what they know to be lies.

But errors in negotiation do not make criminals of the mediators sent by the government. Surely they thought such half-truths would favor the continuation of the truce, which was then the urgent aim. Aznar likewise flattered ETA, terming it a National Liberation Movement while attempting to negotiate with it. The courts must investigate, but should not make a criminal issue out of political errors committed by people acting with parliamentary authorization.