Hypocritical diplomacy with Morocco

The Spanish government has sought to justify its lack of response to the serious events in Western Sahara in terms of a false dilemma. This territory, a former Spanish colony immediately to the south of Morocco, is now occupied by Morocco, but has a native Sahrawi (Saharan) independence movement.

It is not true that, in the face of the human rights violations committed by the Moroccan army, we have to opt between the strategic character of our relations with Rabat and a condemnation of demonstrated facts. The death of a Spanish citizen of Sahrawi origin, as well as the news blockade set up by Morocco, including the withdrawal of credentials from the correspondent of the Spanish daily Abc and the expulsion of the journalists of the SER radio network, constitute sufficient cause for demanding, at least, a serious investigation in the first case, and for registering a diplomatic protest, in the second.

Neither the UN, the EU nor, of course, Spain can passively regard events which, even in Rabat's dubious official version, have claimed human lives. Precisely because Spain's relation with Morocco is a strategic one, the government cannot act as it has been doing, particularly by means of two simultaneous channels such as those representing the foreign minister, on the one hand, and the former holder of that ministry, on the other. To which we might add a third channel if, as is planned, the Moroccan interior minister visits Spain, returning the visit lately made to Rabat by Spain's deputy prime minister, Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba, after recent incidents in the Spanish enclave of Melilla.

Under the present circumstances, persevering with this line of conduct cannot be the result of a routine decision. The government would do well to weigh the benefits it expects to obtain from it, and the mistaken impressions to which it might give rise. Does the government want to let it be thought that Spain's interest in a good neighbor policy is greater than that of Morocco? If relations deteriorate, Spain will pay a price. But so will Morocco, whose exposure to the risks that both countries must jointly face is certainly greater. The fact that we recognize its role in the stability of the Maghreb cannot be interpreted in Rabat as a license to impose its will by force in a territory that it occupies in defiance of international law, arrogantly proclaiming "either with us or against us."

And the Spanish government is contributing to that impression, first with its silence, and then with pharisaic explanations such as those offered by Prime Minister Zapatero and by Foreign Minister Trinidad Jiménez. Zapatero's foreign policy has been characterized by solemn talk about human rights when he should be formulating a strategy and by pointing to strategic interests when, as now, he ought to be defending human rights. It is true that relations with Morocco were at a nadir when Zapatero came to power, but the method he adopted for improving them was not really viable: that of stabilizing dealings with Rabat, simply by means of drawing closer to its position on the principal issues of contention. This approach was doomed to failure, and the grave events in Western Sahara are new evidence of the fact.