King Trump

Donald Trump’s resounding return to the White House a month ago marked a milestone in contemporary U.S. history, but it also opened up a conundrum: how solid are the institutional boundaries in the world’s most influential democracy?

The 22nd Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, passed in 1951 after the extended presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt, states that no person may be elected president more than twice. It does not matter whether the terms are consecutive or not: two is the limit. Since he is in his second term, the current regulations prevent Trump from continuing in power beyond 2029.

However, recent history has shown that democratic norms are not always insurmountable. Institutional erosion and the concentration of power are gradual processes that, in certain contexts of crisis, can accelerate.

If Trump or his supporters wanted to abolish the two-term limit, they would have to change the Constitution. But amending the U.S. Magna Carta is an intentionally difficult process, designed to avoid impulsive or self-interested alterations. There are two routes: an amendment passed by Congress and ratified by 38 states, or the convening of a national convention, something that has never happened in the country’s history. Both routes seem unattainable in a context of extreme polarization.

Historically, some Republicans have proposed eliminating the 22nd Amendment, but to no avail. In fact, in recent years, proposals to strengthen limits on presidential power, not weaken them, have been more frequent.

Institutional resistance depends, to a large extent, on the political context. In times of crisis, the boundaries of power can become blurred. The United States has a set of laws and executive orders that grant the president expanded authority in national emergencies. In theory, if the country were to face a war, a large-scale terrorist attack or a crisis of governance, the government could take extraordinary measures, such as suspending elections or extending the president’s term.

Throughout history, several presidents have expanded their authority in times of crisis. Abraham Lincoln temporarily eliminated the right of citizens not to be arbitrarily detained without a warrant during the Civil War, allowing arrests without charges before a judge. Franklin D. Roosevelt assumed extraordinary powers during World War II, allowing the government to intervene in the economy, restrict civil liberties and make decisions without congressional approval in certain cases. George W. Bush increased government surveillance after the September 11, 2001, attacks.

In most cases, these powers were eventually withdrawn, but history shows that states of exception can shift the balance of power in lasting ways. Trump, who has based his rhetoric on the idea that the system is against him and on friend-versus-foe narratives that cohere and reinforce his supporters, could argue that the country faces an unprecedented threat. If he were to garner enough support in Congress and among his base, he could attempt to use some form of emergency to postpone elections or challenge their outcome (as he did in 2020).

Along with the use of emergencies, Trump could also ensure that any disputes over his tenure are resolved in his favor. His first administration left a deep mark on the judiciary, with hundreds of appointed federal judges and a conservative-majority Supreme Court. If in his second term he succeeds in further consolidating his influence on the judiciary, the independence of the courts could be compromised at a critical time for American democracy.

Added to this is the recent Supreme Court decision, which has further expanded the executive branch’s room for maneuver. In a landmark ruling, the court determined last year that sitting presidents enjoy absolute immunity for official acts and legal protection for certain unofficial actions, making it difficult for them to be prosecuted while in office. This interpretation gives Trump unprecedented cover, which could shield him from attempts to hold him legally accountable for extreme measures, reinforcing the perception that the president is largely above the law.

In Central America, the case of Nayib Bukele in El Salvador illustrates how a leader with sufficient popular support can challenge the limits of reelection. Although the Salvadoran Constitution prohibits immediate reelection, a Supreme Court ruling, in a context of pro-government dominance, allowed Bukele to run again. Likewise, the figure of Rodrigo Chaves in Costa Rica seeks to expand his power in the next government, with an appointed candidate, and to reform the system to facilitate his return as soon as possible, taking advantage of the popular distrust towards traditional institutions and straining constitutional limits.

Nicaragua represents an even more extreme case. Daniel Ortega returned to power in 2007 and, after removing the limit to reelection by a court ruling in 2009, has consolidated an authoritarian regime. Elections have been systematically rigged, the opposition has been imprisoned or exiled, and the country has spiraled into political repression. His government is an example of how, once the institutional brakes are dismantled, staying in power becomes an end in itself.

Venezuela is a well-known case. Hugo Chávez promoted a constitutional reform in 2009 to eliminate limits to reelection, ensuring his continuity in power until his death in 2013. His successor, Nicolás Maduro, has deepened his control over institutions, disqualifying opponents, co-opting the judiciary and holding internationally questioned elections. Through the use of the economic crisis and the military apparatus, he has managed to hold on to power despite growing international isolation and the erosion of democracy in the country.

We are facing a global trend: leaders who have circumvented the limits of reelection using different mechanisms. Vladimir Putin in Russia has alternated between the presidency and the post of prime minister, amending the Constitution in 2020 to extend his possible term to 2036. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey went from prime minister to president, consolidating power with a constitutional reform in 2017 that transformed the parliamentary system into a presidential one. Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus removed limits on re-election by referendum in 2004 and has rigged successive elections with repression and allegations of electoral fraud.

Not all leaders choose this path. But those who have sought to perpetuate themselves in power have used the weakening of institutions and the control of the state apparatus as key tools for their permanence. What begins as an exception, an institutional adjustment or a justification for stability, ends up transforming the political system. By the time democratic erosion becomes evident, it is usually too late.

Thus, the question is no longer whether Trump can amend the Constitution to stay in power, but whether the American democratic system is robust enough to withstand challenges from a leader with a base willing to question its limits. He, for his part, is already referring to himself as King.

In the United States, the chaos necessary to justify extraordinary measures could resemble the assault on the Capitol on January 6, 2021, but on a larger scale and with support within the power structures. A scenario where riots, attacks or security crises were presented as a threat to national stability could generate the conditions for Trump or his allies to argue the need to “protect democracy” with out-of-the-ordinary measures.

Are you sure this can’t happen?