Violence in Colombia: Deadly twin attacks expose country’s deep security crisis

Six people were killed in the heart of Cali in an explosive attack on a military facility. Twelve police officers were murdered after the helicopter in which they were traveling was shot down in a rural area of Antioquia. The war is becoming increasingly visible in Colombia, spreading from conflicts that in recent years seemed localized to certain regions — usually far from major cities, such as Catatumbo, Cauca, or Putumayo.

The attack in Cali shows that at least some groups of the dissident factions of the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) are seeking to go on the offensive against the state, carrying out attacks outside the areas they control. In recent years, only the ELN guerrilla group had conducted this type of action, and only occasionally, drawing strong public condemnation.

For that reason, Colombian President Gustavo Petro’s first reaction was to label the Cali attack as a “terrorist reaction” that would indicate the group responsible had been affected by a military offensive he himself ordered several months ago.

“After the defeat of the Carlos Patiño column with the loss of a good part of the Micay Canyon, we have a terrorist reaction in Cali with two dead civilians. Terrorism is the new expression of the factions that claim to be led by [ex FARC leader] Iván Mordisco,” he shared on X, just minutes after the attack occurred in the city.

Early Thursday evening, acting Defense Minister Ana Catalina Cano reaffirmed the message. “We are following the president’s instruction that the dissidents of alias Iván Mordisco, the Gulf Clan, and the Second Marquetalia will be considered terrorist organizations, prosecutable anywhere in the world for crimes against humanity,” she said in a video released by the ministry.

For now, the statement leaves questions about the talks that the government has reopened with Gulf Clan, which are currently taking place in Qatar.

Colombia experienced severe waves of terrorism in its cities in the early 1990s, during drug lord Pablo Escobar’s war against the state, and at the start of the 21st century, when the former FARC surrounded major cities in their failed attempt to seize power.

After the 2016 Peace Agreement that disarmed FARC — the largest and most significant guerrilla group — the threat of urban terrorism seemed distant, and the conflict was mostly confined to areas with ELN presence, a few FARC dissidents, and drug-related groups.

One notable exception was an ELN car bomb against Bogotá’s military school in January 2019, which left 23 dead and over 100 injured. The country’s urban areas seemed to be moving away from decades of war. At the time, the term “post-conflict” was used, a phrase that has now fallen out of use; the International Committee of the Red Cross now refers instead to eight distinct conflicts.

The war has grown as illegal groups and their disputes have multiplied across all types of revenue, especially illicit ones such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, illegal mining, and extortion.

Cali, however, has been closer to the conflict than other major urban centers. Just 93 miles away lies the Micay River canyon, an important route connecting the Andean highlands of Cauca with the jungles and estuaries leading to the Pacific. Once a route for arms and drugs, it has also become a stronghold for illicit crops and a center of power for the Carlos Patiño front and its allies in the Dagoberto Ramos column.

These groups worked with others as part of the so-called Central General Staff, which is led by Iván Mordisco. In August 2022, after taking office, Petro sought to negotiate with the Carlos Patiño front and its allies, but the process failed.

In October 2024, the president launched an offensive to reclaim the area, called Operation Perseus, even using artillery; the dissidents responded with multiple waves of attacks on the police — first in Cauca, then on the outskirts of Cali, and more recently in the urban area.

On June 10, they had already killed two people and injured several others in two explosions in the city, part of a wave of 24 attacks in the region that had already raised concerns among experts due to their logistical capability and the state’s inability to prevent them. Thursday’s attack marks a further escalation in a show of force that had previously included direct threats to the United Nations Biodiversity Conference in April, but had not yet resulted in an event of this scale.

This same pattern of state decline is also reflected in the police helicopter shot down in Amalfi, in northeastern Antioquia, just a few hours earlier. The Colombian state focused on acquiring dozens of helicopters during the administrations of Andrés Pastrana (1998–2002) and Álvaro Uribe Vélez (2002–2010) to achieve air superiority against the then rapidly growing FARC, which had begun profiting from drug trafficking.

That symbol of a strengthened state, which had forced guerrillas to retreat and negotiate, has now become a vulnerability for the military and police forces. According to reports, several police officers were conducting a coca eradication operation when they were attacked. They requested air support for evacuation — a maneuver dependent on helicopters. But when the aircraft arrived, a drone struck the tail rotor, causing it to crash. Armed groups have found in drones not only a weapon to attack barracks, but also a way to undermine the airpower that had been a major advantage for the state.

Additionally, many helicopters are grounded for various reasons. Although no maintenance failures like those alleged by some government critics in 2024 — when four helicopters crashed, killing 25 — have been detected, part of the fleet is of Russian origin and has been grounded due to U.S. sanctions that prevented contract renewal with the maintenance company.

Security expert Jorge Mantilla explained last January that by the second half of 2024, nearly 60% of the aerial fleet was grounded. “They cannot fly either because they require maintenance, are obsolete, or there is no fuel,” he noted, emphasizing the dire situation of the helicopters, as only 25% were operational.

The advantage of air dominance has been greatly reduced, reflecting just one example of how Colombia’s military has declined in recent years, even as illegal groups continue to grow in fighters.

The escalation of violence is also evident in the fact that the ELN can launch an offensive with hundreds of men against a dissident faction without the state being able to stop it, as occurred in January in Catatumbo on the border with Venezuela, or that a group dares to assassinate a presidential candidate, as happened to Miguel Uribe Turbay.

The situation in Colombia is not the same as it was in 1989, when bombings and political assassinations were common, or in 2000, when there were 232 massacres of four or more people. Last year, there were 22 massacres. But the trend is worsening. Not surprisingly, surveys indicate that Colombians’ primary concern — with figures at their highest since before the 2016 Peace Agreement — is security.

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