Dmitry Medvedev, from Russia’s ‘modernizing’ president to Western-bashing prophet
The former president, a loyal Putin supporter, uses social media to attack Europe and Ukraine. His criticism of Trump has led the US to patrol nuclear submarines in the region
Vladimir Putin doesn’t mince his words when it comes to threatening the West with sophisticated new nuclear weapons, but when it comes to sending inflammatory messages, Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of the Russian Security Council, is the student who surpasses the master.
The apocalyptic diatribes of the erudite Petersburg jurist have a special value, as Medvedev is a close friend of Putin’s since the time when both worked together in the Committee for Economic Relations of St. Petersburg after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and also because he was the man chosen to guard the post of president of the Russian Federation for four years (from 2008 to 2011), when, by law, Putin could not remain in power for three consecutive terms.
On his Telegram channel in late July, the former president criticized Trump’s threat to impose new sanctions on Moscow if Russia didn’t agree to a ceasefire with Ukraine within two weeks. Trump responded to the “failed former president of Russia” by asking him to measure his speech. “Words are very important, and can often lead to unintended consequences,” the Republican said.
Medvedev responded by reminding everyone that Russia has the capability to carry out a decisive attack using the “fabled Dead Hand,” referring to a semi-automatic command system designed to enable a nuclear strike in the event that the Russian leadership were to perish as victims of an attack.
“If some words from the former president of Russia trigger such a nervous reaction from the high-and-mighty president of the United States, then Russia is doing everything right and will continue to proceed along its own path,” Medvedev concluded.
The back-and-forth, but above all the fact that Trump used the Russian’s comments for the first time for practical decisions (announcing the dispatch of two atomic submarines to the vicinity of Russia), has brought Medvedev back into the spotlight — a man linked to Putin since the latter was already a veteran of international espionage who had not yet turned 40, and the former president (13 years his junior), an ambitious twenty-something jurist who carried out missions for the city council of Russia’s second-largest city.
“Medvedev carried out assignments for the security services, which monitored the economic activities of the St. Petersburg Foreign Relations Committee,” a senior official from St. Petersburg told EL PAÍS in 2008. “There were people involved in dirty business in the Committee, and one way to evade control was to open and close accounts and then erase all traces,” the source stated, according to whom Medvedev was “an errand boy,” used by Putin to “accomplish a task.” “He won’t be able to do anything else and he doesn’t have enough character to prevail,” he concluded.
Putin, formally the prime minister for a temporary period, never ceased to be Russia’s strongman. In July 2009, when then-U.S. president Barack Obama visited Moscow, journalists covering his meetings with Russian leaders observed that while security measures for access to President Medvedev were relaxed, controls for access to Putin were very strict and serious.
Obvious dependency
Although Medvedev’s dependence on Putin was always obvious to his closest collaborators, a segment of Russia’s liberal elite (now largely in exile) expected (or wanted to expect) that Medvedev would initiate a liberalization of the political system. The Dauphin was presented as a “modernizer.” He liked rock and tech gadgets, was good with the internet (Putin wasn’t), was polite, and spoke the language of technocrats. During his visit to the U.S. in 2010, he made a point of visiting Silicon Valley, where he was given an iPhone that wasn’t yet on the market.
New modernizing institutions were created around Medvedev, such as INSOR (Institute of Modern Development), a think tank that developed laws and government programs, and Skolkovo (a university, technology park, and startup incubator launched with the help of Harvard Business School).
Putin always maintained control. The internal tensions within his clique weren’t about distinct political directions, but rather personal struggles to accumulate power and influence, as well as to place his children in the administration and large state-owned companies.
During Medvedev’s term, the atmosphere between Russia and the West was generally lighter than after Putin’s return to the Kremlin. In September 2009, in Helsinki, Medvedev said that Russia considered it feasible to “exclude the possibility of deploying strategic offensive weapons outside its national territory” under conditions of reciprocity and equal security. In 2010, in Prague, together with Obama, Medvedev signed the New START Treaty, which continued the reduction of strategic offensive weapons (warheads and launchers) and is valid until February 2026.
Only Putin’s consent would have allowed Medvedev to run for reelection in 2012. When Putin wanted to return, Medvedev found it difficult to accept, but he didn’t question it. Russia’s strongman no longer needed a vision of the future linked to “modernity” and, eventually, democracy. He had opted for tradition, empire, increased military spending, and all the ideas that serve to justify his war against Ukraine.
After Putin’s return to the presidency, Medvedev was appointed head of government, a post he left in January 2020 under the new Constitution, which effectively gave Putin the option of remaining president until 2036. Medvedev was appointed vice president of the Security Council, a position created specifically for him within the advisory body (chaired by Putin), whose responsibilities include detecting threats and developing strategies.
From his current position, Medvedev uses his social media channel to lash out at the West and threaten Ukraine. He calls Europeans “Nazis,” cowards, and “imbeciles,” and calls Ukraine a “dying,” “nonexistent,” or “useless” entity.
“Our enemies like to make grandiloquent declarations and rely on terms like ‘freedom,’ ‘democracy,’ and ‘mission,’ which are in reality ‘ritual verbal diarrhea,’ ‘diarrheal demagoguery,’” he said in September 2022.
The recipients of Medvedev’s invectives don’t usually respond to him, but Trump did. In the same message that provoked the American, Medvedev called European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen “a crazy old witch” who betrayed the EU’s interests by accepting the tariffs imposed by Washington. Europeans “should probably be storming Brussels now in order to hang all EU commissioners,” Medvedev concluded.
Medvedev’s verbal outbursts may cause concern today, just as his carefully crafted, modernizing language could inspire hope in the past. In both cases, these are “expressive nuances” in a system whose helm is in Putin’s hands.
The exchange of insults between the former Russian president and Trump served to “energize” the dialogue between Moscow and Washington, which does not mean that Putin will lower his ambitions in Ukraine.
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