Hamas holds its own against Netanyahu

Israel is closer to achieving one of its main objectives during the Gaza ceasefire: securing the release of the 100 hostages. However, the other primary goal of the war — destroying Hamas politically and militarily — seems increasingly elusive, despite the significant casualties inflicted on the Islamist group. Israel estimates that around 20,000 Hamas militants have been killed, though it has not provided data on new recruits during the war, which has now lasted more than 15 months. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu continues to insist that Hamas must be completely annihilated, but he is also under growing pressure to maintain the current ceasefire, which is approaching three weeks.

The question of the future government of the Gaza Strip after the war, however, is not resolved by the ethnic cleansing plan that U.S. President Donald Trump and Netanyahu presented on Tuesday. According to Hamas, the plan only “adds more fuel to the fire.” At a press conference with Netanyahu, Trump outlined his proposal to expel 1.8 million Gazans (though the actual population is about 2.2 million) and place the region under U.S. control. However, he did not offer any concrete details or a roadmap for institutional reconstruction. Both Netanyahu and the broader international community dismiss Hamas as a legitimate option for governing Gazaa. Netanyahu does not even consider the Palestinian Authority (PA) an alternative.

Mustafa Barghouti, a Palestinian doctor, politician, and former minister, states in a telephone conversation from Ramallah that it is paradoxical to try to eliminate someone whom he has no choice but to engage in dialogue. “This war has shown that Netanyahu cannot eliminate Hamas, which is an idea,” insists Barghouti, advocates for a future government of unity involving various Palestinian factions, without Hamas dominating the political landscape in Gaza and the West Bank.

Barghouti also stresses that this unified entity should pave the way for elections, which have not taken place for two decades. He criticizes the immobility of President Mahmoud Abbas, leader of the Palestinian Authority. The argument that “Hamas cannot be completely eliminated” is echoed by Haizam Amirah Fernandez, an analyst specializing in Middle Eastern international relations, in a telephone interview from Doha, Qatar.

“Unfortunately, the Israeli government has done very little to create conditions” that would offer an alternative to the current administration in the Gaza Strip due to “ideological interests” of the executive, says Eyal Hulata, who was Israel’s National Security Advisor until Netanyahu’s return in 2022, during an online meeting from Washington. He is referring to the most ultra-nationalist sector of the coalition that supports the prime minister and which defends, in line with Trump, “fully reconquering” the territory, expelling the Gazans and reestablishing Jewish settlements.

Who will then manage Gaza when the war is over? Analysts and politicians agree that Trump’s push has been significant, but they also point out that the ongoing ceasefire and the scenes of Hamas fighters celebrating the release of Palestinain fighters serve to strengthen the position of the Islamist group. “They are not going to disappear,” says Barghouti. According to Hamas health authorities, the death toll in Gaza during the current conflict stands at 47,000, with more than half of the casualties women and children. However, the U.N. and The Lancet suggest that real number is likely to be much higher.

Collective leadership

Despite the heavy casualties and significant losses among its top leadership, there is no internal power vacuum within Hamas, according to Barghouti. In the second half of 2024, the movement suffered the deaths of its most prominent leaders. Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated by Israel in Tehran on July 31, and his successor, Yahya Sinwar, was killed in an operation in southern Gaza in October.

According to Barghouti, Hamas is now governed by a collective leadership managed by the Consultative Council, a kind of parliamentary body. While Khalil Khaya, a negotiator based outside Gaza, is often mentioned as a potential successor, the movement continues to operate through a decentralized leadership, allowing it to engage in negotiations, such as those for the ceasefire and the release of hostages, which have become key propaganda tools for Hamas commanders abroad and within Gaza.

“Hamas has been hit very hard, but it still has some capabilities,” says Amirah Fernandez, although it is difficult to assess the exact number of losses or new recruits. He specifically refers to the images emerging from Gaza during the handover of captives, where militants can be seen taking control among the rubble. These images show that Hamas maintains an organization and internal communication, which have also prevented Israeli rescue operations by force, as Netanyahu had intended.

But what is happening during the ceasefire is “unusual,” the analyst adds with some optimism. Netanyahu’s determination to “stay in office as prime minister and retain immunity from the cases he has pending in the courts” is something that has not been seen before, he notes. Additionally, the return of a large number of Palestinians who were forcibly expelled from their land to northern Gaza — albeit to an area in ruins — is unprecedented, he says.

The main Palestinian Islamist group, Hamas, was responsible for the massacre of approximately 1,200 people in Israel on October 7, 2023. Now, the gradual release of hostages is being used as leverage to prevent further Israeli attacks. Hamas is benefiting from these ceremonies, where the handover of captives is broadcast live: it is being used for propaganda purpuses and Israel cannot prevent this from happening.

Hulata considers Hamas’ use of hostages to be “unfortunate,” as it benefits their “propaganda” and is a “humiliation” for Israel. While he believes Hamas as an organization that has been “crushed,” he stresses the importance of isolating the group to prevent it from recovering its capabilities through external support, such as funds or weapons smuggling via Egypt and building new tunnels. According to Amirah Fernandez, Netanyahu and his war agenda are actually interested in the survival of a “weakened Hamas,” which serves as a “survival trick” and an excuse to avoid peace talks.

“It is very remarkable,” says Barghouti about the ceasefire’s progress, but “one must always be careful with the fascist government of Netanyahu” — as he describes it — and the influence of more radical figures within it, such as Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and former National Security minister, Itamar Ben Gvir, who left Israel’s Cabinet due to his opposition to the ceasefire.

The ceasefire is holding, and Amirah Fernandez thinks it would be “very difficult for Israel to return to the war phase of large-scale operations.” He argues: “Israel has been severely damaged by everything it has done. Is it now going to return to massive bombing and displacing hundreds of thousands of Palestinians again? Ethnic cleansing again?” He acknowledges the complexity of the situation, particularly Donald Trump’s proposal to deport 1.5 million Gazans to Egypt and Jordan, regional allies of Washington, a plan that mirrors the views of the “Zionist extreme right.”

While debate continues on the consequences that Trump’s policy could have on Gaza and Hamas, in the face of Israel’s longest and bloodiest war since its independence in 1948, Hulata admits that “there are not many and not good alternatives” to a new government scheme in the Gaza Strip, and “they are not going to be created from within.” He does not believe that the Palestinian Authority is capable of “managing Gaza,” but he does not rule out the possibility of alternative conditions coming into play with the involvement of different Palestinian factions inside the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and the support of Arab countries.

For Barghouti, there is only one solution: “that the Palestinians manage their affairs without interference from abroad.” This means a national unity government, like the one proposed last July during a conference in Beijing, which included 14 factions. He sees this as “the only realistic solution.”

The two main groups, Fatah (secular groups with a larger presence in the West Bank and the driving force behind the PA) and Hamas (Islamists with greater influence in Gaza), met in Beijing, along with other groups such as Barghouti’s own party. The Islamist group hinted they might accept staying outside this entity if progress is made with it.

“Netanyahu continues to say that he does not want Hamas, but he does not want the PA either, and he also rejects any formula that guarantees unity among the Palestinians,” Barghouti laments. The Israeli prime minister, according to Barghouti, “does not want Palestinian unity and democracy, he wants us weak and divided,” he concludes.

Whether a plan like the one advocated by Barghouti will succeed depends on the Palestinians overcoming their internal divisions and on Israel accepting it, which could pave the way for support from the international community, especially from the U.S., Europe, and Arab nations, says Amirah Fernandez. Included in this equation is the Palestinian Authority, led by Abbas, which is “ossified,” “lacking legitimacy,” and “has lost the respect of many Palestinians,” which is an “impediment.”

In any case, he says, “the greatest threat is not the Palestinians or the Arabs. The greatest threat to Israel is internal,” as there is “a brutal clash within Israeli society, within its political forces, and within their vision of what the future state will be.” Amirah Fernandez. argues that “what happened on October 7 and since then has only accentuated the internal contradictions of the very project that is Israel.”

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