Delays and deception

Italy and Greece have once again offered the disturbing image of two states that are unable to live up to the level expected of two members of a great project. The delayed resignation of Silvio Berlusconi plants the seed of more obstacles in the path of the euro: it multiplies the perverse effect that the crisis is having on countries that, like Spain, have weaker public finances; and, by concentrating attention on the avoidance of a rise in sovereign debt levels, it diverts resources from what should be the main task in hand: fixing the monetary union both politically and institutionally.

The case of the Italian prime minister is particularly unpleasant. Irresponsible behavior can come in the shape of refusing to adopt measures, or delaying their implementation once they have been adopted. Berlusconi has committed both these acts of disloyalty. He has labeled Italian deputies as traitors rather than asking himself why they are saying he should step down.

The worrying rise in the Italian risk premium, which has hit levels that saw other countries have to resort to a bailout from the EU and the IMF, indicates that the delay in Berlusconi's resignation has negated its therapeutic effects. More urgent and more resounding measures are needed.

With regard to Greece, the chain of events set into motion when George Papandreou decided to withdraw his irresponsible referendum initiative on the second bailout plan for the country did not lead to a rapid agreement between the governing Socialists and the conservative opposition to name a new prime minister. On Thursday a former European Central Bank vice-president, Lucas Papademos, was named as the man responsible for guiding the transition up to new elections as well as beginning the execution of the bailout and the reforms that the rescue is dependent on. But the struggle over the choice of a new leader reveals the high levels of tension between the two main Greek political forces, and the desperation and the active protests of a population that is disorientated given that the reforms are still not producing results in combatting the recession.

Apportioning blame

Common governance urgently requires a more responsible political style, one that is less frivolous, more European and less nationalist. But the political and institutional deficiencies of the monetary union are also to do with the absence of the appropriate mechanisms, as well as the delay in putting them into action once they have been launched. And then there is the issue of the different versions of the causes of the crisis: for some, the sole blame lies with fiscally unbalanced countries; for others, the selfishness of some of the more prosperous European countries; for the more balanced, responsibility is shared between the two extremes.

We will have to live with these two extremes, and try to smooth them out. Perhaps the time for a deeper rethink is now approaching. Does this Union, and the euro zone, have enough flexibility when taking tough and unavoidable decisions? Or should it start to lay out a path toward a stronger central nucleus, based not just on qualities such as prosperity, but also of political will? The creation of a group on the forefront of the euro zone, or the design of a set of concentric circles, may be indispensible if it ends up being impossible to introduce a very modest tax on financial transactions - at least upon the more speculative ones.